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 i 
Abstract 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
This thesis examines representations of lawyers and law in examples of Jacobean city 
comedy, taking into account certain contemporary developments in the legal 
profession and the law in England. The period covered is 1598-1616. The thesis 
questions the conventional interpretation of city comedy as hostile to the legal 
profession. It suggests the topic is more complex than has been assumed, arguing that 
city comedy makes direct and indirect positive representation of Inns of Court 
lawyers, who are to be distinguished from attorneys (newly segregated in the Inns of 
Chancery), amateur quasi-lawyers, and university-educated civil lawyers. It is 
proposed that city comedy represents Inns of Court lawyers positively in two ways. 
Firstly, by means of legal content: representations of developments in the profession 
and the law demonstrate a wish to connect with the young lawyers and students of the 
Inns of Court, and reflect a contemporary drive by them for increased organization 
and regulation. Secondly, by means of literary form: ostensibly pejorative 
representations need not be taken at face value; instead, they may be found to be 
ironic. The main proposed contributions to knowledge are: that Inns of Court lawyers 
were a favoured part of the target audience of the private playhouses, making it 
questionable that they would be represented negatively in city comedy; that lawyers 
as represented in city comedy are not a single or a simple category; that representation 
of lawyers is inflected by the various forms and impulses of city comedy; and that city 
comedy incorporates some reflection of the increasing professionalization of legal 
practice in the period.
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 The argument 
 
In this thesis I consider Jacobean city comedy as a complex literary and dramatic form 
that involves representations of lawyers and law. I regard the material duration of the 
genre as being from 1598 to 1616.1 This compact lifespan coincides with some 
notable developments in English law, and comes at the height of a period of 
profession-defining change in London’s Inns of Court. I examine five plays: Jonson’s 
Poetaster (1601), Middleton’s The Phoenix (1603-4) and Michaelmas Term (1606), 
John Day’s Law Tricks (1604), and Lording Barry’s Ram Alley (1607-8). My central 
argument is that the attitude taken in the plays to lawyers and law is more complex 
than has previously been assumed. It is, I contend, often deceptively positive. Positive 
representation of lawyers in city comedy is an idea contrary to prevailing opinion, 
which says in general terms that the genre is hostile to the legal profession and the 
law.2
                                                 
1 1598 for the first performance of the original version of Every Man in His Humour; Brian Gibbons 
deems The Devil is an Ass (1616) the terminal point in the genre in Jacobean City Comedy: A Study of 
Satiric Plays by Jonson, Marston and Middleton, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1980), 152. Dates relate 
usually to first performance rather than time of original composition or publication. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the source for dates is Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642, 4th ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 286-98. 
 I propose that the plays take a positive attitude to lawyers and law essentially on 
account of three points. 
2 Gibbons says that city comedy features “dishonest and ruthless” lawyers, and displays “increasing 
ambivalence of attitude towards [lawyers’] methods and appetites”: Jacobean City Comedy, 118-19. 
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The first point is commercial consideration. These plays were written for 
performance before an audience including Inns of Court men, so it is questionable that 
the plays should unambiguously undermine this desired section of their audience. 
The second point is legal content. I argue that the plays incorporate reflections 
of contemporary legal developments in a way that would appeal to Inns of Court 
lawyers. Barry’s Ram Alley provides possibly the most straightforward example of 
how what appears to be a broadly negative representation of lawyers becomes positive 
in relation specifically to Inns of Court lawyers. The play contains allusions to the 
newly enforced division between the Inns of Court and the Inns of Chancery. The 
lawyer-figure, Throte, is an Inns of Chancery man, and Barry has the character 
declare to the audience that he only seems a lawyer, implying that it is the Inns of 
Court which produce superior, so-to-speak real lawyers – a sentiment that could be 
                                                                                                                                            
Tom Cain affirms the conventional view of anti-lawyer sentiment in his edition of Poetaster 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 45. Gail Kern Paster perpetuates the standard view 
of Michaelmas Term’s Induction as a “sharp satire against the law as a mercenary system run for its 
own benefit” in her edition of Middleton’s play (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 57. 
See also Alan Brissenden, “Middletonian Families,” in Plotting Early Modern London: New Essays on 
Jacobean City Comedy, ed. Dieter Mehl, Angela Stock, and Anne-Julia Zwierlein (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004), 29; C. W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 134;  Daniel B. Dodson, “Thomas Middleton’s City Comedies” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1954), 95; G. Blakemore Evans, Elizabethan-Jacobean Drama 
(London: A. & C. Black, 1989), 285; Edward Gieskes, Representing the Professions: Administration, 
Law, and Theater in Early Modern England (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2006), 119-21; 
Alfred B. Harbage, Shakespeare and the Professions (Fred S. Tupper Memorial Lecture, 2 April 1965; 
The George Washington University, n.p.), 20; W. J. Jones, Politics and the Bench (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1971), 33; Wilfrid Prest, The Rise of the Barristers: A social history of the English 
bar, 1590-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 289. 
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expected to have pleased the Inns of Court men in the audience at the Whitefriars. The 
increased determination of the members of the Inns of Courts to stand apart (and to be 
seen to stand apart) from the Inns of Chancery is only one example of divisions within 
the legal profession. The word “lawyer” had anything but a univocal, vocationally 
unified meaning, and lawyers in the plays are not a single or a simple category. To 
speak against one type on the stage would have been to find favour with another. 
The third point is literary form. I propose that representation of lawyers in the 
plays is inescapably the product of various devices and attitudes which are 
conventional in city comedy. For example, I show how some ostensibly pejorative 
representations may be taken to be ironic. The self-consciously sophisticated and 
ambitious writers of the plays would not have been content merely to perpetuate a 
predictable literary tradition without adding some twist. They began playing with and 
against expectations of genre almost as soon as conventions could be recognized, in 
the self-parody of typical comedy and language that is Eastward Ho! (1605). Playing 
against dramatic expectation was something the young lawyers in the audience for the 
plays appreciated. The induction to Goffe’s The Careless Shepherdess (1618) features 
four audience-member types, among them a young Inns of Court man.3
                                                 
3 Date estimated by Keith Sturgess, Jacobean Private Theatre (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1987), 19. The induction was added later, possibly by Richard Brome (ibid.). The play is reproduced in 
The Seventeenth Century Stage, ed. G. E. Bentley (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), 28-37; 
Bentley discusses it in The Jacobean and Caroline Stage (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), vi, 109-12. 
 Spark and his 
courtier companion Spruce are connoisseurs of drama, and the two are pleased that 
the ensuing comedy does not contain a fool, which they regard as an outmoded 
device. Spark’s conversation portrays the Inns of Court man as one who 
simultaneously demands of a playwright awareness of the laws of drama, and 
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ingenuity in working against cliché. The writers of the plays I examine may appear to 
perpetuate a tradition of anti-lawyer sentiment, but I contend that they work against 
cliché by using various methods to make the plays favourable to Inns of Court 
lawyers. They play to traditional expectation by appearing to be broadly hostile to the 
legal profession, all the time playing against the expectation to the subtle and 
deceptive end of representing the standard antipathies and professional ideals of 
young Inns of Court men. The objects of the Inns of Court lawyers’ antipathy vary. 
They are represented in different examples of city comedy: there are unqualified, 
quasi-lawyers in Law Tricks and Ram Alley; Tangle in The Phoenix is a swaggering, 
conspicuously old type of jobbing common lawyer; and Jonson uses for Voltore and 
Littlewit the nomenclature of the civil law, as distinct from the common law studied 
in the Inns of Court. 
I aim to provide a foundation for the chapters which follow in four further 
sections. In the next, I look at anti-lawyer sentiment, examining contemporary 
perceptions of the law from within the profession and from non-dramatic literature. I 
offer in this section some awareness of lawyers from the different Inns: men who may 
therefore have been part of the audience for city comedy. In the third section, I 
provide a sense of the theatrical culture of the Inns of Court. In the fourth section, I 
discuss the private theatres with which Jacobean city comedy is principally 
associated, and I examine genre, considering how the variety of forms and impulses 
within city comedy affects representations of lawyers. In a short final section, I take a 
summary look at current practice in the interdisciplinary study of law and literature. 
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1.2 Anti-lawyer sentiment 
 
On November 3, 2007, the Chairman of the Bar Council of England and Wales, 
Geoffrey Vos Q. C., made news in his speech at the Bar’s annual conference by 
calling for lawyers to be recognized in a positive light.4 Barristers perform a vital role 
as public servants, he said, and they deserve recognition in the same way as nurses, 
doctors and teachers. Vos’s argument rests on a fact not applicable to the early 
modern period. Something like half of the work undertaken by the Bar today is legal 
aid driven – representing people accused of crimes, families, children, immigrants, 
and challenging official decisions.5 Vos’s motive for making the plea infers that the 
Bar of today is made of softer stuff than early modern lawyers, at least as they are 
conventionally portrayed to us: “If . . . lawyers were to be more openly accepted . . . 
for the public servants they are . . . , it would lift the confidence of the profession 
more than I can explain.”6
                                                 
4 “Bar Chairman Champions Barristers’ Public Service Role, 3 November 2007” from the Bar 
Council’s website: Home News, Press Releases, http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/news/press/531.html 
(accessed June 11, 2009). 
 Even the earnest loss for words seems to break with the 
image conventionally presented of the lawyer. Part of the relevance of this speech is 
that it infers what appears to be a perennial presumption: lawyers are viewed 
negatively. Also of interest is the Chairman’s suggestion that the confidence of the 
profession is in need of a lift – and a substantial one at that, if it is more than he can 
explain. Confidence was anything but lacking in the early modern lawyer, if we are to 
take as read the sentiments expressed in city comedy. Indeed, in Poetaster, the 
5 Frances Gibb, “From fat cats to human rights: how the Bar is changing,” from The Times, October 30, 
2007, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article2763596.ece (accessed June 11, 2009). 
6 “Bar Chairman Champions Barristers’ Public Service Role,” from the Bar Council’s website. 
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military captain Tucca declares perseverance and confidence sufficient qualification 
for the practice of law. A prospective lawyer needs only “patience to plod inough, 
talke, and make noise inough, be impudent inough, and ’tis inough” (I.ii.106-7). 
If there appears to be an abundance of anti-lawyer sentiment in late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth century literature, the impact of the printing press should not be 
overlooked. But clerical and literary anti-lawyer sentiment was nothing new.  
 In the Bible, Luke tells of Christ bidding “Woe unto ye lawyers! for ye have taken 
away the key of knowledge.”7 In the Canterbury Tales, “Al was fee simple” to 
Chaucer’s Sergeant of the Lawe, a man “who semed bisier than he was.”8 The 
Utopians have banished lawyers,9 albeit that the approving report comes from 
Raphael Hythlodaeus – the ambiguous dispenser of nonsense, conceived by a 
foremost common lawyer. One of Jack Cade’s followers in the 2 Henry VI sends out a 
rallying call: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers” (IV.ii.78).10 In the 
present-day interdisciplinary study of law and literature, Shakespeare’s work is 
interpreted as taking up a generally adversarial stance in relationship to law, the plays 
being found, broadly speaking, to display disrespect for law and legal processes.11
                                                 
7 Luke: 11.52 RSV (see from 11.45-52; cf. Matthew: 23.29-32, Acts: 7.51-3). 
 
Harbage noted long ago, though, that, although there are judges and justices, among 
Shakespeare’s more than seven hundred characters only one is explicitly tagged as a 
8 Geoffrey Chaucer, The General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, in The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd ed., 
ed. Larry D. Benson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 61; lines 321, 324. 
9 Thomas More, Utopia, tr. Paul Turner (London: Penguin, 1965), 106. 
10 Dick the butcher, in William Shakespeare, The Second Part of King Henry VI, ed. A. R. Humphreys 
(London: Methuen, 1980). 
11 Anthony Julius, introduction to Law and Literature, ed. Michael Freeman and Andrew Lewis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), xi-xii. 
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lawyer – an almost invisible character in 1 Henry VI.12 Harbage suggested that the 
fact Shakespeare did not expressly portray lawyers may seem to reduce the 
significance of the fact that he portrays no “shysters.”13
 How did anti-lawyer sentiment figure in late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century perceptions of lawyers and law? Attitudes were influenced by notions about 
law’s functions. William Fulbeck saw the law as holding society together: without it, 
“neither house, nor city, nor nation, nor mankind, nor nature, nor world can be.”
 On the other hand, said 
Harbage, the opportunity was there and a number of his contemporaries seized it. The 
inference points clearly enough to the playwrights of city comedy, since lawyers 
appear so often in the plays as to be considered conventional types. 
14 
And Coke called the laws of England the best inheritance an English subject had: “for 
by them he enjoyeth not only his inheritance and goods in peace and quietness, but his 
life and his most dear country in safety.”15
                                                 
12 “Portia posing as Dr Bellario [in The Merchant of Venice] is the nearest we come to a portrait of a 
member of the profession in action.” Harbage, Shakespeare and the Professions, 19. Of the judges and 
justices: “some of them [are] ex officio, like the several presiding dukes, . . . [others] vary in type from 
the Lord Chief Justice who is Falstaff’s nemesis, to Justice Shallow, whom Falstaff mulcts” [in 2 Henry 
IV]. (Ibid.) 
 As early as this time, jurists such as 
William Hakewill and John Doddridge recognized the law to be no more than a 
13 Ibid., 20. 
14 William Fulbeck, A Direction or Preparative to the study of the Lawe: Wherein is shewed, what 
things ought to be observed and used of them that are addicted to the study of the Law, and what on the 
contrary part ought to be eschued and avoided (London, 1600), 2. See also Henry Finch, Law or a 
Discourse Thereof in Foure Bookes (London, 1627), 1. 
15 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt. In English, in thirteen parts complete, translated by George 
Wilson (London, 1777), the fifth part, vol. III, part iii. 
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human artefact subject to change as circumstances altered.16 Still more revolutionary, 
Thomas Mun advanced in his economic tract England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade 
the idea that lawsuits “decay not our trade nor our treasure,” and he questioned a 
conventional anti-lawyer sentiment: was the contemporary increase in litigation the 
result of “lawyers’ covetousness, or the people’s perverseness”?17 But above (or 
instead of) all this, law was, for the majority, a reflection of the will of God, and if 
lawsuits could be seen as detrimental to social order, blame could be directed at 
lawyers for encouraging discord. Middle Temple lawyer Sir Anthony Benn deplored 
the idea “that menn . . . cann devoure one another w[i]thout blooding one another” by 
extortion, usury, and oppressing one another at law.18
 
 But another Middle Templar 
articulated the point that lawyers alone should not be singled out for responsibility for 
the multitude of lawsuits: 
Clients, witnesses, jurors, counsel and judges are men and no angels . . . neither will be 
otherwise so long as men are men, neither may a paradise be expected to be, where any 
man may innocently fall by the law, as by ignorance or misprision; by his attorney or 
                                                 
16 C. Brooks and K. Sharpe, “History, English Law and the Renaissance: A Comment,” Past and 
Present, 72 (1976), 138-9. See also J. R. McCulloch, ed., Early English Tracts on Commerce 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 179. 
17 Thomas Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade (1664; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1959), 59-60. 
18 “The Essays of Sir Anthony Benn, Knt., Recorder of London,” Bedford County Record Office, 
L28/46, F17v; cited in Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 108. Sources used for 
identifying Inns membership: The Records of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn: Admissions, 
1420-1799 and Chapel Registers, ed. W. P. Baildon (London, 1896); Register of Admissions to Gray’s 
Inn, 1521-1889, together with the Register of Marriages in Gray’s Inn Chapel, 1695-1754, ed. Joseph 
Foster (London, 1889); Register of Admissions to the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple, from 
the Fifteenth Century to the Year 1944, ed. H. A. C. Sturgess (London, 1949); “Admissions to the Inner 
Temple to 1659,” compiled by R. L. Lloyd, typescript (Inner Temple Library, London, 1954). 
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counsellor; by practise or combination of the adversary; by perjury of witnesses; by 
forging of deeds; by subornation or corruption of witnesses, jurors or officers of courts; 
by affection, inclination or corruption in the judge, and by many other bye and black 
ways, whereof many men have made experience.19
 
 
A charge commonly made by historians against early modern lawyers is the cost of 
going to law.20 William Harrison’s complaint that “all the wealth of the land doth 
flow unto our common lawyers” could seem to support this, though he implicitly 
acknowledges, again, that litigants themselves at least share blame: lawyers “wax rich 
apace and will be richer if their clients become not the more wiser and wary 
hereafter.”21 In any event, C. W. Brooks has shown that one of the reasons for the 
great increase in litigation in the second half of the sixteenth century, was that an in-
demand service came within reach of a large number of customers – basic common 
law litigation was by 1560 not prohibitively expensive, and its cost actually declined 
steadily in relation to prices over the next eighty years.22
                                                 
19 The Berkeley Manuscripts: The Lives of the Berkeleys, Lords of the Honour, Castles and Manor of 
Berkeley in the county of Gloucester, from 1066 to 1618, with a description of the hundred of Berkeley 
and of its inhabitants. By John Smyth of Nibley, ii, ed. John McLean (Gloucester, 1883-85), 312; cited 
in Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 312. 
 Very high sums could be 
charged depending on the status of lawyer and client and the demands of the task, of 
course. The highest single fee in this period went to Inner Temple barrister John 
20 Conrad Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments, English History, 1509-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 53; Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1965), 242. 
21 The Description of England (London, 1587), book II, chapter 9; cited in G. Blakemore Evans, 
Elizabethan-Jacobean Drama (London: A. & C. Black, 1989), 282. 
22 Brooks calculates the approximate cost of an ordinary suit in Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the 
Commonwealth, 101-4; see also 147, 327 n. 72. 
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Bridgeman, to whom a Welsh property consortium paid £40 for a written opinion on 
twenty-six questions of law.23
Another point in connection with costs is that a payment to a lawyer was not 
(then, as now) necessarily a payment for their lawyer: overheads – including clerical 
work, travelling and subsistence – could often be the heaviest item of cost in a 
lawsuit. One study examined two early modern accounts where such expenses 
amounted to eighty-seven percent and seventy-one percent of the total bill.
 
24 I noted 
at the beginning of this section that there was no legal aid in this period. In civil 
matters at Westminster Hall, however, litigants unable to meet the cost of a suit could 
apply to sue in forma pauperis, by producing a certificate of good character, worthy 
cause and slender means from a barrister or justice. If the application was successful, 
a court could arrange for attorney and counsel to act for a litigant without fee. Though 
it became a proverb that “a suit in forma pauperis hath no scent,”25 there were good 
and conscientious lawyers to take them.26
 Another cause of anti-lawyer sentiment centred on the potential for vexation, 
expense and delay arising from the fact that one legal jurisdiction could challenge 
another. The numerous problems have been summarized thus: 
 
 
. . . going to law was not always a simple matter of moving from initiation of a suit in 
one court to judgment in the same court. Indeed, even if litigation was confined to one 
court, judgment might not be achieved. Often there were many suits around the same 
                                                 
23 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 162; citing National Library of Wales, Wynnstay Manuscripts, 
Manorial Miscellanea 10; Prest’s source: Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies, ix, iv (1939), 350. 
24 E. W. Ives, The Common Lawyers of Pre-Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 320-1. 
25 See Edward Hake, Newes out of Powles Churchyarde (London, 1579), B7v. 
26 Prest cites without specifying by name Folger MS. V.b.186, 343 as an example of a petition for a suit 
in forma pauperis in The Rise of the Barristers, 22 n. 34. See also Ives, Common Lawyers, 318. 
 11 
dispute, several courts could be involved, and the atmosphere might be that of a war of 
attrition . . . Sometimes the delay was a device, sometimes the parties were hoping to 
force discovery of evidence, and often it was just incompetence. Proceedings in a 
particular court might have no more than a tactical purpose. Even when there was only 
one set of proceedings, the end might well be some settlement or interim order. Every 
stage in procedure could be a subject of contest.27
 
 
There was a degree of central authority: the early establishment of the supremacy of 
the royal courts in London (including the Courts of King’s Bench, Common Pleas, 
and Chancery) is a founding part of the history of the English legal system; but a very 
large number of other courts administered numerous types of law, and this caused 
great confusion.28 Interpreting the word “system” strictly, Brooks makes the point that 
in terms of procedure there was no such thing as an English legal system.29 As far 
ahead as 1628, Sir Edward Coke could identify sixteen varieties of law, only one of 
which he called the common law.30
                                                 
27 Jones, Politics and the Bench, 34. For a more detailed discussion than Jones’s, see Louis A. Knafla, 
Law and Politics in Jacobean England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 128-54. 
 In 1616, James I still had reason to include in his 
speech in Star Chamber of 20 June of that year advice to litigants to “make not many 
changes from Court to Court: for hee that changeth Courts, shewes to mistrust the 
iustnesse of the cause. Goe to the right place, and the Court that is proper for your 
28 Besides the various royal courts, these included the ecclesiastical courts, county courts, borough 
courts, manorial courts (courts leet and baron), the hundred courts, stannary courts, pye-powder courts, 
and the quarter sessions. On the court system generally, see Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in 
England, c. 1558-1642,” in Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America, ed. Wilfrid Prest (London: 
Croom Helm Ltd., 1981), 42. On assizes and quarter sessions see infra, 17 n. 49. 
29 Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 12. 
30 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (1628), F11v; cited in 
Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 42, 61 n. 2. 
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cause.”31 In respect of the King’s advice, consideration of the justness of a cause of 
action might not be any great impediment to the possible advantages to be gained 
from vexatious and dilatory conduct of law-suits through the differing courts and 
jurisdictions, of course: the court which one party might deem “proper” could 
presumably be claimed to seem quite improper for the other party’s cause. It is 
understandable, in any event, that litigation involved delay to the extent that 
communications took time in this age.32 Lincoln’s Inn barrister Henry Sherfield was 
criticized by his client Nicholas Assheton for “slowness” in conducting a suit in the 
Court of Wards. But when the case was heard in the following term, the outcome was 
in Assheton’s favour, so the delay may have been not only necessary but in the 
client’s best interests.33
 The verbosity of lawsuits could be a cause of discontent both to clients and to 
some members of the profession. The grumblings of a client required to pay for 
pleadings drawn at length
 
34
                                                 
31 “Speech in Star Chamber of 20 June 1616,” in King James VI and I: Political Writings, ed. Johann P. 
Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 219. 
 may seem minor in comparison with the anger of Egerton, 
who on one occasion in 1596, after receiving a petition that he considered too 
32 On the opportunities for delay which existed in the common law, see J. H. Baker, An Introduction to 
Legal History, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002), 65-6. 
33 The Journal of Nicholas Assheton of Downham: in the county of Lancaster, Esq. for part of the year 
1617, and part of the year following, ed. F. R. Raines (Chetham Society, 1848), 115-16, 125-6; cited in 
Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 295. 
34 Brooks notes allegations that pleadings in the Common Pleas were drawn to extraordinary length: 
Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 327 n. 72. From the late sixteenth century to the early 
seventeenth the rate for drafting pleadings was 8d. a sheet for the first three and 12d. a sheet for the 
rest; the cost of entering pleas was 2s. for the first three sheets and 12d. for additional sheets. (ibid.). 
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verbose, had the lawyer responsible (Richard Mylward) paraded around the courtroom 
with his head forced through the petition up to his chin.35
 Suspicion of corruption was another part of anti-lawyer sentiment. The lack of 
proscription of ambiguous practices – such as seasonal gifts to the judiciary, and 
solicitation of judges in person or by letter – served to fuel rumour.
 
36
 
 The potential 
ambiguity of these formal, often etiquette-driven practices could prick the conscience 
of (or perhaps even stimulate paranoia in) the ordinary, conscientious lawyer beyond 
the significance of the act. Lincoln’s Inn man Henry Sherfield (who delayed to 
favourable end in Nicholas Assheton’s Court of Wards suit) is a case in point. 
Sherfield recorded in law French on the penultimate page of his first fee book an 
ostensibly trivial episode that appears to have troubled him for years to come: 
Memorandum that the case between Richard Corbett Esq by information plaintiff and 
Sir Robert Needham defendant was decreed in the Court of Wards at the end of 
Michaelmas term 8 Jac., 1610. And on this decree Sir Robert Needham left with me a 
gilt cup worth £10 as I estimated for Sir Ja. L. [Sir James Ley] This I delivered to him 
on December 2nd 1610, in his inner chamber at Lincoln’s Inn. But this was after the 
decree was signed by him and before the decree was carried to him to enter.37
 
 
Sherfield added a note in English, up to sixteen years later: 
 
For which I humbly ask forgiveness at God’s hands, having given me the grace never 
to offend in that kind since that evil act I then detesting as abominable the same with 
                                                 
35 Harvard Law School MS. 1035, F71r-77v; cited in Cecil Monro, Acta Cancellariae; or selections 
from the Records of the Court of Chancery, remaining in the Office of Reports and Entries (London, 
1847), 692-3, and Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, 62. 
36 In this connection, see Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 146-50; Prest, The 
Rise of the Barristers, 304-7. 
37 Hampshire Record Office, 44M69/xxv/I; cited in Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 310. 
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promise to God never to offend again in that manner which he hath enabled me to do 
hitherunto viz 3 June 1626.38
 
 
The infinitely complex issue of law’s relationship with ideas about right and wrong 
encouraged some lawyers to take what humanly possible precaution they could for 
taking a clear conscience into the afterlife – it became customary for a while for 
lawyers to include in their wills clauses of restitution. This clause from the will of 
Robert Morton of Lincoln’s Inn was typical: 
 
Tenderly I pray and specially require myn executours that if eny wrongis by me haue 
be done to eny manner persones and dew profe therof made afore my seid executours, 
that they make due restitucion to the parties grevid for such wrongys by me so doon, to 
the vtterest that it may be knowen.39
 
 
There was an inherent danger, of course. Another Lincoln’s Inn man, William 
Ayloffe, made it clear in his will that such a clause was included as a kind of 
insurance, and not as an invitation to former clients simply to try their luck.40
 Judgments capable of seeming influenced by personal prejudice or political 
expediency might arouse suspicion of a different form of corruption, for their possible 
lack of impartiality. At a senior level, both prejudice and expediency may have 
influenced Egerton’s judgment in the 1604 fraud case in Star Chamber against John 
Hele of the Inner Temple, the King’s senior serjeant at law. Political expediency 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid. Milton wrote a sonnet to Ley’s daughter Margaret, praising her late father’s achievements and 
character: “that good Earl, once President / Of England’s Council and her Treasury, / Who lived in both 
unstained with gold or fee.” Sonnet X, in Milton: Poetical Works, ed. Douglas Bush (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 171. 
39 National Archives, PROB11/8 f. 146v.; cited in Ives, Common Lawyers, 317. 
40 National Archives, PROB11/19 f. 1; cited in Ives, Common Lawyers, 317. 
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factored against Hele after he was implicated in the Cobham plot against the Crown;41 
more personally, Egerton may be seen to have harboured a grudge against Hele since 
1600, when Hele called in a debt of £400 from Egerton after the latter refused to 
support his attempt to become Master of the Rolls.42 A majority of the common-law 
judges voted to acquit Hele, but Egerton found Hele “guilty in all of corruption and 
ambition, craft and covetous practices,” voting for disbarment, imprisonment, and a 
fine of £2,000.43
 Dishonesty in a lawyer could be dealt with in a staggeringly harsh way. In 
1601, Robert Pye, a young barrister of the Inner Temple, pursued a case against 
Christopher Merrick of the same Inn. The particulars of the matter were, on the face 
of it, fairly trivial – failure to repay a £3 loan resulting in fisticuffs. But Pye persisted 
with a doubted account of events (involving a serious accusation against Merrick), 
and was accused and convicted of perjury in the Star Chamber. He was sentenced, 
again by Egerton: 
 
 
to pay a fine of 1,000 marks, to be pilloried at Westminster and there to lose an ear, to 
ride with his face to the horse’s tail with a paper stating his offences, from Westminster 
                                                 
41 Hele’s part in the Cobham plot is suggested in the Ashburnham Manuscripts, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission, London, Reports and Papers, 8th Report, Appendix Part III (1881), 13-22; cited in 
Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, 63 n. 2. 
42 J. S. Cockburn discusses the different types of politics involved in “The Spoils of Law: the trial of 
Sir John Hele, 1604,” in Tudor Rule and Revolution, ed. Delloyd J. Guth and John W. McKenna 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 309-44. 
43 John Hawarde, Les Reports del Cases in Camera Stellata, 1593-1609, ed. W. P. Baildon (London, 
1894), 171-6, 411. See also Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, 62-3, and Prest, The Rise of 
the Barristers, 294. 
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Hall to the Temple Gate, where he was to be again pilloried, and to lose the other ear, 
and to perpetual imprisonment.44
 
 
The sentence was carried out at Temple Gate, as described in a letter dated 17 May 
1602 by Commissioner for the repair of St Paul’s, John Chamberlain: 
 
This last week one Pie an utter barrister of the Inner Temple stood on the pillory before 
the Temple gate and lost both his ears for contriving and plotting the death of one of his 
fellow lawyers by the way of justice.45
 
 
It was in his judgment in this case that Egerton dispensed a famously discriminating 
anti-lawyer sentiment: between “the good and literate professors of the law [who] are 
as good members of the Commonwealth as any others, [and] the ignorant and bad 
professors of the law [who] are as dangerous vermin to the Commonwealth as 
caterpillars.”46
 
 The attorneys bore the main brunt of this type of criticism. For 
example, Egerton proposed a variety of reforms in his “Memorialles for Iudicature” of 
1609, among them that: 
A view . . . be taken of the Number of Attorneyes in euery Court, specially in the 
kinges bench and common place, and thervpon a competent number of the moost 
expert and honest, discrete and sufficient only to be allowed, and the residue to be 
discharged and put out from that trade.47
 
 
                                                 
44 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, ed. F. A. Inderwick (London, 1896), i, xci. The sharp-
dealing and spurious litigation in this matter involving two young Inns of Court lawyers can make it 
resemble in some respects a city comedy plot. For this reason the full report is reproduced infra at 
Appendix 1, 250-4. Rogues may be found in all walks of life: see infra, 18. 
45 Letter dated 17 May 1602 from John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carlton: Calendar of State Papers, 
Domestic, Eliz. vol. cclxxxiv, No. 14; Letters written by John Chamberlain during the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth, ed. S. Williams (London: Camden Society, 1861), 135. 
46 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, i, xcii. 
47 The instrument is set out in full in Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, 274-81 (275). 
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There is an instance of Coke and Egerton agreeing on the harsh sentence of an 
attorney who was convicted in Star Chamber of blackmail jointly with a client. Coke 
and Egerton had the lawyer disbarred; he and his co-defendant were pilloried, had 
their ears cut off, were branded in the forehead with a “C” for conspiracy, whipped 
through the streets, and at last fined £500 each.48
 Some anti-lawyer sentiment may have had a political or class basis. According 
to Brooks, by 1640 one in every eighty men in England was using the King’s courts, 
and use of these implied recognition of royal rule – often at the expense of magnates 
or lords of the manor.
 In view of the examples made of 
individual lawyers caught and found guilty of dishonesty and corruption, it is 
questionable that any more than a relative few would have been tempted into serious 
wrongdoing. 
49
                                                 
48 Miller v. Reignolds and Bassett (1614), in Reports of Certain Cases, arising in the severall Courts of 
Record at Westminster, by John Godbolt, ed. William Hughes (London, 1652), 205-7. See also Knafla, 
Law and Politics in Jacobean England, 128. 
 It would be wrong, of course, to say that lawyers were 
characteristically egalitarian. But developments in legal practice in the second half of 
the sixteenth century did make it easier for the common people to go to law, so many 
among the landed classes may well have felt they had reason to speak against lawyers, 
in part because lawyers were able to articulate the concerns of the lower classes, and 
thus give commoners a taste of liberty and power that could threaten the established 
social order. Coke is reported to have commented on what law meant to the poor: 
49 Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 134. On use of the king’s courts: for 
administration at local level, see J. S. Cockburn, A History of English Assizes, 1558-1714 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972); for quarter sessions, see Cynthia B. Herrup, The Common Peace: 
Participation and the Criminal Law in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). 
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The equall course of Justice being stayed, the poore & meaner sort of people they are 
overwhelmed with wrongs oppression, whilest great and wealthy men, like Hilles and 
Mountaines, buyld their Stations sure, being freed from any cause of griefe: Justice 
with-held, only the poorer sort are those that smart for it.50
 
 
Commentators on the history of the legal profession are surely right to point out that 
every occupational group, in any period, has its quota of rogues and incompetents.51 
But litigation is fraught with emotion, so it is not difficult to see how some anti-
lawyer feeling might be the bitter refuge of impatient and unsuccessful litigants. There 
may be an element of lawyer myth-making in the story of an imperturbable Thomas 
More being led to his execution, cursed by one disappointed litigant and confronted 
by another about an unfinished matter.52 To the first he answered that justice had been 
done (secure in the knowledge that not every courtroom defeat can be a miscarriage of 
justice); to the second he acknowledged that the business was incomplete, explaining 
that he had not time or influence left.53
It seems obvious to think first of anti-lawyer sentiment coming from outside 
the profession. But degrees of rivalry and antipathy existed between different 
categories of workers in England’s legal system. Accordingly, the word “lawyer” did 
not have a vocationally unified meaning in Jacobean city comedy. It is important to 
 
                                                 
50 Lord Coke, His Speech and Charge, with a Discoverie of the Abuses and Corruption of Officers 
(London, 1607), C4v. The author, Robert Pricket, claims to reproduce an address by Coke to the jury in 
the Court of Assizes in Norwich on 4 August 1606; cf. The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, the seventh 
part, vol. IV, part v. 
51 For example, Ives, Common Lawyers, 318; Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 296. 
52 Hall’s Chronicle; Containing the History of England during the Reign of Henry the fourth and the 
Succeeding Monarchs, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1809), 817; R. W. Chambers, Thomas More (London: 
Cape, 1935), 348; Ives, Common Lawyers, 316. 
53 Paraphrase from Ives, Common Lawyers, 316. 
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recognize the distinction between common lawyers and civil lawyers, for example. 
Practitioners or students of the common law (law “common” throughout the realm) 
had, by the second half of the sixteenth century, some degree of professional rivalry 
with those who practised or studied the civil law (so-called for being derived and 
adapted from Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, the sixth century codification of Roman 
law). Historians’ opinions differ as to the nature and degree of rivalry between the 
common lawyers and the civilians.54 Brian Levack’s view is that it was Roman 
influence in the law up to this time that aroused suspicion if not hostility. The English 
ecclesiastical law (a substantial part of the early modern civilians’ practice) could be 
criticized for the large amount of unreformed Roman canon law it contained: civilians 
are described as “popish doctors of the bawdy courts” in the Marprelate Tracts.55 The 
common lawyers of the Inns of Court lawyers would prevail in professional terms 
over the civilians, who, in the first decade of the seventeenth century, arguably 
became “medieval fossils in an early modern world”56
                                                 
54 See Brian P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603-1641: A Political Study (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), 126; idem, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750,” in Lawyers in Early Modern 
Europe and America, ed. Wilfrid Prest (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981), 120; Prest, The Rise of the 
Barristers, 191; J. H. Baker, “The Newe Littleton,” Cambridge Law Journal, xxxiii (1974), 148-51; H. 
S. Pawlisch, “Sir John Davies, The Ancient Constitution and Civil Law,” Historical Journal, 23 
(1980), 689-702; Gilbert Burnet, The Life and Death of Sir Matthew Hale, Kt., sometime Lord Chief 
Justice of His Majestie’s Court of King’s Bench (London, 1682), 13; on “revisionist” approaches, see 
Glenn Burgess, “On Revisionism: An Analysis of Early Stuart Historiography in the 1970s and 1980s,” 
Historical Journal, vol. 33 (1990), 609-27. 
 – servants of a church losing 
influence and prestige, clinging to outmoded forms of political and religious thought. 
But the rivalry approached its height in the decade in which city comedy developed in 
55 The Marprelate Tracts, 1588, 1589, ed. William Pierce (London, 1911), 51. 
56 Levack, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750,” 124. 
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London’s private theatres, and recognizing the difference and rivalry between Inns of 
Court lawyers and civilians not only makes possible but actively invites an alternative 
interpretation of generalized anti-lawyer sentiment in city comedy. 
Precise applications of the different titles under which lawyers are classified 
have fluctuated over time. Broadly speaking, in the reigns of Elizabeth and James I, 
the common law courts had barristers, where the civil law courts had advocates; the 
common law had attorneys, where the civil law had proctors. As remains the case 
with today’s barristers and solicitors, any type of lawyer – barrister or attorney, 
advocate or proctor – might be referred to using the simple generic classification 
“lawyer.” This contributes to the conventional perception of city comedy as hostile to 
lawyers generally – different types of lawyer are often referred to in the plays using 
the simple generic term “lawyer.” But specific civil terms are sometimes used. The 
best-known lawyer figure in city comedy is by title a civilian, not an Inns of Court 
common lawyer. Voltore in Volpone is an advocate (strictly a civil denomination), 
and Jonson, whose renowned learning made him a stickler for detail,57
                                                 
57 See infra, 39 n. 118. 
 may be 
presumed to have given the matter due deliberation before using the term “advocate” 
– instead of the generic “lawyer,” or the common law equivalent denominations 
“barrister” or “counsellor.” Despite Volpone’s Venetian setting, the appearance of the 
four Avocatori in IV.ii and V.vii looks again like an allusion to the advocates of the 
civil law. Why should Jonson make allusions to civil advocates in the play? It would 
fit the commercial purpose of the theatre to answer that he targets civilians in order to 
appeal to Inns of Court men. Voltore is the vulture, and the target of Mosca’s 
sarcastic, back-handed compliments when reporting Volpone’s sentiments on 
Voltore’s vocation: 
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I oft have heard him say how he admired 
Men of your large profession, that could speak 
To every cause, and things mere contraries, 
Till they were hoarse again, yet all be law; 
That, with most quick agility, could turn, 
And re-turn; makes knots and un-do them; 
Give forked counsel; take provoking gold 
On either hand, and put it up. These men, 
He knew, would thrive with their humility (I.iii.52-60). 
 
Voltore’s was not such a large profession by the first decade of the seventeenth 
century. A look at the diminishing figures for civilians suggests that Mosca’s speech 
may well be a piece of civilian-targeted sarcasm. The civilians who enjoyed the 
highest status were those admitted as advocates to the Court of Arches, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury’s most important court. Between 1500 and 1750 some 460 
lawyers were admitted to the Court of Arches, but the first two decades of the 
seventeenth century saw a marked decline in admissions which would never fully 
recover. Between 1580 and 1589 thirty-six advocates were admitted; this rose to fifty 
between 1590 and 1599. Between 1600 and 1609, however, the number dropped to 
twelve, rising only negligibly to fourteen between 1610 and 1619.58 In terms of 
civilian students, numbers hit a low point in the first decade of the seventeenth 
century, as well. Between 1581 and 1590 forty completed their degrees; the number 
fell between 1591 and 1600 to twenty-nine; the number sank dramatically between 
1601 and 1610, when only seventeen completed their degrees.59 In the four Inns of 
Court, meanwhile, admissions increased from around fifty a year in the early sixteenth 
century to a high point of three hundred in the reign of James I.60
                                                 
58 Levack, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750,” 109. 
 Inns of Court 
common lawyers could be expected to have approved when Mosca sarcastically called 
59 Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603-1641, 51. 
60 Prest, The Inns of Court, 7, 52-3; Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 112. 
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the declining civilians a “large profession,” before disingenuously congratulating 
these Rome-connected lawyers for, in effect, hypocrisy hid behind false humility. 
 Two things may be taken to account for the declining numbers entering the 
civil law. One, the perception of the civilians’ type of law as popish; and two, the 
successes of common lawyers in limiting the civilians’ jurisdiction.61 Historians tend 
to view the smaller numbers of the civilians as a disadvantage, as much as a sign, of 
their decline.62
 
 Contemporary writers do not invariably bear this out, though. Thomas 
Powell was claiming still in 1635, several advantages to being part of the persevering 
minority of civilians: 
It is to be confest, the charge of breeding a man to the Civill Law, is more expensive, 
and the way more painefull, and the bookes of greater number, and price than the 
Common Law requireth. But after the Civill Lawyer is once growne to Maturity. His 
way of Advancement is more beneficiall, more certaine, and more easie to attaine, than 
is the Common Lawyers, and all because their number is lesse, their learning more 
intricate.63
 
 
In contradiction of Powell’s ideas in 1635 about the opportunities open to newly 
qualified civilians, there were already problems in this connection by 1604, as a 
contemporary journal writer noted: 
 
There is great complaint among those scholars of the University of Cambridge who 
have dedicated themselves to the study of the civil Law that when they leave the 
University there is no room for them in the State to exercise their profession, insomuch 
                                                 
61 Levack, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750,” 120. Ecclesiastical court jurisdictions continued 
dealing with lapses in religion, sexual offences and the probate of wills long after the Restoration of 
Charles II: C. W. Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England, c. 1558-1642,” in: Lawyers in Early 
Modern Europe and America, ed. Wilfrid Prest (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981), 43. 
62 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 4; Levack, “The English Civilians, 1500-1750,” 108. 
63 Powell, The Art of Thriving. Or, the plaine pathway to Preferment (London, 1635), 51. On the 
decline of the Inns of Chancery see infra, 191-2. 
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that the Vice-Chancellor and Senate petition the Lord Cecil, their Chancellor, to take up 
their cause.64
 
 
After making Voltore an advocate, Jonson used the civil version of the common law 
attorney in Bartholomew Fair: John Littlewit is a proctor. The use of a negative, half-
witted name for the civil equivalent of an attorney could be expected to appeal to Inns 
of Court lawyers, in that it served both to affirm the type of law they practised, and to 
infer the putative superiority of their position as court pleaders. There is some line of 
argument for reversing the apparent negative to be found in the city comedy repertoire 
of character names ending in “wit”: Littlewit in Bartholomew Fair has a part-
namesake in Follywit of A Mad World, My Masters (Middleton has the more 
positively named Allwit in A Chaste Maid in Cheapside, and Savourwit in No Wit, No 
Help Like a Woman’s; Jonson has the stoical Lovewit in The Alchemist). Cowell 
looked back to the Saxon root of the word “wit” when defining early modern legal 
terms such as bloodwit and childwit.65
                                                 
64 G. B. Harrison, A Jacobean Journal, being a record of those things most talked of during the years 
1603-1606 (London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1946), 109. The entry relates to 10 March 1604. 
 The word wit in this legal usage had its 
etymology, said Cowell, in the Saxon signification of charging with a fault, or of 
blame or reprehension. With this in mind, the name Littlewit is capable of 
construction as little-fault, or little-blame. But this construction seems unlikely, and it 
works against the more likely possibility – that the civilian proctor is represented in 
65 Bloodwit conferred a power to exact a fine for the shedding of blood; childwit signified a power to 
fine a servant woman who became pregnant without her employer’s consent. John Cowell, The 
Interpreter: or Booke Containing the Signification of Words: Wherein is set foorth the true meaning of 
all, or the most part of such Words and Termes, as are mentioned in the Lawe Writers, or Statutes of 
this victorious and renowned Kingdome, requiring any Exposition or Interpretation (Cambridge, 
1607). 
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ordinary terms as having little wit, as the Inns of Court lawyers in the audience could 
be expected to have wanted. In The Alchemist, again, Jonson has pastor Tribulation 
Wholesome speak in passing of “aurum potabile being / The only med’cine for the 
civil magistrate, / T’ incline him to a feeling of the Cause” (III.i.41-3).66
The debates of 1628 concerning the Petition of Right are outside the period 
covered in this thesis, and there is no connection to be found with Jacobean city 
comedy. But they provide an example of how anti-lawyer sentiment could be based in 
something more serious than the disappointment of unsuccessful litigants or 
professional rivalry.
 Specific 
reference is made to a civilian legal figure, with an imputation of bribery. The express 
distinction made to the corrupt civil magistrate infers the reverse of the common law 
equivalent: a characterization that would have met with the approval of the Inns of 
Court common lawyers in the audience. 
67 By the Caroline period, anti-lawyer sentiment could be 
generated by the growing lack of security about certain liberties English gentlemen 
assumed the law guaranteed them. A key event on the way to the debates was 
Darnel’s or The Five Knights case,68
                                                 
66 Aurum Potabile, drinkable gold, was thought to be an elixir: Gordon Campbell, ed. “The Alchemist” 
and other plays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 244 n. 41. 
 in which it was held that it was sufficient answer 
to a writ of habeas corpus to state that a prisoner was detained by special order of the 
King. Thus the King had a power of preventive arrest not questionable in the courts, 
and which in this case was used to enforce taxation levied without Parliament’s 
consent. John Holles, Earl of Clare, articulated his doubts about the law and lawyers 
in a letter to Thomas Wentworth (who in his youth had been at the Inner Temple): 
67 The Petition of Right is enrolled on the statute book as 3 Car 1 c 1: Halsbury’s Statutes, vol. 10, 37. 
68 (1627) 3 St Tr 1; discussed in E. C. S. Wade and A. W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, 11th ed. (London: Longman, 1993), 263. 
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. . . I cannot term you, nor myself, a freeman, when law hath no protection for us; for 
this diseased body our councillors have left us and the disease still strengtheneth upon 
us. Neither do the lawyers, the physicians for this subject, heal us any whit, for meum 
or tuum69 between common persons they crow in every corner, but when the question 
transcends between the head and the body, they are crestfallen and have nothing to say 
and if accidentally something of them be heard and show themselves in [the law], they 
only beray the place and leave the matter worse than they found it; witness the late 
Habeas Corpus.70
 
 
 
Some Members of the 1628 Parliament fastened early on to distrust of the common 
law.71
 
 But the result of the House of Commons’ instruction of both prominent civilian 
Henry Marten and prominent common lawyer John Glanville of Lincoln’s Inn 
following the House of Lords’ proposed amendment to the Commons’ draft of the 
Petition may be taken to suggest that some civilians and common lawyers were not so 
far apart politically as they were in respect of their respective professions. The Lords’ 
proposal was for preserving the King’s discretionary power in affairs of state: 
We humbly present this Petition to your Majesty, not only with a care for preservation 
of our liberties, but with a due regard to leave entire that sovereign power whereby 
your Majesty is entrusted for the protection and happiness of your people.72
 
 
Such an amendment would enable the King to ignore the common law where there 
was just cause in the interests of his subjects – but it would be for the King to decide 
what amounted to just cause. Civilians were seen, in contrast to the common lawyers, 
                                                 
69 Mine or thine: used to express rights of property. 
70 J. P. Cooper, ed., The Wentworth Papers, 1597-1628, Camden Society, Fourth Series, 12 (1973), 
287-8; see Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), 348; on Russell’s approach to the history of political thought, see Glenn Burgess, The Politics of 
the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (London: 
Macmillan, 1992), 110. 
71 Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 347. 
72 Lords’ Journals, unpublished manuscript (London: Inner Temple Library), Petyt MS. 537/23/f. 367; 
cited in Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603-1641, 118. 
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as supporting the autocratic power of the Crown, but Marten, instructed by the 
Commons, showed himself to be politically independent. To admit the exception 
would, Marten observed, make the Petition meaningless – the civilian pointed out that 
absolute power could in theory be used for bad as well as for good: 
 
The King may not require money but in Parliament, it is a man’s head; but add this 
clause unless it be by Sovereign power; then it is lion’s neck, and it mars all. We leave 
entire a sovereign power. . . . I say it is . . . dangerous. It implies the King is trusted 
with a power for the destruction, and also for the safety of the people. It admits also he 
may use sovereign power, and if he does we may not refuse it for it is for our 
protection, so it bounds up my mouth that I cannot but say it is for the good of the 
people. Sovereign power is transcending and a high word.73
 
 
 
Marten showed that fundamental questions of politics might bring civilians and 
common lawyers in some way together – the King would have to observe the rules of 
the common law. But professional context would continue to keep the common 
lawyers and the civilians apart. 
 
 
1.3 Theatrical culture of the Inns of Court 
 
The Inns of Court are an important focal point for consideration of early modern 
theatrical culture.74
                                                 
73 Ibid., 356v-357r; cited in Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603-1641, 118. 
 The records of the Inner Temple register the popularity of 
74 The cultural significance of the Inns of Court has been the subject of several conferences in recent 
years. A three-day interdisciplinary conference titled “The Intellectual and Cultural World of the Early 
Modern Inns of Court” took place on 14-16 September 2006 at the Courtauld Institute and the Inns of 
Court. It attracted some 150 participants; among them, legal historians Sir John H. Baker, Q.C. (who 
reconsidered the Inns’ status as “the third university”), and Wilfrid Prest (who examined readers’ 
dinners and the culture of the early modern Inns of Court). Among the literary scholars were Lorna 
Hutson (who extended her work in Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe to examine links 
between Shakespeare’s 2 Henry VI both to pedagogical uses of classical judicial oratory in humanist 
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masques and other Christmas entertainments at the Inns in the first half of the 
sixteenth century and earlier, noting that there were at this time no public theatres 
where dramatic pieces could be produced.75 Performances of plays at the Inns began 
as part of various organized entertainments celebrating holidays, the three main ones 
being Christmas, All Saints or All Hallows (1 November), and Candlemas (2 
February).76 Inderwick observes the evolution of taste for drama at the Inns from 
simple entertainments to performances characterized by literary and artistic 
excellence.77
                                                                                                                                            
interpretation of Roman new comedy and to developments in English legal culture of participatory jury 
trial), and Andrew Gurr (who extended his study on playgoing in Shakepeare’s London to look at 
bonds between lawyers and playing companies, in particular Middle Templar John Ford). Speakers at 
the “Law, Evidence and Fiction” conference held at St Andrew’s, Scotland on 17 February 2007 
included Marion Wynne-Davies, Subha Mukherji, and Lorna Hutson. An interdisciplinary conference 
entitled “‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’: Conversations in Law, Literature and Philosophy from the 
Reformation to the Present Day” took place at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge on 7-9 September 2007, 
bringing together legal practitioners, literary critics, jurists and philosophers; speakers included Peter 
Brooks, Lorna Hutson, Ian Ward, and Luke Wilson. “Text and Image in Early Modern Society,” held at 
the University of Sussex on 9-11 September 2008 included the Inns of Court among numerous areas of 
investigation. 
 The revels of the Inns of Court were initially non-dramatic (involving 
sports, singing and dancing), but they progressed from pageants and mumming to 
75 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, i, lxix. 
76 Appendix 2, 256-8, is a selective list of plays performed at the individual Inns up to the period 
covered by the thesis (from 1500 to 1615). Where not otherwise indicated, material on the theatrical 
culture of the Inns of Court informed by Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, ch. 7; Marie 
Axton, The Queen’s Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession (London: Royal Historical 
Society, 1977), ch. 1 and passim; Ann Jennalie Cook, The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare’s 
London, 1576-1642 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), 108-10. 
77 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, i, xcvii. 
 28 
masques and then plays.78 The archives of Lincoln’s Inn contain the earliest surviving 
allusion to revels, celebrations being organized for four festivals in 1431.79 The Inns 
of Chancery seem to have had their own theatrical culture, at least in the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth century, before their enforced decline. Middle Templar Robert 
Brerewood records the Grand Christmas of 1482-3 at Clifford’s Inn, where the 
celebrations included “stately stageplays, . . . [and] speeches whereby was unfolded 
the brave wits and ingenious capacity of sundry persons.”80
 Revels at the Inns of Court could last for several days at a time (on occasion, 
longer), attracting public attention – sometimes of an undesirable kind. The Inns’ 
association with drama was first notably visited by controversy and questionable 
interpretation in 1526, when Cardinal Wolsey imprisoned a prominent lawyer, 
Serjeant John Roo of Gray’s Inn, for a political satire which Wolsey interpreted as an 
attempt to discredit him. Edward Hall, Roo’s contemporary at Gray’s Inn, provided an 
account of the matter in his Chronicle, which contains an allusion to the title by which 
Roo’s satire is sometimes known, Lord Governance and Lady Publike-Wele: 
 
                                                 
78 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “revels.” Cf. William Herbert, Antiquities of the Inns of 
Court and Chancery Containing Historical and Descriptive Sketches relative to their Original 
Foundation (London, 1804), 314. 
79 The Records of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, 1422-1914. The Black Books, ed. J. D. 
Walker, W. P. Baildon, and R. F. Roxburgh (London, 1897-1968), i, 4. The first mention of a revel at 
the Middle Temple dates from November 1501: “Minutes of Parliament of the Middle Temple, 1501-
1703,” tr. & ed. Charles Trice Martin, in Middle Temple Records, ed. C. H. Hopwood (London, 1904-
5), i, 2; first mention at the Inner Temple from November 1505: A Calendar of the Inner Temple 
Records, i, 2; at Gray’s Inn, from 1530: The Pension Book of Gray’s Inn (Records of the Honourable 
Society), 1569-1669, ed. Reginald J. Fletcher (London, 1901), i, Appendix ii, 495. 
80 Robert Brerewood, “The Brerewood Manuscript,” Middle Temple Library, n.d., 109, 110; cited in 
Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 217. 
 29 
This Christmas was a goodly disguisyng plaied at Greis inne,81 whiche was compiled 
for the moste part, by master Ihon Roo seriant at the law xx yere past, and long before 
the Cardinall had any aucthoritie, the effecte of the plaie was, that lord gouernance was 
ruled by dissipacion and negligence, by whose misgouerance and euill order, lady 
Publike wele was put from gouerance: which caused Rumor Populi, Inward grudge and 
disdain of wanton souerignetie, to rise with a greate multitude, to expel negligence and 
dissipacion, and to restore Publik welth again to her estate, which was so done. This 
plaie was so set furth . . . that it was highly praised by all menne, sauing of the 
Cardinall, whiche imagined that the plaie had been diuised of hym, & in a greate furie 
sent for the said master Roo, and toke from hym his Coyfe, and sent hym to the Flete, 
& after he sent for the yong gentlemen, that plaied in the plaie, and them highly 
rebuked and thretened, & sent one of them called Thomas Moyle [of Gray’s Inn] of 
Kent to the Flete, but by means of frendes Master Roo and he wer deliuered at last. 
This plaie sore displeased the Cardinall, and yet it was neuer meante to hym, as you 
haue harde, wherefore many wisemen grudged to see hym take it so hartely, and euer 
the Cardinall saied that the kyng was highly displeased with it, and spake nothyng of 
himself.82
 
 
The Inns had enjoyed some degree of freedom before the Wolsey incident when 
presenting plays intended only as entertainments. But Roo’s (and his actors’) brush 
with the authorities may seem to foreshadow the problems Jonson would face with his 
dramatic satires, and legislation and royal proclamations gradually encroached on 
what freedom the Inns had in staging entertainments, at least until Elizabeth’s reign. 
Statutes of 1543 and 1548 prohibited seditious and irreligious matter in plays, and 
proclamations of 1549 and 1551 established systematic censorship of plays performed 
at the Inns.83
                                                 
81 Disguising was another word for mumming: see E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1923), i, 149-55. 
 
82 Hall’s Chronicle, 719; cited in Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 238-9. On Roo, see 
Axton, The Queen’s Two Bodies, 2, 3, 7, 9. 
83 “Acte for thadvauncement of true Religion and for thabbolisshment of the contrarie,”34 & 35 Henry 
VIII, c. 1, The Statutes of the Realm, from Original Records, 1101-1713, ed. Alexander Luders, et al 
(London, 1810-28), iii, 894-7, s. vii; Act of Uniformity, 2 & 3 Edward VI, c. 1, ibid., iv, Pt. I, 37-9, s. 
iii. See Tudor Royal Proclamations, ed. Paul Hughes & James Larkin (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1964-9), i, 478 (No. 344), 514 (No. 371). 
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Members of the Inns of Court could be innovative in drama. Two Inner Temple 
men, Thomas North and Thomas Sackville, were responsible for the first known 
English tragedy in blank verse, Gorboduc, which was performed at the first revels to 
draw real public attention – Inner Temple’s Christmas revels in 1561-2. With 
Westminster Hall not far away, students of the Inns of Court were more immediately 
subject to the ideas and fashions of the royal court than the students of the 
universities. Irreverent originality could be seen in the royal-sounding titles given to 
the organizers of the Inns’ entertainments as their presentations came to rival those of 
the royal court in both quality and scale. The Lord of Misrule governed the Christmas 
entertainments, and the Inns charged an official with Mastership of the Revels before 
the royal court adopted that title. In terms of scale, the most spectacular celebration 
was the Gesta Grayorum – Gray’s Inn’s extended series of events lasting from 
December 1594 to the following Shrove Tuesday. Again, the Gesta can be seen to 
reflect the ideas and organization of the royal court; for example, with the planning of 
an imaginary kingdom of Graya (for Gray’s Inn), and a state of Templaria 
(representing the Temple). Gray’s Inn’s celebrations drew on successive nights an 
unexpected level of curiosity, and unruly revellers turned the scene into one of 
temporary disorder.84
                                                 
84 See the first part of Gesta Grayorum: or the History of the High and Mighty Prince Henry, Prince of 
Purpoole, Anno Domini, 1594, ed. Walter Wilson Greg (Oxford: Malone Society Reprint, 1914). 
Gray’s Inn customarily used the title “Prince of Purpoole” for its master of revels, Purpoole being the 
parish in which the Inn was located. 
 The restoration of order coincided with a performance of The 
Comedy of Errors, but it is the following night which provides an interesting insight 
into the approach lawyers took to representing their own vocation. 
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Interesting in what way? One commentator has remarked on the odd, 
unreciprocated regard in which lawyers might be said to embrace works which are in 
places scornful of their own language, practices, and professional ethic.85 Another 
recently acknowledged it as paradoxical that an example of city comedy should be 
hostile to the law as a profession when Inns of Court men formed a significant part of 
the audience, and the playwrights themselves had connections with the Inns.86 The 
explanation offered is that the paradox is lessened on reflection that mockery of 
lawyers was predictably traditional in the Inns of Court revels.87
Following the collapse into disorder at the Gesta, the Inns men held a mock trial 
of the person held most responsible, in which England’s courts, justice, and the legal 
profession were all subjects of satire. Axton sees this approach as the Inns’ version of 
the causes grasses, a French carnival tradition in which imitation of legal procedure is 
pushed to comic absurdity.
 The suggestion is 
that lawyers would go to see these plays in which their profession was represented 
apparently in a negative light in order simply to laugh at themselves. There may be 
something in this. We hope to see the funny side if others find reason to make fun of 
us. But this by itself seems a not wholly satisfactory explanation. 
88
                                                 
85 Julius, introduction to Law and Literature, xiii. 
 At the same time the Inns men’s use or imitation of legal 
procedure in the wake of disorder can be interpreted as an implicitly positive response 
to, or representation of, the restoration of order. Given the Inns men’s vocation, 
implicit valorization of order may seem a persuasive explanation for city comedy’s 
86 Cain, introduction to Poetaster, or His Arraignment, 45 
87 Ibid. 
88 The Queen’s Two Bodies, 6. 
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imitation of legal procedure and the use in the plays of judgment scenes, and the 
approach to the type of mock trial performed at the Gesta may have influenced this.89
A contemporary account of the “Lincolnia” Christmas revels of 1599-1600, in 
which Lincoln’s Inn invited students of the Middle Temple to join them, features a 
description of the conclusion to the role of the appointed organizer (the so-called 
“Prince of Burning Love”) which has a hint of city comedy plot possibilities about it: 
 
 
the Prince, wearied with the weight of government, made a voluntary resignation into 
the hands of the Optimates, intending a private life, wherein he required the advice of 
his Counsaile. One perswaded him to follow the sea; another to land travaile; a third, to 
marry a rich widow; and a fourth, to study common lawe; hee choose the last, and 
refused not the third if she stood in his way.90
 
 
The Inns’ theatrical entertainments enjoyed a high profile in the first two decades of 
the seventeenth century, and this excited public curiosity. All four Inns contributed to 
the major celebration in honour of the 1613 marriage of the King’s daughter, Princess 
Elizabeth. The celebrations included two masques; one presented jointly by Lincoln’s 
Inn and the Middle Temple (written by George Chapman, a resident of Gray’s Inn), 
and another presented by Gray’s Inn and the Inner Temple.91
                                                 
89 Susan Wells’ Bahktinian analysis of city comedy alludes to the carnivalesque aspect of the Inns of 
Court revels, in which “[w]hat had been serious was parodied and profaned [. . . and] normal forms of 
authority were . . . degraded”: “Jacobean City Comedy and the Ideology of the City,” English Literary 
History, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 1981), 46. 
 An example of the 
popularity of Inns-related drama can be found in relation to the production of William 
Browne’s Inner Temple Masque of 1614; intended as a private entertainment, 
90 “Noctes Templariae, or, A Briefe Chronicle of the Dark Reigne of the Bright Prince of Burning 
Love,” British Library, Harleian MS. 1576, f. 556, cited in Memoirs of Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, Knt., ed. 
James Alexander Manning (London, 1841), 9, and Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 228. 
91 Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 228-29. 
 33 
numerous uninvited spectators pressed themselves up against the windows outside the 
Inner Temple in hope of seeing the masque.92
 Axton described certain sixteenth century revellers of the Inns of Court as 
“ambitious men with a shrewd appreciation of the possibilities of imitation.”
 
93
 
 If 
representations of lawyers in city comedy are inflected by the variety of forms and 
impulses within the genre, the genre’s writers may seem equally to have experimented 
with the possibilities of representation influenced in part by the theatrical culture of 
the Inns of Court. 
 
1.4 The private theatres and genre 
 
This section is divided into four subsections. In the first, I examine the idea of rivalry 
between the two private theatres with which city comedy is principally associated. In 
the second, I consider ways in which Jonson’s ideas about the role and function of 
comedy are significant to the interpretation of representation in the genre. In the third, 
I look to literary and non-literary antecedents with a view to tracing city comedy’s 
contradictory, antithetical nature. In the final subsection, I provide a survey of 
criticism, considering the implications for representation of lawyers and law. 
 
 
(i) Private rivals? The Blackfriars and Paul’s 
 
Andrew Gurr has suggested that readings of city comedy can involve some confusion 
where they fail to differentiate Paul’s plays from Blackfriars plays; he cites as 
                                                 
92 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, ii, Introduction, xlii-iii. 
93 The Queen’s Two Bodies, 10. 
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examples some critics most notably associated with the genre: Gibbons, Leggatt, and 
Leinwand.94
 Gurr regards the two main twentieth-century theories about early modern 
playgoing as flawed for oversimplification and stereotyping.
 It is worth considering the point in relation to interpretations of city 
comedy’s treatment of lawyers. In order to do so, I first provide some background to 
the criticism, highlighting points relating to lawyers. 
95 Alfred Harbage 
advanced the idea of two “rival traditions.” On one hand, said Harbage, Shakespeare 
exemplified a popular, public tradition aimed at the middle ranks and working people; 
on the other, city comedy belonged to a “private” tradition, in which boy companies 
performed before a social elite with a taste for satire.96
 
 Harbage’s earlier work 
includes his genial estimation of the typical early modern Inns student: 
A student at the Inns of Court was a well-born, affluent, university educated young man 
in his earlier twenties. He lived in a society devoted to intellectual pursuits and well 
disposed towards belles-lettres. He must have made a good spectator.97
 
 
Ann Jennalie Cook challenged Harbage’s ideas about the theatre audiences of 
Shakespeare’s London. The social elite were the main patrons not only of the so-
called private theatres, said Cook, but of theatre in general: playgoing was the pastime 
                                                 
94 Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearian Playing Companies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 342, 352 n. 
13; examples: Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 76-7; Alexander Leggatt, Citizen Comedy in the Age of 
Shakespeare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 4; Theodore B. Leinwand, The City Staged, 
1603-1613 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 14-20. 
95 Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
3-4; this material is omitted from the third edition of the text. 
96 Shakespeare and the Rival Traditions (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 56-7. 
97 Shakespeare’s Audience (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941; reissue 1961), xiv. Harbage 
was not an admirer of the private stage: “The difference between Shakespeare and Fletcher is, in some 
inverse fashion, the difference between a penny and sixpence” (ibid., 159). 
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of the privileged.98 Puritan William Prynne was a young student at Lincoln’s Inn near 
the end of city comedy’s peak popularity. In contrast to Harbage’s mild perception of 
the typical early modern Inns of Court man, Cook was tempted by Prynne’s sternly 
moralizing caricature of Inns of Court playgoers – “Even allowing for Prynne’s 
violent prejudice, his sketch contained a certain amount of truth”99
 
 – thus 
demonstrating her partiality for the kind of stereotypical images against which the 
puritan lawyer made these charges: 
That Innes of Court men were undone but for Players; that they are their chiefest guests 
and imployment, & the sole busines that makes them afternoons men: that this is one of 
the first things they learne as soone as they are admitted, to see Stage-playes, & take 
smoke at a Play-house, which they commonly make their Studie; where they quickly 
learne to follow all fashions, to drinke all Healths, to weare favours and good cloathes, 
to consort with ruffianly companions, to sweare the biggest oaths, to quarrel easily, 
fight desperately, game inordinately, to spend their patrimony ere it fall, to use 
gracefully some gestures of apish complement, to talke irreligiously, to dally with a 
Mistresse, and hunt after harlots, to prove altogether lawlesse in steed of Lawyers, and 
to forget that little learning, grace and virtue which they had before.100
 
 
Gurr rightly points out that ideas about playgoing involve factors more intricate than 
numbers and stereotypes.101 He notes that Inns of Court students were prominent as 
playgoers – recognizing that, although their numbers in the different theatres cannot 
be ascertained, even a small section in an audience was capable of exercising a 
disproportionate influence over the whole.102
                                                 
98 “The Audience of Shakespeare’s Plays: A Reconsideration,” Shakespeare Studies 7 (1974), 283-305; 
Cook, The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare’s London, passim. 
 Yet in a sense Gurr only refines 
Harbage’s bifurcated notion of rival traditions when he says that the Blackfriars 
presented a “special kind of satire . . . designed to appeal quite explicitly to audiences 
99 Cook, The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare’s London, 147. 
100 “Epistle Dedicatory,” in Histrio-Mastix (London, 1633), F3v. 
101 Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 2nd ed., 4. 
102 Ibid., 4, 5. 
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at a higher social and probably critical level than the adult companies and the other 
boy company [at Paul’s].”103 Two of the plays I examine, Poetaster and Law Tricks, 
were first performed at the Blackfriars; Ram Alley was produced at the Whitefriars 
(used for a while by the Blackfriars’ boy company104); The Phoenix and Michaelmas 
Term were presented at Paul’s. The Blackfriars’ location to the southwest of Paul’s 
made it closer to the Inns of Court, and it is as appealing today as no doubt it was to 
certain tastes then to think of it as the theatre that “insisted on being outrageous.”105
 Inns of Court lawyers might scribble short diary entries recording theatre 
attendance; a brief note by John Greene of Lincoln’s Inn is typical: “all the batchelors 
. . . were at a play, . . . some at blackfriers.”
 
But did Inns men prefer the Blackfriars over Paul’s? 
106 But Inner Temple lawyer-poet John 
Davies’s suggestion that “the clamorous frie of Innes of Court / Filles up the private 
roomes of greater prise” implies that members of the Inns could make up a significant 
part of the audience in both the Blackfriars and Paul’s.107
                                                 
103 Gurr, The Shakespearian Playing Companies, 352. 
 Jonson’s association with 
the Blackfriars is probably the main reason for thinking that the venue operated at a 
higher critical level. Having left Shakespeare’s company and the Globe after Every 
Man Out of His Humour was performed there in 1599, Jonson took the first 
opportunity to snipe at the public theatre in the Induction to Cynthia’s Revels (1600), 
which he hoped would, in the new private theatre near the Inns of Court, “come to 
104 Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 88-9. 
105 The Shakespearian Playing Companies, 338. 
106 E. M. Symonds, “The Diary of John Greene (1635-1657),” English Historical Review 43 (1928), 
386; cited in Cook, The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare’s London, 139. 
107 Sir John Davies, “In Sillam” (Epigram No. 28), in Complete Poems, ii, ed. Alexander Grosart 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1876), 27-8. See Harbage, Shakespeare’s Audience, 80. 
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learned eares.” But in the same year, Marston performed a similar exercise in favour 
of Paul’s. In V.ii of Jack Drum’s Entertainment, he said that, at Paul’s (as opposed to 
the public theatres), “A man shall not be choakte / With the stench of Garlicke, . . . 
[for there] Tis a good gentle audience.”108 In the Prologue of Antonio and Mellida 
(1599-1600), Marston had appealed already to the “Select, and most respected 
Auditours” of Paul’s,109 and in V.vi of Antonio’s Revenge (1599-1600) it was 
acknowledged that plays in the private theatre could count on “gentle presence, and 
the Sceans suckt up / By calme attention of choice audience.” 110 Meanwhile, the idea 
that audiences at the Blackfriars could always be relied upon to “get it” was arguably 
proved wrong when Beaumont’s Knight of the Burning Pestle (1607) flopped on its 
first showing, supposedly because the audience, “not understanding the privie mark of 
Ironie about it . . . utterly rejected it.”111 The Blackfriars played as a rule to a high 
critical level, certainly. But the accompanying proposition that Paul’s “never had 
much notice taken of it” because the plays it staged “never gave much cause for alarm 
or offence”112
                                                 
108 Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 3rd ed., 259; John Marston, Jack Drum’s Entertainment 
(1600) V.ii, in Wood, ed. Plays. 
 implies no sense of daring at Paul’s, no allusive latency. It seems a 
109 John Marston, Antonio and Mellida (1599-1600), Prologue. 
110 John Marston, Antonio’s Revenge (1599-1600) V.vi, ed. Greg, Malone Society Reprints. See 
Harbage’s comment on Marston in Shakespeare’s Audience, 88. 
111 Comment of the publisher of the First Quarto (1613). See Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s 
London, 3rd ed., 87; Alexander Leggatt, “The Audience as Patron: The Knight of the Burning Pestle,” 
in Shakespeare and Theatrical Patronage in Early Modern England, ed. Paul Whitfield White and 
Suzanne R. Westfall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 312-14. 
112 Gurr, The Shakespearian Playing Companies, 338-9. 
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surprising conclusion about the theatre in which plays by Middleton and, early on, 
Marston were performed. 
 The interconnections between, at the Blackfriars, Eastward Ho and, at Paul’s, 
Westward Ho and Northward Ho point toward a shared audience which could be in on 
a continuing line of jokes and parody,113 if Eastward Ho does operate at a higher 
critical level than the two Paul’s plays. The poetomachia and the series of Ho plays 
show an interaction between the two theatres the spiritedly adversarial nature of 
which could be expected to appeal to lawyers. The personal and professional quarrels 
of the dramatists concerned thus enabled a relatively short-lived theatrical enterprise 
to flourish, and for business purposes the Blackfriars and Paul’s may be seen to have 
co-operated to this end.114
 
 
(ii) Jonson’s ideas about comedy 
 
The phrase “the end of comedy” would not be out of place in a damning theatrical 
review. It could be taken to mean something like the death of amusement. To attach 
the phrase to city comedy might seem to be to follow the example of the critic who 
said of Shakespeare’s comedies that “the funniest thing about [them] is the 
criticism.”115
                                                 
113 Cook, The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare’s London, 213; Clifford Leech, “Three Times Ho 
and a Brace of Widows: Some Plays for the Private Theatre,” in The Elizabethan Theatre III, ed. David 
Galloway (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), 15-17. 
 But that possibility might not be altogether to find fault on Jonson’s 
114 Adapting an idea of Roslyn Lander Knutson, Playing Companies and Commerce in Shakespeare’s 
Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), i. 
115 Malcolm Evans, “Deconstructing Shakespeare’s comedies,” in Alternative Shakespeares, ed. John 
Drakakis (London: Routledge, 1985), 84. 
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terms. He says in Timber that laughter is not necessarily the aim of comedy: “Nor, is 
the moving of laughter alwaies the end of Comedy, that is rather a fowling for the 
peoples delight, or their fooling.”116 By end, he means aim or purpose, of course. I 
regard Jonson’s ideas about comedy as being representative of the approach to writing 
in city comedy generally.117 He writes, characteristically, under the aegis of classical 
authority: “For, as Aristotle saies rightly, the moving of laughter is a fault in 
Comedie, a kind of turpitude, that depraves some part of a mans nature without a 
disease.”118 What then is the purpose of Jacobean city comedy, and what are the 
implications for its representations of lawyers and law? For Jonson, comedy should be 
“an interpretation of life, a criticism of society, and an embodiment of values.”119
 Jonson finds a surprising similarity in the most basic distinction in drama: 
“The parts of a Comedie are the same with a Tragedie, and the end is partly the same. 
For, they both delight, and teach.”
 The 
emphasis placed on interpretation and criticism is important. The fact that these plays 
contain apparent anti-lawyer sentiment does not mean that they are to be taken at 
face-value; there is interpretation at work, and this invites audience interpretation. 
120
                                                 
116 Jonson, Timber: or, Discoveries, in Workes (London: 1641), ii, 129. 
 Comedy shares ground with tragedy, then, and 
117 The approach to Jonson’s work is deemed the approach to city comedy as a whole in Gibbons, 
Jacobean City Comedy, 18. Cf. M. C. Bradbrook, The Growth and Structure of Elizabethan Comedy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 141. 
118 Jonson, Timber, 129-30. On Jonson’s “notorious learning” and twentieth century critical responses 
to this, see Michael Jamieson, introduction to Three Comedies by Ben Jonson (Middlesex: Penguin, 
1966), 30; see also Rosalind Miles, Ben Jonson: His Life and Work (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1986), 11-17. 
119 Jonson, Timber, 129-130. 
120 Ibid., 129. 
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in the Chorus to the second of the three early “Comicall Satyres,” Every Man Out of 
His Humour, Jonson has the ground threatening to give way in apocalyptic terms: the 
earth has “cracked with the weight of sin, / Hell gaping under us, and o’er our heads / 
Black rav’nous ruin . . . / Ready to sink us down and cover us” (Chorus, 6-9).121 
Using the character of the play’s presenter, Asper, Jonson subsequently announces his 
satiric aim and technique. He will scourge the sinners; he will to his audience’s 
“courteous eyes . . . oppose a mirror / . . . Where they shall see the time’s deformity / 
Anatomiz’d in every nerve and sinew” (Chorus, 116, 118-119). This bears a 
resemblance to the definition of comedy that Aelius Donatus attributed to Cicero: “an 
imitation of life, a mirror of character, and an image of truth.”122 Jonson’s idea of 
mirroring the time’s deformity in his comedies may be seen as something other than a 
realist reflection metaphor. Wendy Griswold argues that sheer reflection is too simple 
a model in this connection,123
                                                 
121 Ben Jonson, Every Man Out of His Humour, ed. Helen Ostovich (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2001), 112-13. 
 and this is relevant to how we view what city comedy 
122 Aelius Donatus, “On Comedy,” tr. O. B. Hardison, in Medieval Literary Criticism, ed. Alex 
Preminger, O. B. Hardison and Kevin Kerrane (New York: F. Ungar, 1974), 45. The phrase does not 
exist in any known works by Cicero; see Richard F. Hardin, “Encountering Plautus in the Renaissance: 
A Humanist Debate on Comedy,” Renaissance Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 3 (2007), 791. 
123 Griswold observes that reflection has been the dominant metaphor behind most sociological 
analyses of the relationship between culture and society, but, “while few would deny some connection 
between social experience and cultural objects, these connections are always mediated by the 
institutions through which the cultural objects are produced”: Renaissance Revivals (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 9. Leinwand alludes to the mirror metaphor when qualifying the 
way in which extra-theatrical reality is represented; the plays are “informed by the social and economic 
reality in which playwrights found themselves . . . [but] this does not mean that we turn to these 
dramatizations for a mirror image of the time”: The City Staged, 3. 
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has to say about lawyers and law because of the assumption involved in treating 
aspects of the plays as unmediated reflections of their time. An example referring to 
representations of economic history in another of Jonson’s city comedies will help to 
illustrate how it is possible in some respects to misread these plays. Early in the 
twentieth century one historian enthusiastically suggested that a play might reflect 
better than anything else the economic situation of the time in which it was written: “a 
study of the leading characters of The Devil Is an Ass . . . would be by far the best 
introduction to the economic history of the period.”124 This approach to the plays is 
vulnerable to the criticism that Jean Howard makes of the old historicist approach of 
Tillyard. Such an approach may be found to be based on problematic assumptions, 
namely that history is knowable, and that historians and critics can see the facts of 
history objectively.125 This can lead “to the trivialization of literature: to its reduction 
to a mere reflection of something extrinsic to itself.”126
Jonson may be seen to have recognized this in his time. In the Prologue to 
Epicoene he expresses disapproval of the idea that a play might be viewed as an 
attempt to represent contemporary life in unmediated literal terms. He disclaims any 
possibility of defamation, and at the same time cautions audiences to “think nothing 
 Howard presents for the 
reader’s disapproval what she identifies as the older historicism’s distinguishing 
mark: the assumption that literature was a mirror reflecting something more real and 
more important than itself. 
                                                 
124 Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 3; citing “Commerce and Coinage” in Shakespeare’s England 
(London, 1917), vol. i, 340; original source: George Unwin, Industrial Organization in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904). 
125 Jean E. Howard, “The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies,” in New Historicism and 
Renaissance Drama, ed. Richard Wilson and Richard Dutton (London: Longman, 1994), 23. 
126 Ibid. 
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true,” since a “poet never credit gained / By writing truths, but things (like truths) well 
feigned” (7, 9, 10).127 If realism does deal in things, like truths, well feigned, Jonson’s 
prefatory disclaimer of defamation doubles as a self-conscious literary strategy in 
which, while trumpeting the soundness of his ethic, he reminds his audience of the 
artifice at work in the writing: “think nothing true.” At its most successful, this 
approach has the result of forming a bond between the playwright and the section of 
an audience he wishes to reach. Stanley Fish finds this bonding approach in Jonson’s 
verse, noting that speaker (or writer) and hearer become “mutually constituting 
members of a self-identifying community.”128
 Jonson’s choice of verb in that line from the Chorus to Every Man Out of His 
Humour – he aims to “oppose” a mirror – holds a connotation beyond the 
straightforward sense of holding up a mirror: one of antagonistic contrariety, not out 
of character for the author. If Jonson can be seen as a guardian of traditional ethics,
 It is part of my thesis that Inns of Court 
lawyers were a favoured part of the target audience for city comedy, and, in drama 
more directly than in verse, playwrights and Inns men likewise could become, in 
Fish’s phrase, mutually constituting members of a self-identifying community. 
129 
he is, at the same time, “a man of paradox and contradiction whose . . . plays are 
profoundly dialectical.”130
                                                 
127 Ben Jonson, Epicoene, or The Silent Woman, in “The Alchemist” and other plays, ed. Gordon 
Campbell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 123. 
 Instead of “writing truths,” Jonson and a few others might 
be interpreted to mirror their time’s deformity by means of a discourse of stylized 
deformity. By deformity I mean the kind of elusive and antithetical discursive practice 
128 Stanley Fish, “Author-Readers: Jonson’s Community of the Same,” Representations, No. 7 
(Summer, 1984), 52. 
129 Wells, “Jacobean City Comedy and the Ideology of the City,” 37. 
130 Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 5. 
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which, as one of John Marston’s characters notes, has become fashionable in educated 
circles of 1604 London, where “’tis not in fashion to call things by their right 
names.”131 In his dedication of Every Man Out of His Humour to the Inns of Court, 
Jonson will say only that the Inns’ lawyers are “not despis’d.”132
Things “like truths” may be feigned in terms of reputation, too. In Every Man 
in His Humour, Jonson articulates the idea that “it holds for good polity ever, to have 
that outwardly in vilest estimation, that inwardly is most dear to us.”
 The disclaimer of 
anti-lawyer sentiment is made authentic by its inclusion in what comes closest to 
being a non-fiction part of the text (the dedication), and by the no-nonsense quality of 
its brevity. If, moreover, the negative expression – not despised – is recognized as an 
example of litotes, it becomes an emphatic affirmation of laconic regard. I say 
emphatic since expressing an affirmative by negative of its contrary infers that the 
affirmative is meant to the same degree as the negative is expressed (and “despise” is 
an emphatically negative verb). This is to sound mathematical or cryptic about 
emotion, but it may represent the playwright’s viewpoint. 
133 An idea 
ostensibly antithetical in character becomes pragmatic advice when applied to a 
profession. Lawyers in Jonson’s audience, for example, may have recognized it as 
professionally desirable to cultivate identities as formidable adversaries, of 
“outwardly vile estimation.”134
                                                 
131 Spoken by Freevil in Marston’s The Dutch Courtesan (I.ii.103-4): Four Jacobean City Comedies, 
ed. Gāmini Salgādo (Middlesex: Penguin, 1975), 45. 
 Some became too formidable, browbeating litigants or 
132 See infra, 108. 
133 Every Man in his Humour (II.iv.4-6); Ben Jonson, Five Plays, ed. G. A. Wilkes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 33. 
134 There were instances of lawyers’ disputes escalating to verbal abuse and physical violence. John 
Davies assaulted Richard Martin in 1598: Minutes of Parliament of the Middle Temple, i, 379-80; Hans 
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witnesses in legal proceedings.135
Having examined the fashion for an antithetical approach in verbal practice, I 
want to return to Jonson’s ideas about the function of comedy. Besides the worthy 
classical authority on which Jonson’s ideas are founded, there seems a self-
consciously clever enjoyment in the antithetical notion of a writer of comedy who 
 Tangle in The Phoenix is vile for his vexatious and 
dilatory ways: “by the puzzle of suits and shifting of courts, [he] has more tricks and 
starting holes than the dizzy pates of fifteen attorneys” (I.ii.148-150). But Tangle is 
only a quasi-lawyer, and as such he is inwardly vile, too. There was uncertainty up to 
the sixteenth century, and into the seventeenth, about what legitimately defined 
whether a man could be called a professional lawyer. The large number of different 
and complicated legal jurisdictions meant that there was no single qualification which 
automatically allowed a man to practise in them. It is impossible to provide even 
approximate figures, but it may be presumed that, for centuries, men had acted as 
legal representatives who possessed no more qualification than that they were thick-
skinned and unafraid of public-speaking. Antipathy to amateur lawyers is reflected in 
the strange episode at the end of The Phoenix where ex-lawyer Quieto opens Tangle’s 
vein in order to bleed him of his vexatious tendencies (V.i.306). The idea may be seen 
as something like an Inns of Court lawyer’s version of Jonson’s remedy for 
Crispinus’s verbal idiosyncrasy: the ethical satirist Horace requests that the poetaster 
be made to vomit offending words and constructions, as Quieto performs his 
humours-surgery on the offending quasi-lawyer. 
                                                                                                                                            
S. Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 18-22; see also The Records of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, ii, 31-2. 
135 In The Rise of the Barristers, 293 n. 27, Prest cites without specifying by name STAC 8/134/3; 
located at the National Archives: Records of the Court of Star Chamber and other courts, 1558-1649. 
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wishes to insist that making people laugh is vulgar. There are no detailed 
contemporary accounts of early modern audience responses.136 In the Induction to The 
Isle of Gulls (1606), John Day makes the light-heartedly sceptical suggestion that too 
“witty” material may sometimes have relied for appreciative responses on the favour 
of friends: “And where sits his [the playwright’s] friends? hath he not a prepard 
company of gallants, to aplaud his iests, and grace out his play [?]”137 It may be over-
sceptical to wonder if this aspect of Jonson’s ideas about comedy – making people 
laugh is vulgar – was in part a matter of authorial convenience: insurance against poor 
receptions. The possibility that some element of convenience might underpin the 
intellectual rigour seemed possible in criticism of the 1990s. Jonson was found not 
above “the perennial techniques of the mountebank who decried the deceptions and 
the false wares of others the more easily to practise his own deceptions and pass off 
his own productions as the ‘real thing’.”138 There may have been some element of 
self-insurance on the playwright’s part. One un-amused audience member remarked 
of a Jonson entertainment that it was “so dull that people say the poet . . . should 
return to his old trade of brickmaking.”139
                                                 
136 Charles Whitney remarks on the lack of detailed accounts in “Ante-aesthetics: Towards a theory of 
early modern audience response,” in Shakespeare and Modernity, ed. Hugh Grady (London: Routledge, 
2000), 41. See also Andrew Gurr, “‘Within the compass of the city walls’: Allegiances in Plays for and 
about the City,” in Plotting Early Modern London: New Essays on Jacobean City Comedy, ed. Dieter 
Mehl, Angela Stock, and Anne-Julia Zwierlein (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 122. 
 Another playgoer, student Richard West, 
137 The play is included in The Works of John Day, ed. A. H. Bullen, London, 1881. 
138 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, “Smithfield and Authorship: Ben Jonson,” in New Historicism 
and Renaissance Drama, ed. Richard Wilson and Richard Dutton (London: Longman, 1994), 216. 
139 Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, James I, 1611-1618, vol. 
xcv (London: Longman Brown, 1858), 512; detail stated: 10 January 1618, Nath. Brent. 
 46 
admired the didactic aspect of Jonson’s comedies, but West’s encomium is open to 
interpretation as a backhanded compliment to a writer of comedy: “Thy scaenes are 
precepts, every verse doth give / Counsel, and teach us not to laugh, but live.”140
 
 
 
(iii) Antecedents 
 
City comedy’s literary and non-literary antecedents give further evidence of its 
contradictory, antithetical nature, and this contributes to the idea that surface anti-
lawyer sentiment ought not to be taken as read. 
The genre has three principal dramatic antecedents: the morality play, the 
Roman intrigue comedy, and the commedia dell’arte. The form of the plays derives 
from the medieval morality play, specifically the estates morality, and the morality 
play’s successor, the Tudor interlude. An opportunist approach in city comedy to the 
acquisition of sex and money, and reference to recognizable locations in the depiction 
of urban life, derives from classical Roman intrigue comedy, as exemplified by the 
comedies of Plautus and Terence. Intrigue comedy’s contemporary descendant, the 
commedia dell’arte, is a further influence; its improvised performances featured stock 
character types and stock trickery episodes, or lazzi.141
                                                 
140 Jonsonus Virbius, London, 1638: one of the less detailed accounts in Whitney, “Ante-aesthetics: 
Towards a theory of early modern audience response,” 49. 
 If city comedy makes the bad 
or unscrupulous lawyer a famous stock character type, it is not the young Inns of 
Court lawyer: it is the quasi-lawyer Tangle in The Phoenix, the civil Advocate Voltore 
in Volpone, the Inns of Chancery drop-out Throte in Ram Alley. The worst that direct 
allusions to young common lawyers get is to such as the “two-shilling Inns o’ Court 
141 See Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 4, 12. 
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men,”142
 I now examine city comedy’s non-dramatic antecedents, in order to show how 
they affected representations of lawyers. The genre has three principal non-dramatic 
antecedents: the coney-catching pamphlet, verse satire, and complaint. The coney-
catching pamphlet was a minor genre just preceding city comedy, a form of 
Elizabethan low prose which became popular in the 1590s;
 careful with money when paying for sex. Quieto, the Puritan ex-lawyer in 
The Phoenix, remains, true to his name, fairly quiet; and Trebatius in Poetaster is not 
only a good lawyer, he represents the utmost in ethics and dignity. The main point in 
connection with city comedy’s dramatic antecedents is that antithesis is present in the 
amalgam of them. The Morality tradition and intrigue comedy display contradictory 
social attitudes; juxtaposed in city comedy, the effect is not unlike the meeting of 
jurisprudence and miscreants in a courtroom: high-minded ideas confront low-life 
experience. City comedy’s formal antecedents, then, are contradictory, and an 
inherent contradiction of form might be seen as an apt foundation for a provocative, 
antithetical discursive practice, in which context pejorative allusions to lawyers ought 
not to be taken at face value. The figure of Michaelmas Term in the Induction to 
Middleton’s play, for example, is riddled with contradiction, even in form. To 
overlook the unreal, fantastical context of the Induction, where a personified period of 
time is made corporeal, city-bound lawyer is to be drawn in by deceptive appearance. 
143
                                                 
142 Marston, The Dutch Courtesan (II.ii.29-30). 
 an urban setting and 
characters are conventional, with emphasis on the trickery of urban thieves. Beyond 
the episodes of trickery and the urban settings, the relevance of these pamphlets for 
representations of lawyers in city comedy is the way in which an audience is left with 
143 A coney is a rabbit, and coney-catcher was a name attached to vagabonds, the homeless and 
itinerant poor, who were feared and legislated against in Elizabeth’s reign. 
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a kind of sympathy, admiration even, for the wrong-doers, including the quasi-
lawyers. The playwrights of city comedy may be seen to represent the antipathies of 
young Inns of Court men, but the latter could be expected at the same time to be 
thoroughly entertained by Tangle’s misdeeds in The Phoenix, by Throte’s wheeling 
and dealing in Ram Alley, and so on. There is nothing to say that antipathy should not 
be entertaining. Robert Greene exemplifies the genre’s characteristic method of 
offering readers sensational material disguised as helpful advice on how to avoid 
being a target of vice. We find here a similar tendency towards contradiction and 
antithesis to that between Roman intrigue and morality play. Greene’s “pleasant tales” 
of shady behaviour reveal an affection and admiration for their subjects that 
contradicts the traditional morality framing of the narratives. An analogy may be 
found in the characteristic last-moment recantations of city comedy’s tricksters. The 
moral didacticism in these plays tends to be ambiguous. City comedy’s tricksters see 
the error of their ways in what can seem a perfunctory manner; the regret may seem 
so late in the day as to make it to some extent ridiculous or redundant. Quomodo’s 
loss and regret at the end of Michaelmas Term, for example, can seem unconvincing; 
not only in terms of the abruptness with which he is turned around, but because he 
had a case to argue against Easy, following a significant legal development made 
some two years or so before the play’s first performance.144
Verse satire shared with the coney-catching pamphlet the formal approach of 
the writer affecting an attitude of disgust with social and moral corruption and folly. 
Marston’s early experience as a verse satirist may have increased his particular 
 There are patterns of 
irony and antithesis here, one of the implications of which is that anti-lawyer 
sentiment ought not to be taken at face value. 
                                                 
144 See infra, 212. 
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interest in the organization of ambiguity of motive and personality in his plays.145 
Representations of social and moral corruption in lawyers and others learned in the 
law from Marston, a Middle Templar, might be expected to involve at least some 
degree of posture (or imposture), of a conventional satirical persona employed in a 
new and striking way. Lording Barry, on the other hand, was known to operate on the 
wrong side of the law, and something interesting happens when authorial imposture is 
directed at imposture in the law. Barry injects an unexpected note of didacticism in 
Ram Alley when he has a quasi-lawyer articulate the idea of removing property from a 
privileged young man in order to let him experience want.146
There is something provocative and contradictory, again, about city comedy’s 
use of complaint, a tradition derived from the Church in a genre in which sinful 
motives, of avarice and lust, are treated light-heartedly and, at least up until the last 
moment, apparently celebrated. Complaint denotes a different strain of satire. 
Elizabethan audiences’ ability and willingness to involve themselves in plays, often 
complex ones, is sometimes accounted for by the fact that Church commitments 
meant that they were accustomed to standing for an hour or more in order to listen to 
the didactic argument in sermons and homilies.
 
147
                                                 
145 See Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 87. 
 Lawyers were accustomed to taking 
part in argument, of course, so the sometimes intricate points attaching to the 
expression of apparent anti-lawyer sentiment would have provided an entertaining 
diversion. The private theatres may have been even a little quieter than the quite noisy 
environment in which they had to work: in this period, the courts of King’s Bench, 
Chancery, Common Pleas, and Exchequer were all situated in Westminster Hall; each 
146 See infra, 203. 
147 Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 19. 
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court was scarcely out of earshot of the others, and speakers had to compete with the 
noise made by numerous suitors, lawyers, shopkeepers, cutpurses and sightseers in the 
body of the hall.148 The Church had since medieval times had a tradition of using 
invective – “complaint” – against evils such as greed and ambition; this was a harsher 
form, comparable to Juvenilian satire, as distinct from Horatian satire, which is more 
direct about and focused on its targets.149
The harshness of complaint, and its resemblance to Juvenilian satire leads me 
back to dramatic antecedents: specifically to Juvenal, who may seem to have had a 
particular influence on the playwrights of city comedy in terms of the plays’ arguable 
status as morally didactic texts. I want to suggest that one of the new and decisively 
“modern” things which Jonson and other playwrights of satirical city comedy do is to 
make them, as didactic texts, deliberate failures. The idea is that the playwrights of 
city comedy reproduce a perceived “error” of the satirists of antiquity, notably 
Juvenal, with a view to their resembling the ancients more closely in terms of 
achievement and identity. This contributes to making apparent anti-lawyer sentiment a 
deliberately failed aspect of the genre. Jonson was critically aware of the possibilities 
 Satire involving lawyers in city comedy 
tends more towards the Horatian form – Jonson has Horace himself trying to escape 
the company of the poetaster and possible lawyer Crispinus (the need to argue a case 
in court would add to the resemblance to Middle Templar Marston) with some 
remarks about the routine trials involved in simply going to court: “Now, let me dye, 
sir, if I know your lawes; / Or haue the power to stand still halfe so long / In their loud 
courts, as while a case is argued” (III.i.195-8).  
                                                 
148 Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 37. 
149 See John Peter, Complaint and Satire in Early English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1956). 
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of shaping identity, and none more so than his own, as evidenced by his suppression 
of his own popular plays. These included a collaboration with Dekker on a domestic 
tragedy, Page of Plymouth (possibly on the line of Arden of Faversham), and 
historical tragedies on Richard Crookback, Robert II, King of Scots and the Fall of 
Mortimer.150 The playwright’s reason for excluding Bartholomew Fair from his 1616 
Workes is (or has been) anybody’s guess.151 Jonson’s desire to be seen to resemble the 
classical satirists is witnessed early on in the development of city comedy in 
Poetaster, in which he represents himself as Horace and associates with Virgil. 
Horace’s meeting of minds in the play with the revered ancient lawyer-jurist Trebatius 
creates a setting for poet and lawyer to be in on the deliberate failure of some 
deliberately predictable anti-lawyer sentiment from fool Tucca and fawn-informer 
Lupus. Critics have written before, in different respects, of perceived failures on 
Jonson’s part. Edmund Wilson delivered the notorious account of Jonson as anal-
erotic: “a hoarder who withholds from others the treasures he collects and remains 
consistently ‘aloof not yielding himself to intimate fellowship’”; Wilson links what he 
sees as Jonson’s “deficiencies of personality” to some perceived “difficulties as an 
artist,” which, for Wilson, are “reflected in characteristic artistic failures . . . 
[including] a disastrous restriction of range and sympathy that contrasts so markedly 
with the expansiveness of Shakespeare.”152
                                                 
150 Bradbrook, The Growth and Structure of Elizabethan Comedy, 141. 
 And Stanley Fish has questioned the 
characterization of Jonson’s poetry as urbane and polished, finding much of it marked 
151 Stallybrass and White, “Smithfield and Authorship: Ben Jonson,” 217. 
152 “Morose Ben Jonson,” in The Triple Thinkers (New York: Octagon Books, 1977), 219-20. See also 
Fish, “Author-Readers: Jonson’s Community of the Same,” 40. 
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by laboured awkwardness.153 I would emphasize in this idea the importance of a 
deliberate, affected failure – with a fashionably antithetical aim of success in 
resembling the ancient satirists. It is possible to see the approach to moralizing in 
satirical city comedy as an intellectual brutalization of sprezzatura:154 affecting false 
humility has come to seem old-fashioned; the new thing is to make extravagant show 
of high intellect, but to do so – again in fashionable, contradictory spirit – using low, 
sordid subject matter. This is where the example of Juvenal is of relevance. Juvenal is 
recognized to have “fall[en] into an error very common among intellectual moralists, 
that of proclaiming a social ideal with his rational mind, and then destroying any hope 
of its fulfilment by the emotional attitudes he brings to it.”155 And Peter Green’s 
observation that there is “a radical split detectable between Juvenal’s moral ideals, 
and the fashionable intellectual scepticism which he shared with most educated 
Romans of his day and age”156
                                                 
153 Fish gives the example of the poem in praise of Shakespeare: “Author-Readers: Jonson’s 
Community of the Same,” 28. The first sixteen lines of Jonson’s poem describe the kinds of praise the 
poet will not offer. Jonson’s announcement at Line 17 “I therefore will begin” introduces a list of poets 
to whom Shakespeare will not be compared. 
 might be adapted to apply to Jonson and the educated 
Londoners of his day. What may have influenced Jonson and others in this connection 
is that an esteemed ancient such as Juvenal is seen to “fall” into such an error, so, 
conscious in their time of image-building as well as aspiration to achievement (self-
fashioning), certain early modern writers could be walking into such an “error,” of 
destroying idealism with attitude, with a view to coming closer to resembling in 
154 The paradoxical concept of appearing effortlessly graceful, despite the effort required for mastering 
the necessary codes of behaviour, as articulated in Castiglione’s Il Cortegiano (The Courtier). 
155 Juvenal, The Sixteen Satires, tr. and ed. Peter Green (Middlesex: Penguin, 1967), 39. 
156 Ibid. 
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reputation and achievement, the ancients. Janet Clare finds Marston following the 
example of “gloomie Iuvenall” in his verse satire the Scourge of Villanie (1598), 
implicitly preparing to enact the role of free-speaking satirist in exile.157 For Jonson 
the ancients are “guides, not commanders”,158
Thomas Dekker and Thomas Heywood succeed where Jonson, Marston and 
Middleton choose, so to speak, to fail in this way. In the context of city comedy 
criticism, Dekker and Heywood seem at times outsiders to the in-crowd of Jonson, 
Marston and Middleton
 but they are guides all the while, 
possibly, to intellectual self-contradictions (in a sense, magnificent failures) such as 
Juvenal’s. 
 .159
                                                 
157 Janet Clare, “Marston: censure, censorship, and free speech,” in The Drama of John Marston, 
Critical Re-Visions, ed. T. F. Wharton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 195. 
 But Dekker did perform at least one intentional failure 
with the purpose of irking Jonson, in his structuring of Satiromastix: a conventional 
historical romance with a response to Poetaster inserted as a subplot with 
conspicuously little of the attention to craft and decorum which Jonson demanded. 
The distinction between the structural anomalies of Satiromastix and, say, 
158 L. C. Knights, Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968), 192; 
referring to Jonson, Timber, xxi. 
159 In 2004, Stock and Zwierlein summarily dismissed plays by Dekker and Heywood as “sentimental 
and falsely nostalgic claptrap”: “Our Scene is London,” 18. Knights diminished Dekker as he lionized 
Jonson, declaring that “[t]o turn from Jonson to Dekker is to be jolted into recognition of the gulf 
between the higher and the lower ranges of Jacobean dramatic literature”: Drama and Society in the 
Age of Jonson, 228. He continues: “[w]ith a few exceptions Dekker’s plays are uniformly dull, and the 
effort of attention they require – the sheer effort to keep one’s eyes on the page – is out of all 
proportion to the reward”: ibid, 28. Gibbons recognizes that “one [should not] altogether dismiss the 
much mocked Thomas Dekker”: Jacobean City Comedy, 3. Leggatt defends Heywood in Citizen 
Comedy in the Age of Shakespeare, 12. 
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Michaelmas Term – where knowledge of the introduction of a contemporary, new 
remedy for debt recovery is capable of making a difference to an interpretation of the 
play’s ending – is that, if Middleton’s play’s ending is interpreted as a deliberate 
failure, it has the lateral function of appearing to destroy idealism with attitude, self-
consciously in the style of the ancient satirical poets. 
 
 
(iv) Criticism 
 
In her recent book, Heather C. Easterling says that the critical habit of comparing 
Shakespeare with city comedy results often in a reduction of the genre’s purview to 
“the narrowly local or simply satirical next to Shakespeare’s Ciceronian fullness and 
expansive scope beyond the local and the commercial.”160 Jean Howard observed a 
few years earlier that the continuing monumental presence of Shakespeare in 
education and culture meant that issues and topics not covered in his plays might be 
ignored: “If we want to study dramatic depictions of London’s shopkeepers and their 
wives, we need to look elsewhere.”161 The same might be said of lawyers, since 
Shakespeare expressly portrayed only one of them. Recent interdisciplinary 
scholarship in law and literature finds that Shakespeare’s plays, broadly speaking, 
display disrespect for law and legal processes.162
                                                 
160 Parsing the City: Jonson, Middleton, Dekker, and City Comedy’s London as Language (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 150 n. 12. 
 The preoccupation with Shakespeare 
remained evident in the introduction to a 2004 collection of essays on city comedy, in 
which it is observed that the writers of the genre “may not yet rival Shakespeare” in 
161 “Shakespeare and the London of City Comedy,” Shakespeare Studies 39 (2001): 15-16. 
162 See supra, 6. 
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the amount of editorial work and critical acclaim they receive.163 The “not yet” may 
seem over-optimistic. Parity seems unlikely, as city comedy does not have 
Shakespeare’s variety. Gibbons comments on the first page of his study of 
Shakespeare about the great abundance in the plays – it may have seemed the more 
remarkable after his work on city comedy.164 And Leonard Tennenhouse has written 
bluntly about the possibility that there can seem at times little variety in the genre, 
finding that it can be “difficult . . . to remember which of the many characters in city 
comedy belong to the same play, or for that matter . . . to distinguish one plot device 
from another.”165 Even if new work by Easterling, and recent collections edited by 
Dennis Kezar, and Dieter Mehl and others signal an increase in critical interest,166 city 
comedy is, and is likely to remain “a compact subgenre . . . the critical response to 
[which is] equally compact.”167
 Wells’ notion of city comedy having a “dual audience” may be applied to the 
reception of legal matter in the genre.
 
168
                                                 
163 Stock and Zwierlein, “Our Scene is London,” 2. 
 Lawyers and student members of the Inns of 
Court might make something different of complex legal allusions and ironic treatment 
of conventional anti-lawyer sentiment from a lay audience interested in the law, and 
familiar with more high-profile legal developments, but lacking detailed knowledge. 
164 Shakespeare and Multiplicity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1. 
165 “Family Rites: City Comedy and the Strategies of Patriarchalism,” 196. Tennenhouse paraphrases 
Knights’ remark about Middleton’s characters: Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson, 258 n. 4. 
166 Easterling, Parsing the City; Dennis Kezar, ed., Solon and Thespis: Law and Theater in the English 
Renaissance (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Mehl, Stock, and 
Zwierlein, eds., Plotting Early Modern London. 
167 Wells, “Jacobean City Comedy and the Ideology of the City,” 37. 
168 Ibid, 47-8 
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Wells had something different in mind: a sophisticated, well-educated element, and a 
broader, less educated public element. The theory of Mikhail Bahktin is central to her 
essay “Jacobean City Comedy and the Ideology of the City”.169 She contends that a 
proposed critical opposition – the sociological criticism of L. C. Knights and the 
generic criticism of Brian Gibbons – can be overcome by analysing city comedy as a 
response to “specific contradictions within hegemonic ideology concerning the City 
of London.”170 The main argument in the analysis is that city comedy is an attempt to 
recover pre-industrial harmony between commerce and celebration – things which 
have become contradictory aspects of the marketplace – such harmony having been 
compromised by rapid growth, commercial development, and royal domination of the 
city during the Jacobean period. The language of early modern satire, says Wells, is: 
“the ‘billingsgate’, the language of abuse, the language of the body.”171 If this is the 
case, though, the proposition of an intellectually stratified dual audience for these 
“billingsgate” satires seems not to corroborate the idea of an attempt to recover 
harmony, or to reconcile contradiction. The conventional view that these plays are 
hostile to the legal profession is paradoxical because Inns of Court lawyers were an 
element of the audience for the plays, and the plays play on this obvious contradiction 
not in order to recover harmony, but in order rather to segregate certain of those 
working in the legal system outside of the Inns of Court. Lording Barry’s Ram Alley, 
for example, can be interpreted as favouring the members of the Inns of Court in the 
enforced segregation of attorneys and others to the Inns of Chancery.172
                                                 
169 Wells, “Jacobean City Comedy and the Ideology of the City,” 38; reference to Mikhail Bahktin, 
Rabelais and his World, tr. Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1968). 
 
170 Ibid., 37. 
171 Ibid., 38. 
172 See infra, 193-5. 
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Theodore B. Leinwand’s analysis of city comedy’s stereotypical characters 
may be applied in such a way as to break the commonly negatively perceived 
stereotype of the lawyer. Leinwand argues that the discussions and disagreements 
Londoners were having about the way they perceived their city and those who 
populated it offer a key to accounting for the plots and stock character types of city 
comedy.173 These types become familiar in the plays’ dramatis personae, and come to 
give a readymade idea of the plot-line to follow. Leinwand incorporates into his 
account the idea that the people of Jacobean England cultivated a “status ideology,”174 
and suggests that city comedy is a measure of the way the inhabitants of Jacobean 
London perceived each other:175 it is a satire of the stereotypes which, he proposes, 
Londoners tolerated for the purposes of identifying one another.176 These satirical 
plays encompass more than folly and vice, or at least they find folly in stereotypes: 
they “embody men’s attitudes, not merely their vices . . . To laugh at the foolishness 
figured in one of city comedy’s merchants, gallants, or wives would have been to 
laugh at attitudes that were already stale and inadequate.”177
                                                 
173 Leinwand, The City Staged, 20. 
 In the same way, then, to 
laugh at vexatiousness and greed in one of city comedy’s lawyers might be to laugh at 
an attitude already stale and inadequate. Leinwand says the playwrights were able to 
174 Historian Perez Zagorin writes of Jacobean England as a status-conscious society: The Court and 
the Country: The Beginnings of the English Revolution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 124. 
175 Leinwand, The City Staged, fly leaf. 
176 Ibid., 18. 
177 Ibid., 14. Cf. the idea that plays are “provocations to thought and patterns for action”: Louis A. 
Montrose, “The Purpose of Playing: Reflections on a Shakespearean Anthropology,” Helios, New 
Series, 7 (1979-80), 68. Knights suggested that the playwrights played with contemporary attitudes: 
Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson, 188, 266. 
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suggest the inadequacy of a denigrating stereotype by exaggerating and parodying 
it.178
 
 There is exaggeration and parody in, for instance, Tangle’s copious spouting of 
law-related Latinisms in The Phoenix, but there are other reasons for this besides 
exaggeration and parody, relating to a drive for increased organization and 
professionalism on the part of the young lawyers and students of the Inns of Court. 
Stereotypes were to be found in non-dramatic literature, too. Francis Lenton penned a 
prose example of the stereotype of the Inns of Court student in Characterismi: 
A yong Innes a Court Gentleman . . . is one that for the most part forgets his errand, and 
studies Poetry instead of Perkins [a reference to a contemporary legal text, Perkins’ 
Profitable Book179] . . . His Recreations and loose expence of time, are his only studies 
(as Plaies, Dancing, Fencing, Tauerns, Tobacco,) and Dalliance . . . [these recreations] 
are the alluring baits of ill disposed extrauagants. He is roaring when hee should be 
reading, and feasting when he should be fasting . . . Amorous Sonnets, warbled to the 
Vyall are his Coelestiall Harmony, and if you put a Case betweene you make a great 
discord. Hee loues sense better than reason, and consequently not so fit to make a 
Lawyer.180
 
 
The stereotype of the sonneteering Inns student is used at the end of The Phoenix, 
again in the mouth of Tangle. Only here the allusion has not to do with any loose 
expense of time, but is tied to the rhetorical horror of his own (or his own type’s) 
immolation at the hands of the member of the new profession:181
                                                 
178 Leinwand, The City Staged, 93. 
 “here, here, here, 
here; quickly dip your quills in my blood, off with my skin and write fourteen lines of 
a side” (IV.i.124-5). 
179 Inner Temple man John Perkins’ Incipit perutilis tractatus magistri Johnis Perkins sive explanation 
quorandam capitulorum valde necessarie (the original title of his practical interpretation of the land 
law) was first printed in law French in 1530; an English translation appeared in 1555. 
180 Francis Lenton, Characterismi: or, Lentons Leasvres. Expressed in Essayes and Characters, Neuer 
before written on (London, 1631), F4r-F5v. 
181 See infra, 115. 
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One commentator feels that Leinwand may exaggerate the plays’ capacity to 
arouse an audience’s scepticism about the London they dramatize.182 But this seems 
unjustly to underestimate contemporary audiences, particularly the audience for these 
plays; it is in any event a matter impossible to determine. Leinwand acknowledges 
one more example of the antithetical nature of satirical city comedy, and a potential 
obstacle for his analysis: “at the very moment that the plays seek to disabuse their 
audience of prejudice, they implicate themselves in these same prejudices by re[-
]enacting them.”183
Griswold’s suggestion that city comedy may present “an indirect, transformed, 
or even inverted image of social reality” emphasizes that tricks are played with 
 Where lawyers and Inns students are concerned, the playwrights 
of city comedy were doing something more than rendering negative stereotypes stale 
by exaggeration and parody. Sometimes it is as simple as having an obviously foolish 
character express a provocative opinion for pantomimic effect – Tucca in Poetaster is 
an example of this. Negative representations are sometimes plainly negative, but 
subtle points make such representations relate not to Inns of Court lawyers, but to 
other workers in the legal system – amateur, quasi-lawyers such as Throte in Ram 
Alley, or civilians such as Voltore in Volpone. The plays do not function to disabuse 
audiences of prejudices about lawyers so much as they use prejudices simultaneously 
to engage the lawyers and Inns students in the audience, and to valorize the profession 
for the non-lawyers in the audience. 
                                                 
182 Michael Taylor, introduction to A Mad World, My Masters, by Thomas Middleton, in “A Mad 
World, My Masters,” and other plays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), xxi. Leinwand’s critic 
may seem to subscribe to the school of thought that “Renaissance English dramatists achieved what 
they did despite their . . . audiences”: Whitney, “Ante-aesthetics: Towards a theory of early modern 
audience response,” 40. 
183 Leinwand, The City Staged, 93. 
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representation in the genre.184 This corresponds with the point made in the section 
concerning Jonson’s ideas about comedy about city comedy importing an elusive and 
antithetical discursive practice, and with Axton’s drawing of attention to Inns men’s 
appreciation of the possibilities of imitation.185 When Griswold says it can be 
“tempting to interpret the genre as reflecting the mores of the late Elizabethan and 
Jacobean period, an era of increasing materialism, cynicism, and sharp dealing, or . . . 
reflect[ing] an abhorrence for these developments,”186 the verb “tempting” implies 
that audiences should look for more beyond this, and, as I suggested in relation to the 
idea of Jonson’s reflecting the time’s deformity, Griswold says that reflection is too 
simple a metaphor.187 She proposes that these plays contain “nervous hymns to social 
degree”.188 By this she appears to be saying that the playwrights of city comedy 
endorse a traditional, conservative position on social hierarchy. Griswold’s view 
places emphasis on contemporary anxieties about increasing social mobility as a 
threat to stability and social order, and about a modern conception of social rank 
based on achievement rather than birth; she concludes that city comedy 
“simultaneously displayed economic mobility while soothing social anxieties.”189
                                                 
184 Renaissance Revivals, 26. 
 
Middleton’s characterization of Tangle in The Phoenix includes sympathetic allusions 
185 See supra, 33, 43. 
186 Renaissance Revivals, 25. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid., 52: “especially late ones like [John Fletcher’s 1614 play] Wit without Money and [Philip 
Massinger’s 1621 play] A New Way to Pay Old Debts.” 
189 Ibid., 51, 54. 
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to the hardship the amateur, quasi-lawyer has endured, showing that city comedy 
offered more complex representations of legal figures in particular.190
Lawyers are implicitly included in Tennenhouse’s affirmation of common 
opinion: “critics who feel that those in . . . the middle rank . . . were receiving shabby 
treatment at the hands of Jacobean playwrights are correct. An assortment of groups . . 
. were being represented in decidedly negative terms.”
 
191 Tennenhouse finds a 
tension, though, between patriarchal endings of plays and the metropolis they held at 
bay.192
Some critics have expressed doubt about the continuing viability of city 
comedy as a genre. Gale H. Carrithers’ decision to consider Jonson and Middleton 
separately in order “to reduce somewhat the violence inevitably done to whole works 
and discrete bodies of work by any thematic focus” is an argument against the concept 
of genre per se.
 There seems some contradiction in being prepared to take at face value 
apparently negative representation of lawyers and other groups, and then reading in 
structural tension to the plays. If tensions are recognized in the structure of the plays, 
it would seem consistent to acknowledge that tensions may exist in representation of 
lawyers and others – that their representation may be more complex than it appears on 
the surface.  
193 Douglas Bruster is more specific in asserting that the concept of 
city comedy has outlived its usefulness as an aid to understanding plays of the era.194
                                                 
190 See infra, 123. 
 
191 Tennenhouse, “Family Rites: City Comedy and the Strategies of Patriarchalism,” 205. 
192 Ibid., 195. 
193 Gale H. Carrithers, “City-Comedy’s Sardonic Hierarchy of Literacy,” Studies in English Literature, 
1500-1900, vol. 29, no. 2, Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama (Spring 1989), 338. 
194 Drama and the Market in the Age of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
30. 
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This sounds more radical than it is. Bruster’s argument is that “the concept of place, 
once crucial to a social analysis of the plays, is ultimately less important . . . than a 
concern with material life which underlies the themes and structures of the drama.”195
 In bringing this examination of genre to a close, I want to highlight the 
generally understated impact of plague on representation in Jacobean city comedy. 
There is underplayed significance, for example, in the information that: “[w]hen the 
theat[re]s reopened after the plague in 1604, they rapidly developed a topical and 
 
By this stage in city comedy’s critical history, Bruster would find little disagreement 
from anyone that the plays’ concerns with material life are at least as important as the 
concept of place. The subordination of the concept of place to a concern with material 
life is immanent in most analyses of city comedy since the first edition of Gibbons’ 
study (Wells’ essay is an exception). Representation of the Inns of Court in the plays 
is an example of location and material life being of equal interest, and the induction to 
Michaelmas Term, for just one example, will always invite a reader to consider the 
significance of location – in that case, the difference made between city and country. 
Perhaps the point for any who doubt the continued viability of the denomination city 
comedy is that it can be an inconvenient label. Dekker’s The Shoemakers’ Holiday is 
set in the city, but is often used as an example of what satiric city comedy is not: 
genial, romantic, sentimental. The use of city as an adjective describing certain 
comedies by Jonson, Marston, Middleton and a few others signifies an attitude and a 
style at the same time as (and always more than) it connotes London the place: in 
these comedies the urban implies a robust and characteristically ironical urbanity. 
                                                 
195 Ibid. 
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urban satiric comedy.”196 Anxiety about the mortality rate in plague-hit London must 
have affected ideas about the long years of study and training necessary to becoming a 
lawyer, all of which could turn out to be futile. Statistics for admissions at the Inns of 
Court do show an increase across decades,197 but, as Prest notes, “a plaguy summer 
depressed income from admissions and chamber entry fees.”198 A sense of mortality 
may be expected to have contributed to the discourse used in city comedy, which 
played to an audience conscious of the possibility that family, friends and neighbours 
might drop dead for sharing bad air, and aware that they might be next. If “plague 
mortality exhibited a clear social bias,” even those who enjoyed some degree of 
privilege “could draw little reassurance from statistical probabilities of infection if 
some of their friends and neighbours were attacked”: several leading lawyers and a 
justice of the peace were numbered among the victims of plague in the seventeenth 
century.199
 Jacobean city comedy was still in its ascendancy artistically in 1606. Today a 
critic may look back and observe that, in the theatre, “it was a rich time, in plays if not 
income.”
 
200
                                                 
196 Bliss, The World’s Perspective: John Webster and the Jacobean Drama, 7. Leggatt writes: “[w]hen 
[the private theatres] re-opened after the plague in 1604, there was a tremendous burst of activity in 
citizen comedy among the boys’ companies”; Citizen Comedy in the Age of Shakespeare, 8. 
 Yet Paul’s closed in 1606 (the year, too, of the Act of Abuses), and the 
197 See supra, 21. 
198 The Inns of Court, 89. In this connection, see The Records of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s 
Inn, i, 339; ii, 37; Minutes of Parliament of the Middle Temple, i, 335. 
199 See Paul Slack, The Impact of Plague in Tudor and Stuart England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 193. 
200 Andrew Gurr, “The Blackfriars Boys, 1600-1613,” ch. 20 in The Shakespearian Playing Companies 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 353. 
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notion of “a rich time,” even in plays, may have seemed an idea not quite in line with 
contemporary perception. Dekker’s Seuen deadly Sinnes of London (published in 
1606) gives a sense of the effect plague had on contemporary theatre, on morale, and 
on morality, and how this impacted on ideas about comedy. Comedy is likened to 
tragedy, but not with Jonson’s expressed purpose of affirming classical theory. There 
seems an idea of an “end of Comedy” which signifies less comedy’s purpose, more its 
subduing, as intimations of mortality begin to close upon all walks of London life: 
 
The Players themselves did never worke till now, there Comodies are all turned to 
Tragedies, there Tragedies to Nocturnals . . . Thinke you to delight your selves by 
keeping company with our Poets? . . . their Muses are more Sullen then old Monkeys, 
now that mony is not stirring, they neuer Plead cheerfully, but in their Tearme times, 
when the Two-peny Clients, and Peny Stinkards swarme together to here the Stagerites 
. . . no, no, there is no good doings in these dayes but amongst Lawyers, amongst 
Vintners, in Bawdy houses and at Pimlico. There is all the Musick, (that is of any 
reckoning) there all the meetings, there all the mirth, and there all the mony.201
 
 
Lawyers are first-mentioned in a short list of those who continue to profit in time of 
adversity, but the character of the piece is one above all of end-of-the-tether bitter 
mockery about plague-hit London, with conventional targets drawn impassively 
together for fuller apocalyptic effect. In Dekker’s rhetorical account of the impact of 
plague, comedies are turned to tragedies at the hands of sullen playwright-poets. 
Dekker’s association of plague with vengeance – it is “[t]he purple whip of 
vengeance”202
                                                 
201 The Seuen deadly Sinnes of London: Drawne in seuen seuerall Coaches, Through the seuen seuerall 
Gates of the Citie Bringing the Plague with them (London, 1606), B1r. 
 – participates in the type of contemporary superstition and religious 
over-zealousness which would insist that God sent plague as he sent any other form of 
natural disaster against the sins of mankind: “[p]articular epidemics were . . . to be 
explained by national vices, such as swearing, negligence in attending church, 
202 Ibid. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “plague”: “Affliction, esp. as divine punishment.” 
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atheism, play-going, covetousness and extravagant female fashions.”203
Jonson is described in The Return from Parnassus: or The Scourge of Simony 
(1606) as “a pestilent fellow” (II.iv). The adjective “pestilent” reads on the surface 
like a form of insult. But earlier in the play Jonson is characterized as witty, 
bricklaying poet in a sequence concerning outstanding contemporary writers (I.ii), 
thus supporting an interpretation of the subsequent apparent insult as an approving 
description of Jonson’s “pestilent,” mordant wit. This is a wit, the author of the play 
may have intended to suggest, figuratively merciless and unpredictable as the plague 
which in Jacobean England daily threatened the end not only of comedy but of 
everything – lawyers and law included. 
 In Jacobean 
city comedy we see the kind of irony and scepticism with which we would today view 
those who seek to explain natural disaster as divine retribution. The same irony and 
scepticism plays with, and against, conventional anti-lawyer sentiment. 
  
1.5 Literature and law 
 
A recent study highlighted the cultural importance of English legal developments 
when asking literary questions about matters such as representation, interpretive habit, 
and generic expectation.204
                                                 
203 Slack, The Impact of Plague in Tudor and Stuart England, 26. 
 But the value of literature’s representation of law-related 
phenomena has been queried. Jonathan Rose feels that literary sources “might be of 
greater interest if they reflected doctrinal and institutional insights and provided 
knowledge about the operation of contract, tort, and property law or courts, juries, 
204 Erica Sheen and Lorna Hutson, introduction to Literature, Politics and Law in Renaissance England 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1. 
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legal procedure, and pleading.”205 Rose notes that literature is, first, fiction, and, 
second, indirect evidence, but he recognizes the possibility that the sources may 
enhance understanding and knowledge.206 G. Edward White finds the very idea of 
interdisciplinary study of law to mitigate the meaning and intelligibility of a 
disciplinary perspective, thus diminishing the concept of an academic discipline, 
while J. M. Balkin doubts altogether the idea of interdisciplinarity, calling it one 
discipline’s attempt to colonize another.207 Law tends to regard its language as 
univocal and authoritative,208 and it is this that makes it resist (or believe it resists) 
what Balkin calls the colonization of interdisciplinarity: because law is a professional, 
not an academic discipline. In spite of the objections, interdisciplinary study of law 
and literature flourishes in America, and it is an area that attracts increasing interest in 
Britain.209
                                                 
205 Jonathan Rose, “English Legal History and Interdisciplinary Legal Studies,” in Boundaries of the 
Law: Geography, Gender and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. Anthony 
Musson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 176. 
 City comedy may seem to have something special to offer in the field. The 
period in which the genre flourished was a time of unique mutual curiosity and 
206 Ibid. 
207 G. Edward White, “Reflections on the ‘Republican Revival’: Interdisciplinary Scholarship in the 
Legal Academy,” Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 61 (1994), 28-9; J. M. Balkin, 
“Interdisciplinarity as Colonization,” Washington and Lee Law Review 53 (1996), 650; White and 
Balkin are cited in Rose, “English Legal History and Interdisciplinary Legal Studies,” 171. 
208 See Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1987), 176-7. 
209  Julius discusses the interest on both sides of the Atlantic in his introduction to Law and Literature, 
xi-xxv. See also Rose, “English Legal History and Interdisciplinary Legal Studies,” 169, 175. 
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engagement between the two vocations, which tend to be seen before and after this 
time as, in effect, mutually exclusive.210
One key area of interest is the law of literature.
 
211 This pertains to the various 
laws which regulate literature, such as, in the modern day, copyright law, and, going 
back to early modern times, laws restricting obscenity and blasphemy, and the law of 
defamation. The notion of a law of literature represents a disparate set of legal sources 
– among them, statutes and precedent – which affect the production of literary texts. 
The law of literature area examines the relationship between the two, and thus is 
inclined to emphasize an essentialist view of “law” and “literature” as separate, 
independent discourses. Allegations and disclaimers of topical and seditious allusion 
became part of the business of city comedy, and Jonson engages with the notion of a 
law of literature with the debate on defamation and satire in Poetaster. In the play, 
Jonson adopts in all but name the defamation doctrine of mitior sensus in anticipation 
of allegations of writing defamatory material.212
Another area of interest is legal and literary hermeneutics. This asks what the 
interpreters of legal sources and literary texts may learn from each other. Answers 
may be problematic. A key difference in purpose between legal and literary 
interpretation centres on the matter of ambiguity, which is at once a friend to literary 
criticism and an enemy to legal analysis. Literary critics search it out in order to 
explore it; lawyers tend to seize on it for partisan advantage, or wipe it out in distaste. 
 This provides an insight into the 
relationship between law and literature that will go on to characterize the genre. 
                                                 
210 The observation about the vocations is made in Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 184. 
211 The summary descriptions of this and the other key areas of interdisciplinary interest are informed 
by Julius’s introduction to Law and Literature, xi-xxv. 
212 See infra, 105. 
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The commonly advanced advantage of applying legal and literary hermeneutics is that 
dry, abstract law might be profitably supplemented by the moral and psychological 
examples of literature, while literature might acquire verisimilitude and gravity by 
engaging with the practicalities of law.213 The implications in law are generally 
regarded as dangerous. A judge inclined to deliberate with the creativity of a literary 
theorist would be liable to transgress the function of applier of law to become maker 
of law.214 Barbara Shapiro has shown, though, that sixteenth century justices of the 
peace were advised to use classical rhetorical texts, such as Cicero’s De Inventione, in 
preparation for pre-trial examinations of suspects.215 It may be anachronistic, 
therefore, to view this kind of creativity on the bench as having always been too 
obviously a dangerous proposition. One example of an area of creativity in law which 
is regarded as a positive thing is the concept of the legal fiction – an agency by which 
the law could be brought into harmony with the present needs of a changing society. I 
suggest that Day’s Law Tricks incorporates allusion to the concept of legal fictions, 
and that reflection of a concept capable of being seen quite differently by lay and 
lawyer members of an audience opens the play up to esoterically positive 
interpretation.216
                                                 
213 Point paraphrased from Jane B. Baron, “Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship as Guilty Pleasure: The 
Case of Law and Literature,” in Law and Literature, ed. Michael Freeman and Andrew Lewis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 21. 
 
214 Richard A. Posner’s argument in Law and Literature, revised ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 237. 
215 Barbara Shapiro, “Classical Rhetoric and the English Law of Evidence,” in Rhetoric and Law in 
Early Modern Europe, ed. Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001), 55-9, 61-70. 
216 See infra, 147. 
 69 
One more area of interest in law and literature studies is the law in literature. 
Modern scholarship in the field repudiates earlier referential and symbolic studies of 
lawyers and legal processes as misreadings. Older studies of representations of 
lawyers and law tended to be concerned with how accurate an account of aspects of a 
legal system were, or what larger subject law represented in a literary text.217
Critics of the interdisciplinary study of literature and law, such as White and 
Balkin, point out the artifice involved at the interface of disciplinary perspectives, and 
find it flawed for incommensurability. Interdisciplinarity does involve artifice. But 
both literature and law resort to artifice individually: literature for its reliance on 
aesthetic strategies; law, for example, in the lawyer’s need to defend even unlikely 
cases, and, in the past, the judge’s countenancing of legal fictions. From the first play 
I examine, Poetaster, the playwrights of city comedy recognize and represent a 
connection between poet and lawyer as practitioners of the art or artifice of 
persuasion. If one wholly accepts the views of critics of interdisciplinary study, the 
whole law and literature studies movement now flourishing is defeated. A parallel 
may be made to western epistemology. Berkeley’s and Hume’s recognition of the 
 City 
comedy can be seen to reflect ideas about change in the law which show a desire for 
the formality of legal frameworks where provision was poor to non-existent. The 
darkly comic approach taken to the deed of sale of a wife in The Phoenix shows 
characters going through quasi-legal motions in order to supplement a deficiency in 
the law: the virtual impossibility for all but the very rich of legitimately dissolving a 
marriage. Different types of anti-lawyer sentiment are apparent in city comedy, but 
ambiguity remains to the present, and the phenomenon invites investigation. 
                                                 
217 Older criticism commonly featured literal readings of legal matter in Dickens’ novels and symbolic 
readings of Kafka’s: Julius, introduction to Law and Literature, xvi. 
 70 
impossibility of objective knowledge was solved (for philosophers, at least) by Kant’s 
contingent proposition of the transcendental unity of apperception.218
A barrister of the Middle Temple recently asserted that interdisciplinary 
research work could reveal hidden facets of a subject, adding that it ideally requires 
specialist knowledge of the respective disciplines, since law-related interdisciplinary 
studies often neglect the specific and wider legal context.
 In an analogous 
way, if one wants to study phenomena incorporating both literary and legal aspects, 
we should view interdisciplinarity not as one discipline’s attempt to colonize another, 
but in a contingent, Kantian way, as something capable of generating debate made 
possible through, if never a transcendental unity, then a transcendental 
commensurability, of individual disciplines. 
219 In principle, it is difficult 
to disagree. But there is always more to know for everyone. And non-lawyers can 
research legal sources in order to acquire knowledge, without being specialist 
professionals. The point made might be qualified to refer to the ethic inculcated, and 
the attitude underpinning, legal education and practice, rather than the knowledge 
acquired. The lawyer’s ethic was recently caricatured as being, among other things, 
dry, abstract, unyieldingly rigid, and contentious.220
                                                 
218 See, for example, Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1961); Roger Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein: A short history of modern 
philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). 
 The commentator calls these 
things a reductive characterization. Yet these are all ingredients in the law-modelled 
219 Anthony Musson, “Crossing Boundaries: Attitudes to Rape in Late Medieval England,” in 
Boundaries of the Law: Geography, Gender and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, 
ed. Anthony Musson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 96. 
220 Guyora Binder, “The Law-as-Literature Trope,” in Law and Literature, ed. Michael Freeman and 
Andrew Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 68. 
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rigour which appealed to Jonson when writing The Arraignment before he gave the 
play the main title Poetaster.221
                                                 
221 See infra, 75. 
 And, rigidity apart, other disciplines might actually 
aspire to the same list of qualities. 
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Chapter two 
Defamation and anti-lawyer sentiment in Poetaster 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter I examine Jonson’s construction of a debate on defamation in 
Poetaster. I argue against the conventional view that the playwright is, without 
qualification, hostile to the legal profession in the play. I suggest in the first section 
that it is Jonson’s engagement in legal debate and his use of the language of the law 
that allows him to defend the proscribed literary mode of satire, and that his 
engagement in this discourse demonstrates respect for legal method. I also argue in 
the first section that Jonson is to be credited with the early drawing of a distinction 
between slander and libel in the 1601 play, a distinction normally said to be post-
Restoration. Jonson and his fellow (or rival) playwrights had a good motive to look 
for a distinction between oral and written defamation, since players’ oral 
improvisations might turn a studiously unoffending script into a recklessly offending 
public performance. In the second section of the chapter, I examine examples of 
apparent anti-lawyer sentiment in Poetaster, and I contend that these are not to be 
taken at face value. I suggest that Jonson plays on the defamation doctrine of mitior 
sensus, and I look at the author’s admiration of particular lawyers, as expressed in 
dedication and allusion. It is hoped that the chapter goes towards resolving the 
paradox that a genre popular among lawyers should be indiscriminately hostile to the 
legal profession. 
 
The subject of defamation had become a significant cultural phenomenon in England 
by the time that Ben Jonson wrote Poetaster.1 The high importance attached to 
honour and reputation in Elizabethan and Jacobean England is witnessed in Coke’s 
suggestion that “libelling . . . robs a man of his good name, which ought to be more 
precious to him than his life.”2
                                                 
1 Ina Habermann says that the fear of being the object of unfavourable representations and becoming a 
victim of detraction was such a conspicuous phenomenon in early modern England that it is surprising 
it has received so little critical attention: Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 1. Habermann argues that defamation played a part in the cultural history 
of femininity, which, she says, was fashioned between praise and slander. 
 Jonson says as much in Poetaster, where Horace uses 
2 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt., vol. III, part V, 125-6. See also Debora Shuger, “‘Paper 
Bullets’: Texts, Lies, and Censorship in Early Modern England,” in Solon and Thespis: Law and 
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the same figurative expression as Coke: “no malicious thiefe / Robs my good name, 
the treasure of my life” (III.v.69-70). While the play is best remembered now for 
being part of a personal conflict between rival dramatists, its central purpose is to 
debate the function of satire, by then a popular but a proscribed form, against a matter 
of universal contemporary interest: the phenomenon of defamation. Jonson insists, in 
the “Apologeticall Dialogue” attached to the end of Poetaster,3 that he is defamed for 
being called defamer. He counter-argues against the charge that he has, among other 
things, “tax’d / The Law, and Lawyers . . . / By their particular names” (68-70). Not 
so, says Jonson: “These are meere slanders” against him (73). Unfavourable 
representation and detraction came to excite public fascination on the stage, in the 
form of satire, as the law on harmful words evolved (probably more noisily4
Lawyers of the Inns of Court were greatly interested in the matter of negative 
representation for several reasons. For one, because defamation actions were said to 
bring them as much work, “if not more, than any branch of the law whatsoever.”
) in the 
English courts. Jonson’s three “Comical Satyres” are recognized for being part of the 
poetomachia, or war of the theatres – an antagonistic exchange that reached full-scale 
confrontation in Jonson’s Poetaster and Dekker’s Satiromastix. 
5
                                                                                                                                            
Theater in the English Renaissance, ed. Dennis Kezar (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2007), 167, 190 n. 10. 
 For 
another, because lawyers could find it necessary to defend their reputations from the 
abusive words of unsuccessful litigants and others: “Thou art no barrister, thou art a 
3 Jonson’s preface tells us that the “Apologeticall Dialogue” was “only once spoken vpon the stage.” 
4 On the suggestion that the courts were noisier than the playhouses, see Baker’s description of 
Westminster Hall in An Introduction to Legal History, 37. See also Herrup, The Common Peace, 141. 
5 John March, Actions for Slaunder, or a methodicall collection under certain grounds and heads, of 
what words are actionable in the law, and what not (London, 1647), 2. 
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barretor. . . . Thou study law? Thou hast as much wit as a daw.”6 Then, there was 
potential always for sensationalistic entertainment in the quest for justice in this area – 
be it on the facts of an allegation or arguments in defence. In 1607, for example, Lady 
Morrison succeeded against a defendant who said that a justice of the peace had 
“reported that he hath had the use of [her] body at his pleasure” – thus overcoming 
notable Lincoln’s Inn lawyer Sir Henry Hobart’s argument that the words could be 
taken to mean that the justice “ha[d] the use of her body as a tailor, in measuring.”7
 
 
2.1 Defamation and satire in Poetaster 
 
In this section I suggest that Jonson’s defence of satire in Poetaster is informed by 
defamation law, and that his construction of a legal debate gives a comedy set in 
ancient Rome topical appeal; at the same time, the playwright sets the tone for the 
new genre of city comedy. I argue, as well, that Jonson contributes to the drawing of a 
distinction between slander and libel. 
Jonson is recognized for transferring to the stage the formal characteristics and 
moral and social preoccupations of verse satire.8
                                                 
6 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, xii, 71; cited in Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 294. 
 Richard Dutton characterizes 
Jonson’s decision to write what he called “Comicall Satyres” as a gesture of defiance 
typical of the young playwright – the first Comicall Satyre, Every Man Out of His 
Humour (1599) came only months after Archbishop Whitgift and Bishop Bancroft 
had denounced and proscribed satire, destroying verse examples by, among others, 
7 Morrison v. Cade (1607) Cro. Jac. 162 (George Croke, Reports, Part 2, tr. H. Grimston [London, 
1661].). Harvard Law School MS. 105, F106v; cited in Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 442. 
8 Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 12, 58. 
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Middleton and Marston; Jonson was working, conspicuously, in a proscribed mode.9 
The playwright makes this a noble fight in Poetaster – implicitly, by identifying with 
the great poet Horace, and expressly in the action of the play. Horace’s battle against 
suppression and denigration in Augustan Rome figures Jonson’s defence of satire in 
London, the Roman poet declaring that he “will write satyres still, in spight of feare” 
(III.v.100). The arbitrary nature of the punishment writers risked from 
undiscriminating officials after the proscription of satire is figured in the play by the 
foolish military captain Tucca’s complaint of Horace, who is: “all dogge, and 
scorpion; he carries poison in his teeth, and a sting in his taile . . . I’le haue the slaue 
whipt one of these daies for his satyres, and his humours” (IV.iii.115-18). But there is 
more to all this than a reckless challenge of authority. The playwright is informed by 
the law. His defence in Poetaster of poetry generally, and of the proscribed mode of 
satire in particular, coincides with a defence of his personal honour and reputation. 
This much might have been more expected under the play’s original title. Original 
audiences saw a play called not Poetaster but what Jonson subsequently turned into a 
subtitle: The Arraignment.10
                                                 
9 “Jonson’s satiric styles,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ben Jonson, ed. Richard Harp and Stanley 
Stewart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 58. The clergymen publicly destroyed a 
number of satires on 1 June 1599. 
 Article became possessive pronoun for the subtitle: 
Poetaster, Or His Arraignment. If Jonson’s decision to change the play’s title 
suggests the original may have been thought deceptively solemn – giving no 
indication of the comedy’s briskness and bite – it may explain, too, why this remains 
lesser known among subtitles, and why it has been largely ignored in critical studies. 
A different reason for the overlooking of the subtitle may be the heavy emphasis 
10 Cain, introduction to Poetaster, 19 n. 40. 
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placed on the play’s generic self-definition, Comicall Satyre.11 In any event, the word 
arraignment refers to a genre of legal narrative, which has conventions including both 
the representations made in court by prosecutors, and a type of pamphlet describing 
trials or justifying their verdicts.12 It is the case that Jonson aims in the play to 
establish both guilty act and guilty mind on the part of his fictitious defendants to 
defamation, Crispinus and Demetrius. Greenfield has argued that Jonson thus allows 
legal narrative to qualify, frame and displace the conventions of verse satire.13 This 
might be a useful argument for my thesis – for emphasizing the legal characteristics of 
this comedy and others following it. But Jonson comes to praise satire, not to bury it, 
as the verb displace suggests. The more persuasive argument may be that use of legal 
narrative in Poetaster is most valuable for highlighting what is distinctive about law 
and literature separately, not for subsuming both in one generality.14
Jonson gives an example of the poet’s interest in law with this play, but what 
might be an example of the law’s interest in literature? I propose one example 
concerning the distinction between slander and libel, in order to show that, in the case 
of Jacobean city comedy, there is regard between lawyers and literary texts that is 
neither odd nor unreciprocated – this being the way the relationship is described in 
current interdisciplinary law and literature scholarship.
 
15
                                                 
11 Reason proposed in Matthew Greenfield, “Trial by Theater: Jonson, Marston, and Dekker in the 
Court of Parnasus,” in Solon and Thespis: Law and Theater in the English Renaissance, ed. Dennis 
Kezar (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 20. 
 Jonson alludes expressly to 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 21. 
14 The conclusion of Deak Nabers, “Epilogue: The True Image of Authority,” in Solon and Thespis: 
Law and Theater in the English Renaissance, edited by Dennis Kezar, 271. 
15 Julius, introduction to Law and Literature, xiii. 
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slander on three occasions in Poetaster (including the “Apologeticall Dialogue” 
attached to the written text), and on twelve occasions to libel.16
The first thing to be aware of is that defamation became actionable at common 
law only in the sixteenth century.
 What might be the 
significance of this? 
17 Before the sixteenth century defamation was 
deemed a spiritual matter, coming within the jurisdiction of the Church courts. The 
immorality of lies and rumours was dealt with in what were in effect criminal 
proceedings, and guilty parties could be sentenced to penance, performed publicly in a 
white sheet. The Court of Star Chamber dealt occasionally with defamation matters of 
a more public nature. The first noted common law action for defamatory words dates 
from 1507; jurisdiction went to the Court of King’s Bench. Baker notes that, since the 
innovation is not contested in any surviving reported case, the reason for the change in 
jurisdiction can only be guessed at.18 Coke’s rationale for the common law remedy 
was the prevention of public disorder: “the party grieved ought to complain for every 
injury done him in an ordinary course of law, and not by any means to revenge 
himself, either by the odious course of libelling, or otherwise.”19
                                                 
16 Slander: III.iv.282; twice in the “Apologeticall Dialogue.” Libel: III.v.132; IV.vii.11; V.iii.30-2 (four 
times); V.iii.45 & 48; V.iii.548; four times in the “Apologeticall Dialogue.” 
 When the action first 
became available, defamation cases often outnumbered cases of assumpsit in the plea 
rolls of the common law courts, and even when cases of assumpsit greatly increased, 
17 Material on defamation law informed by Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, ch. 25. See also 
M. Lindsay Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England (Cambidge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
18 For speculation, see An Introduction to Legal History, 438. 
19 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, iii, part v, 125-6. 
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defamation cases came second in number.20
 
 By 1601, when Jonson wrote Poetaster, 
notions of honour and allegations of damaged reputation were, therefore, high on the 
conversational agenda, particularly in the part of London where the Inns and law 
courts, and the private playhouses, were situated. Conversely, a legal treatise from 
1573 recognizes a link between defamation and comedy in a proposed definition for 
slander: 
Sclaunder is an accusation made for hatred, unknowen to him that is accused, wherein 
the accuser is beleeued, and hee that is accused is not called to giue answer, or to denye 
any thing, and this definition standeth on three persons, euen like as matters of 
Comedies doe that is, by the Accuser, and by him that is accused, and by the hearer of 
the accusement.21
 
 
The threat of defamation and sedition was clearly recognized in the field of literature, 
then, and a notional link to comedic drama could be recognized in the field of legal 
study. Beyond these associations, how do Jonson’s remedies for defamation compare 
with contemporary remedies? Coke summarizes the law’s penalties for defamation 
thus: 
 
A libeller . . . shall be punished either by indictment at the common law, or by bill, if he 
deny it, or . . . on his confession, in the Star-chamber, and according to the quality of 
                                                 
20 In the Court of King’s Bench in Michaelmas Term, 1510, there were six slander actions and five 
assumpsit: National Archives, plea rolls of the Court of King’s Bench KB 27/997; in the Court of 
Common Pleas in 1535, there were thirty-four slander cases pleaded to issue, and only six assumpsit: 
National Archives, plea rolls of the Court of Common Pleas CP 40/1084-1087; cited in Baker, An 
Introduction to Legal History, 441 n. 29. 
21 A Plaine description of the Auncient Petigree of Dame Slaunder, togither with hir Co-heires and 
felllowe members, Lying, Flattering, Backebyting, (being the Diuels deare darlings) Playnly and 
Pithely described and set forth in their colours from their first descent, of what linage and kinred they 
came off (London, 1573), B1v. 
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the offence he may be punished by fine or imprisonment; and if the case be exorbitant, 
by pillory and loss of his ears.22
 
 
Jonson retains something of the pre-sixteenth century idea of defamation as a spiritual 
matter in Poetaster, if his treatment of spirituality involves a degree of poetic licence. 
As if to outdo his own bravado in including in the play Ovid and Horace (not to 
mention the great Roman lawyer Trebatius), Jonson goes to the literary top, and has 
Caesar’s court presided over in the final scene by Virgil, making him something like 
an omniscient poet-god. Virgil’s judgment in favour and support of Horace 
perpetuates the idea of a spiritual concept in the penitential sentence given to 
Crispinus, who, at the end of the play, is made to vomit up his “spurious snotteries” 
(V.iii.476 & 481), representing Marston’s linguistic idiosyncrasy. Thus, Jonson 
represents the legal process affirmatively – poets do not displace lawyers in the play; 
their association with lawyers, and assumption of legal roles functions to affirm the 
gravity and justness of the best examples of their vocation. 
What of the three allusions to slander and the twelve to libel in Poetaster? The 
current understanding, at least in literary studies, is that the modern distinction 
between libel and slander was post-Restoration, and that the terms were used 
interchangeably before 1660.23
                                                 
22 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, iii, part v, 126. 
 The first query one might have following on from this 
is why Jonson’s allusions to libel should outnumber those to slander by four to one. 
The difference between common law suits for damages and criminal prosecutions by 
the Crown might be informative in this connection. The common law drew no 
remedial distinction between written and spoken defamation before 1660: the author 
of a common law primer could insist even in 1656 that: “It matters not how 
23 Shuger, “Paper Bullets,” 190 n. 10. 
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[defamatory] words (if they be actionable) be published or divulged, whether by 
writing or speech; for the action is maintainable in both cases.”24 Written defamation 
began to be treated differently at criminal law, though, shortly before Jonson alluded 
to the subject of harmful words in Poetaster. By the latter half of the sixteenth 
century, the criminal law had begun to recognize a difference in the respective 
degrees of danger posed by verbal and written defamation. Written matter might be 
considerably more dangerous. It could be disseminated in any number of places at the 
same time, and the possibility of expressing controversial ideas while maintaining 
anonymity might embolden a writer. Recognition of the potential for a difference in 
the degree of danger may be witnessed in subtle differences in criminal penalties 
towards the end of the sixteenth century. Statutes of 1554 and 1558 had made it a 
misdemeanour to speak or write with malicious intent “false and slanderous words” of 
the monarch, but declarations of 1580 and 1581 made writing such words felony, 
while speaking such words became felony only on second conviction.25 The Court of 
Star Chamber had, in addition, a reputation in Jonson’s time for punishing some 
written defamation prosecutions with “sharp sentences.”26
I argue against the idea that the terms slander and libel were, without 
qualification, used interchangeably in a semantic sense before 1660. If there should be 
 This deals with the matter 
of a pre-Restoration remedial distinction between written and spoken defamation, but 
what of a semantic distinction? 
                                                 
24 W. Sheppard, Epitome (London, 1656), 21. Baker asserts that the common law drew no distinction 
between written and spoken defamation before 1660: An Introduction to Legal History, 445. 
25 W. S. Holdsworth, A History of the English Law in sixteen volumes (Boston: Little, Brown-Methuen, 
1927-66), iv, 511-12; see also Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England, 127 n. 5. 
26 Edwardes v. Wooton (1607), uncollected report cited in J. H. Baker and S. F. C. Milsom, Sources of 
English Legal History: Private Law to 1750 (London: Butterworths, 1986), 649. Location unspecified. 
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doubt that a semantic distinction between slander and libel existed before 1660 (the 
first example given for the relevant definition of “libel” in the O.E.D. dates from 
1631,27 still some thirty years after Jonson; the notion mentioned above of speaking 
or writing false and slanderous words supports the idea of interchangeable use of 
terms), I would argue that a terminological distinction is to be found in Poetaster, 
and, in view of the dates involved, this would mean that Jonson is to be credited with 
making, at the least, a distinguishing contribution to the etymology of the words 
slander and libel. What does legal history say about the distinction between the two? 
Baker acknowledges that the modern distinction is of uncertain origin, and that, “it 
bears the unsightly scars of a historical accident.”28
                                                 
27 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “libel” (definition 5): “Any published statement damaging 
to the reputation of a person. In a wider sense, any writing of a treasonable, seditious, or immoral kind. 
Also, the act or crime of publishing such a statement or writing.” The O.E.D. does cite Poetaster in 
connection with the verb-form of “libel”, but under a formally non-specific definition of the word 
(definition 2): “To defame or discredit by the circulation of libellous statements; to accuse falsely and 
maliciously”. “Circulation” might be achieved verbally, and since the first cited specific definition of 
the noun dates from 1631 – thirty years after Poetaster – the allusion in the verb definition to “libellous 
statements” is unhelpfully tautological. The O.E.D. cites Tucca from IV.vii: “Thou shalt libell, and I’le 
cudgell the Rascall.” It is part of Tucca’s characterization that he is not one to take care with his choice 
of words. The examples attached to the O.E.D.’s definitions of “slander” go back to the thirteenth 
century, but the definitions tend to be open to interchangeable use; for example, the noun is defined as 
an “utterance or dissemination” (the latter might be in written form); one definition of the verb is: “to 
write or speak evil of” (my italics). 
 Jonson can be imagined to have 
disapproved of the idea of two words being used interchangeably: his renowned 
learning and pedagogic impulse may well have inspired him to design a distinction 
28 An Introduction to Legal History, 446. 
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that appears now only part of a so-called historical accident.29 Referring back to the 
play’s original title, and subsequent subtitle, the definition of the word “Arraine” in 
Cowell’s Interpreter locates its origin in the French verb arranger, meaning “to set a 
thing in order or in his [sic.] place.”30
Slander’s derivation from the Latin for scandal could corroborate the idea of 
interchangeable use – scandalous words might be written or spoken. Libel’s 
derivation from the Latin for book, on the other hand, might imply an inherently 
specific signification of written defamation. Cowell offers no definition of slander in 
his 1607 legal dictionary The Interpreter, but he notes that libel “signifieth a little 
booke [… and ] also a criminous report of any man cast abroad, or otherwise 
unlawfully published in writing, but then for difference sake, it is called an infamous 
libell.”
 Besides the things Jonson obviously attempts to 
set in order in the play (proper satire), or to put in their place (bad poets), he might be 
said, too, to attempt to set in place a distinction, where one is thought not to have 
existed, between slander and libel. 
31
So, how may Jonson be said to contribute to the semantic distinction between 
slander and libel? As mentioned, he uses the word libel four times more often than he 
uses the word slander in Poetaster. Where he uses the word libel, it attaches most 
 The allusion to a “criminous” report may seem to pick up on the distinction 
made between written and spoken defamation at criminal law, but the non-specific 
notion of a report “cast abroad” and the qualification of unlawful publication in 
writing being distinguished “for difference sake” as an infamous libel seems still to 
support the idea of interchangeable semantic use. 
                                                 
29 See supra, 39 n. 118. 
30 Cowell, The Interpreter, s.v. “arraine.” 
31 Ibid., s.v. “libel.” 
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often recognizably to the written word, or, as if to make absolutely clear the drawing 
of a semantic distinction, to graphic representation.32
The sole allusion in the play proper to slander is made by the actor Histrio to 
the bumptious Captain Tucca about the “play-dresser, and plagiary” (V.iii.212) 
Demetrius Fannius – widely recognized to be a representation of Dekker (from the 
first by Dekker himself). Demetrius, says Histrio, “ha’s one of the most ouer-flowing 
ranke wits, in Rome. He will slander any man that breathes, if he disgust him” 
(III.iv.337-8). This, directed at a writer, could seem an allusion to written defamation, 
or at least an interchangeable use of the term. But there are two other possibilities. 
The less satisfactory is that Histrio, as a player, is not to be expected to be punctilious 
about semantics in his description of Demetrius. The more plausible idea is that a way 
 In act III, scene v, for example, 
Jonson has his alter-ego Horace disdain “lewd verses; such as libels bee” (III.v.130); 
in act V, scene iii, the fawning tribune Lupus seeks to incriminate Horace in 
Augustus’s court, claiming that an emblem in the poet’s possession amounts to: “A 
libell, Caesar. A dangerous seditious libell. A libell in picture” (V.iii.43-4). Libel 
signifies here, then, defamatory matter in permanent form – be it written (such as the 
lewd verses) or graphic (such as Horace’s emblem). Where Jonson uses the word 
slander, as with the “meere slanders” that he says in the “Apologeticall Dialogue” 
have been made against him, these appear to attach to defamation in evanescent form, 
such as the oral slights dispensed by “Fellowes of practis’d, and most laxatiue 
tongues” (76). Thus, Jonson’s allusions anticipate the distinction currently thought to 
be post-Restoration. 
                                                 
32 An example of a picture capable of being construed as libel in early modern English law would be 
the image of a gallows drawn on someone’s door; a false accusation of felony amounted to defamation: 
Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England, 77-8. 
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with oral depreciation, in particular, is part of Demetrius’s characterization in the 
play. In act IV, scene iii, the play-dressing poet delights Tucca with jibes directed at 
Horace: “Alas, sir, Horace! hee is a meere spunge; nothing but humours, and 
obseruation, he goes vp and downe sucking from euery societie, and when hee comes 
home, squeazes himselfe drie againe. I know him, I” (IV.iii.104-7). Jonson makes 
himself – in the guise of Horace – the butt of envious Demetrius’s oral slight. 
Following Every Man in His Humour and Every Man Out of His Humour, he is the 
writer known for his “humours” plays, and the idea of sucking from every society 
only to squeeze himself dry at home figures Dekker’s complaint that Jonson did too 
little to conceal, in the name of decorum, the identity of the targets of his satire. 
Jonson expressly refutes this charge in the “Apologeticall Dialogue” attached to 
Poetaster. He claims, earnestly, “To spare the persons, and to speake the vices” (72). 
But the playwright himself had already declared in Every Man Out of His Humour the 
purpose of the Comical Satyres to be simply mirroring the time’s deformity 
(Prologue: 125-7), and the mirror metaphor holds a suggestion of no-holds-barred 
exposé. Jonson is personal even about himself in Poetaster. Demetrius’s jibe doubles, 
in an odd mix of, on one hand, over-flowing, rank hack wit for the purpose of the 
play-dresser’s characterization, and, on the other hand, something deeper than 
artificial humility, something more like confessional pathos on the part of Jonson, as 
the man beneath the fashioned didactic poet persona. This juxtaposition Jonson 
achieves in a personal joke at his own expense – perhaps in an attempt, ingenuous or 
not, to mitigate the hubris of identifying himself with the venerable ancient Horace. If 
the notion of a sponge sucking from every society may connote a taste for alcohol and 
a liking for company as much as it does a capacity for observation, there is a punning, 
funny-sad suggestion in Demetrius’s jibe that the Horace of Poetaster (that is, Jonson) 
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habitually returns home from gregarious nights out on the town to the isolation of his 
own excellent company, and only “squeazes himselfe drie” in a masturbatory sense. 
Read in this way, the jibe implies a development in the idea of the satiric playwright 
and satire itself as more inward-looking. Jonson puns throughout the play on the word 
satyr. In its Roman form, the satyr was a lustful woodland deity, in human form but 
with goat’s ears, tail, legs, and budding horns.33
What of the remarks Jonson makes at others’ expense? Ina Habermann 
observes that the negative fashioning of others can be an implicit part of establishing 
one’s own identity.
 The soldier Tucca, for example, says 
of Horace: “Hang him fustie satyre, he smells all goate” (III.iv.300), and later: “But 
this is humours, Horace, that goat-footed enuious slaue; hee’s turn’d fawne now” 
(IV.vii.12). Demetrius’s jibe turns the sensual, lustful aspect of the satyr in on itself, 
and, as this stage comedy demonstrates, the writer and accordingly the genre of satire 
become more inward-looking yet openly self-gratifying: a paradoxical mix of 
introvert exhibitionism. 
34
                                                 
33 The Greek version had horse’s ears and tail. 
 In Poetaster, while engaging directly and indirectly in a debate 
on defamation for the entertainment and interest of the lawyers in the audience, the 
playwright’s negative fashioning of others is self-consciously a means of setting 
himself apart as an artist; at the same time, he sets the tone for an evolving genre of 
pungently worded, urban stage satire: the city comedies that will follow on from the 
Comicall Satyres. Jonson, conscious of appearing hubristic for identifying himself 
with Horace, uses the play as, on one level, an exercise in first articulating then 
justifying the high opinion he has of himself. Only enough signs of artificial humility 
are injected to make the celebration of the playwright’s own talent palatable. What 
34 Habermann, Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England, 1. 
 86 
sets Jonson apart from his contemporaries in this respect, though, is not the 
identification with a satirist of classical antiquity, but his alias’s ruthlessly efficient 
negative fashioning of Crispinus and Demetrius – figures for Marston and Dekker 
respectively. Crispinus is a “Poetaster, and plagiary” (V.iii.211) and “strong tedious 
talker” (III.i.199) given to “lewd solecisms and worded trash” (III.i.107). Horace 
looks for any excuse to escape Crispinus’s wearying company: “I must craue his leaue 
to pisse anon” (III.i.102). Jonson makes Crispinus a court pleader as well as a writer 
in order to make still clearer the allusion to Marston, a lawyer member of the Middle 
Temple,35
 
 and he fits in some business about the arguing of cases in the courts. 
Horace is not only dismissive; he answers Crispinus’s prose in blank verse, 
demonstrating his superiority as a poet even in formal arrangement on the page: 
Crispinus 
I am to appeare in court here, to answere to one that has me in suit; sweet Horace, goe 
with mee, this is my houre: if I neglect it, the law proceeds against me. Thou art 
familiar with these things, pray thee, if thou lou’st me, goe. 
 
Horace 
Now, let me dye, sir, if I know your lawes;  
Or haue the power to stand still halfe so long  
In their loud courts, as while a case is Argued. (III.i.207-14) 
 
In spite of this, and the ruthless negative fashioning of Demetrius/Dekker, Jonson 
implies throughout the play that he himself, in the figure of Horace, is a blameless 
victim in a vicious age. He complains in the dedication to Poetaster of the “malice of 
the times” (19). It is a theme taken up by Envy, the presenter of the play’s Induction, 
who invites the audience’s assistance in damning the author “With triple malice” 
                                                 
35 See Philip J. Finkelpearl, John Marston of the Middle Temple: An Elizabethan Dramatist in His 
Social Setting (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
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(52).36 Contemporary developments in the English law on defamation tell us that the 
playwright’s characterization of the age can be seen, on this occasion at least, as 
something other than righteous indignation: it reflects a shared view. Near the end of 
the sixteenth century, Chief Justice Sir Christopher Wray complained in the Court of 
King’s Bench that defamation actions “abounded more than in times past, and the 
intemperance and malice of men ha[d] increased.”37 Had it come to his attention, 
Jonson might be sure to have taken personally the advice of a 1594 manual on honour 
and reputation, as well: “the best name is soonest blemished by the malignant. He that 
is famous and in better fauour aboue others, shalbe sure to haue many meanes 
wrought to deface him.”38
                                                 
36 Kaplan notes that Spenser identifies envy with slander in The Faerie Queene (V.xii), where Envy 
and Detraction are paired in the representation of the disgracing of Lord Grey: The Culture of Slander 
in Early Modern England, 66. 
  There was a perceived cultural change at this time, then, 
involving a heightened sensitivity about honour and reputation, and attacks upon 
them, so, Jonson was in authoritative company in finding the age itself endemically 
malicious. To what extent did malice figure in the legal process for a defamation suit? 
Alleging malice was common form in a defamation action, though the matter was not 
normally questioned – its main relevance was as a way of rebutting defences. These 
points of defamation law find contemporary parallels in the evolving genre of stage 
satire. Jonson alleges malice in Poetaster, and he takes it upon himself to set things in 
order, to arraign things, as he saw them. But the poetomachia was throughout quasi-
litigious in character, being based in effect around complaints, defences, rebuttals of 
37 Stanhope v. Blythe (1585), report cited in Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal History, 641. 
38 Charles Gibbon, The Praise of a good Name. The reproach of an ill Name. Wherein euery one may 
see the Fame that followeth laudable Actions, and the infamy that cometh by the contrary. With certain 
pithy Apothegues, very profitable for this Age (London, 1594). 
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defences, and counterclaims – all concerning matters of honour and reputation. If 
interest in the “War of the Theatres” was dwindling in the 1970s,39 there has been 
renewed interest in the phenomenon in the last ten years.40 At a time when interest in 
interdisciplinary study of literature and law is increasing, it is the interdisciplinary 
nature of Poetaster – its juxtaposition of literary and legal matter (for example, in the 
distinction recognized in the first section of the chapter between “libel” and “slander”)  
– that means the play should claim the attention of a wider audience, still more so 
than for the reasons Tom Cain proposes; namely, that it is among the most 
ideologically interesting of English Renaissance plays, and that it is the first, perhaps 
the most powerful, statement of an Augustan literary programme in English.41
 
 
As Chief Justice Wray had observed of the age in which the poetomachia would catch 
playgoers’ imagination, the sequence of supposedly aesthetic exchanges seemed to 
display increasing malice and intemperance. The exchanges appear to have been 
borne of a misunderstanding, but real opprobrium resulted from it. Would any of the 
                                                 
39 In 1973, the war was said to be “dead and buried, and nowadays hardly anyone who is interested in 
the Elizabethan period wants to resurrect it”: Norbert H. Platz, “Ben Jonson’s Ars Poetica: An 
Interpretation of Poetaster in its Historical Context,” Salzburg Studies in English Literature, 12 (1973), 
1. See also Cain, introduction to Poetaster, 19. 
40 The long disrepute into which the topic of the poets’ war fell during the twentieth century meant that 
the topic was persistently under-researched: Charles Cathcart, Marston, Rivalry, Rapprochement, and 
Jonson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 1. There have been book-length studies in the last ten years: 
Matthew Steggle, Wars of the Theatres: The Poetics of Personation in the Age of Jonson (Victoria: 
University of Victoria, 1998), which looks at Roman antecedents; James Bednarz, Shakespeare and the 
Poets’ War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), which examines the impact on Shakespeare 
of the poetomachia. See also Greenfield, “Trial by Theater,” and Shuger, “Paper Bullets.” 
41 Cain, introduction to Poetaster, 19. 
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opprobrium have been actionable at common law, with poet plaintiff and defendant? 
First, in what sense may the exchanges have been borne of a misunderstanding? 
Marston is thought to have had the good intention of complimenting Jonson in his 
first play Histriomastix when drafting the character of Chrisoganus, a worthy 
corrector of society’s ills.42
                                                 
42 Marston satirized Anthony Munday as Posthaste in Histriomastix, as well. Summary of the 
poetomachia informed by R. W. Ingram, John Marston (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978), 44-50. 
 Arguably as a result of flawed characterization, 
Chrisoganus becomes a caricature of the playwright. Jonson replied in his next play, 
Every Man Out of His Humour (1599) in which the verbose Clove becomes an 
oblique representation of Marston, who responded by making the self-important 
Brabant Sr. a representation of Jonson in his next play, Jacke Drum’s Entertainment. 
In Cynthia’s Revels (1600) Jonson, again obliquely, attacks Marston, as one of a pair 
of characters called Hedon and Anaides: “The one a light voluptuous reveller, / The 
other a strange arrogating puffe, / Both impudent, and ignorant inough” (III.iii.25-8). 
Dekker seems now to have assumed that he was the other one of the pair, for he 
quotes these lines in a satirical subplot to his conventional historical romance 
Satiromastix, in which apparent formal liberties may have been included only to 
increase Jonson’s annoyance. Marston seems to represent Jonson as Lampatho in 
What You Will (1601), thereby criticizing Jonson’s capacity for theorizing. To call a 
writer a voluptuous reveller, or an “arrogating puffe” might seem then, as now, not to 
prejudice his artistic reputation; there would be those, as well, who would find such 
characteristics typical of writers – fair comment. These descriptions are, in any event, 
mere expressions of personal antipathy. Jonson’s thinly disguised labelling of 
Marston and Dekker as poetasters and plagiaries could have represented something 
more, though. A common law defamation action centred not on the opprobrium itself 
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but on its effects in terms of recognizable temporal loss;43
Common law actions tended to fall within three main categories: words 
alleging commission of a crime or endangering liberty, words alleging occupational 
incompetence, and words imputing certain diseases – principally, the “French pox” 
(syphilis) and leprosy.
 for example, where a 
plaintiff had lost credit with someone who had dealt with them before an alleged 
scandal. 
44 If the three categories of imputation combined offer 
something like a template of areas in which one should aim to offend when writing a 
conventional city comedy, the category I want to look at briefly here is the one 
concerning words alleging occupational incompetence, since Poetaster, in particular, 
is concerned with the competence or non-competence of paid writers45 – an exercise 
which might have been argued to have the potential to cause recognizable temporal 
loss for the writers inferred. Words alleging occupational incompetence regularly 
gave rise to defamation actions in the sixteenth century. Jonson’s representation of 
legal process in Poetaster shows an admiration (not to say envy) for the way that 
lawyers could claim justice. In the context of defamation, for example, lawyers 
themselves could bring actions when income from their profession was endangered. 
In Woode v. Frogge (1517), a barrister received £40 after he lost clients as a result of 
an accusation of treason and murder.46
                                                 
43 See Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 438. 
 Professional qualification could make some 
44 French pox became epidemic in Tudor England, and imputation of it was regarded as peculiarly 
harmful: ibid., 438-40 for information on the three categories. 
45 The turning of the play’s original title, The Arraignment, into its subtitle figures the parallel yet 
secondary concern with lawyers. 
46 Woode v. Frogge (1517), National Archives, plea rolls of the Court of King’s Bench KB 27/1022; 
cited in Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 439 n. 18. 
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allegations actionable which would not be otherwise. It was not normally actionable 
to say that a man was ignorant or illiterate, but to say the same of a barrister made the 
words actionable, since it was necessary for a barrister to know some law, and he 
would get no work if it was believed he did not. In Palmer v. Boyer (1594),47 
therefore, a barrister of Lincoln’s Inn was able to bring a case against an accusation 
that he had “as much law as a jackanapes”, and in Bankes v. Allen (1615),48 a barrister 
brought a case following an accusation that he was “no lawyer” and unable to draft a 
lease. Poetaster, and the plays of the poetomachia generally, work on inference – 
“application” as Dekker called it, and he thought Jonson conspicuously unsubtle with 
his application. By law, words alleged to be defamatory needed to be understandable 
in a defamatory sense by the person or persons to whom they were disseminated:49 
but where words themselves were not explicit, a complainant could include an 
innuendo clause in his pleading. The device of innuendo was developed in the context 
of common law defamation actions in the 1540s,50
                                                 
47 Palmer v. Boyer (1594) Cro. Eliz. 342 (Croke, Reports, Part 1; see supra, 74 n. 7). 
 in order that courts could look 
beyond indefinite words where an allusion left little to the imagination. For a writer of 
48 Bankes v. Allen (1615), Henry Rolle, Abridgement des Plusieurs Cases (1658), vol. i, 54. 
49 “[T]he words ought to be spoken to one who knowes the meaning of them, otherwise they are not 
actionable”: John March, compiler, Reports: or, New Cases; with Divers Resolutions and Judgements 
given upon solemn Arguments, and with great deliberation. And the Reasons and Causes of the said 
Resolutions and Judgements (London, 1648), B2v. Baker cites in An Introduction to Legal History, 444 
n. 52, examples of contemporary cases affirming the point: Anon. (1584) Moore KB 182 (where the 
words were in Welsh); Jones v. Dawkes (1597), Rolle, Abridgement, vol. i, 74 (words in Latin); and 
Price v. Jenkings (1601) Cro. Eliz. 865 (in Welsh). 
50 Where defamatory meaning was not evident from the words in question, the pleading device of 
innuendo could be applied; the device was first developed in order to explain indefinite pronouns: for 
example, “he (innuendo, a plaintiff lawyer) has as much law as a jackanapes.” 
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some established reputation even by innuendo to label a rival writer poetaster and 
plagiary might cause the latter to lose credit with someone who had dealt with him 
previously. Such a loss of credit might not be recognizable in relation to playgoers 
themselves, who might withdraw their patronage for any number of capricious 
reasons, but the accusations might have caused a writer to lose the individual 
patronage of a wealthy benefactor, or repeat commissions from a theatrical employer. 
Had a defamation action been brought in connection with the poetomachia the debate 
about whether author could at the time be considered a sufficiently creditable 
occupation for the purpose of alleging loss of credit would have made interesting 
reading. From a modern perspective, the writer called poetaster and plagiary might 
seem analogous in principle to the barrister with the successful 1594 “jackanapes” 
claim in the area of occupational incompetence. The debate in act III, scene v between 
Horace and Trebatius may suggest Jonson gave at least passing consideration to the 
possibility of a claim as plaintiff, if the great Roman satirist and lawyer are meant to 
mirror (as seems likely) Jonson and the play’s lawyer-dedicatee Richard Martin. 
Jonson uses his knowledge of the law, at any rate, to make a point about inferior 
writing; contrary to being anti-lawyer in character, the play affirms the legal process. 
Jonson enacts a discussion about a claim against him as prospective defendant 
in the “Apologeticall Dialogue” attached to the end of the play. The dialogue is 
apologetic in the sense of being a reasoned defence: it is (predictably) nothing like an 
acknowledgment of fault. The author has one of his interlocutors, Polyposus, put to 
him the allegation that he has “tax’d / The Law, and Lawyers; Captaines; and the 
Players / By their particular names” (68-70). An early modern writer that actually 
named the targets of his satire might be presumed, had he not maintained his own 
anonymity, to have had a death-wish. Jonson demonstrably had a survival instinct, but 
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equally he liked to be seen to live dangerously. He may not have expressly identified 
his targets, but in his first response to Polyposus’s allegation – “It is not so. / I vs’d no 
name” (70-1) – he sounds every bit the verbal tactician clinging cautiously to a 
technical defence. There could seem small possibility of accident when certain 
material in Jonson’s plays was felt to be understandable in a defamatory sense by an 
audience; he may have used no names, but an innuendo could be more entertaining, 
and, as mentioned above, innuendo had been recognized in common law defamation 
actions since the 1540s, so that indefinite words could still provide the cause to an 
action where an allusion left little to the imagination. One textual omission indicates 
Jonson’s daring, but also his pragmatism in this connection. The 1601 quarto of 
Cynthia’s Revels omits the courtier Asotus’s boast that his accomplished style of 
dancing is “the very high way of preferment” (IV.v.70). The allusion had been 
recognized as a satirical dig at Sir Christopher Hatton, an Inner Temple man known to 
non-admirers as “the dancing chancellor,” with an inference that it was solely his 
skills in courtly arts such as dancing that won him his position.51
                                                 
51 Hatton indulged briefly in drama, as well, writing the fourth act of the original version of an Inner 
Temple tragedy performed for Elizabeth in 1567-8, Gismond of Salerne (two manuscripts of his 
version survive; British Library: Lansdowne 786, Hargrave 205): Axton, The Queen’s Two Bodies, 56. 
On the nickname “the dancing chancellor,” see Janet Clare, “Art Made Tongue-Tied by Authority,” in 
Elizabethan and Jacobean Dramatic Censorship (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 84; 
on Hatton see also Shuger, “Paper Bullets,” 166. F. D. MacKinnon notes for posterity the stupefaction 
at Hatton’s appointment in Inner Temple Papers (London: Stevens & Sons, 1948), 33, 59. 
 The playwright’s 
defence of using no names demonstrates a lawyerly instinct, and his participation in 
technical arguments of exculpation is an example of the bonding approach whereby 
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speaker (or writer) and hearer (the lawyers in his audience) become “mutually 
constituting members of a self-identifying community”.52
 The satirical jibe Seagull makes about the Scots in Eastward Ho! (at III.iii.38-
45) was cancelled in all but two existing quarto copies of the play.
 
53 The conspicuous 
delay of the King’s response – his anger descended on the playwrights in September 
1605, three to six months after the original production54 – raises an interesting issue in 
relation to the possibility of finding defamatory matter in drama. I mentioned that 
statutes of 1554 and 1558 had made it a misdemeanour to speak or write with 
malicious intent “false and slanderous words” of the monarch, and that declarations of 
1580 and 1581 made writing such words felony, while speaking such words became 
felony only on second conviction.55 If satire of the kind contained in Eastward Ho! 
about the Scots could be argued to be or not to be slanderous of the monarch per se, 
impolitic inference of royal folly was clear enough. R. E. Brettle explains the delay in 
the King’s response by suggesting that an unlicensed production of Eastward Ho! was 
performed while the King was on his Oxford Progress (July-September 1605), and 
that rumours about the proposed performance were circulating when the King 
returned to Whitehall in mid-September.56
                                                 
52 Fish, “Author-Readers: Jonson’s Community of the Same,” 52. 
 Brettle speculates that actors in the said 
53 C. G. Petter, ed., Eastward Ho! by Ben Jonson, George Chapman, and John Marston (London: A. & 
C. Black, 1994), 61 n. 38-45. 
54 Ibid., xxiii-xxiv. 
55 Holdsworth, A History of the English Law, vol. iv, 511-12; see also Kaplan, The Culture of Slander 
in Early Modern England, 127 n. 5. 
56 R. B. Brettle, “Eastward Ho, 1605; by Chapman, Jonson, and Marston; Bibliography and 
Circumstances of Production,” The Library, IX (1928-29), 287-302; see also C. G. Petter, ed., 
Eastward Ho!, xxiv. 
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production may have made their own inflammatory additions.57 The implications of 
the possibility that even one line in a strategically written, technically non-offending 
play-script might be transformed on the stage into oral defamation by players’ 
improvisations must have became increasingly clear to the writers of stage satire. On 
one hand, it no doubt inspired Jonson and other playwrights to become more 
fastidious about the matter of actors keeping to an author’s words. In the Induction to 
Poetaster, Envy’s scheme for destroying the play looks hopefully to those players 
who can be relied on to “wrest, / Peruert, and poyson all they heare, or see, / With 
senselesse glosses, and allusions” (Ind.). On the other hand, the possibility of players’ 
distortions would have offered playwrights the corollary possibility of a plausible 
defence to allegations of oral defamation where plays performed had yet to be printed 
– be such a defence pleaded in good faith or not. Perhaps it was such a contingency 
that allowed John Day to hold on to his liberty while the leading boys of the 
Blackfriars company were imprisoned in Bridewell for the airing of seditious matter 
following a performance in February 1606 of Day’s Jonson-influenced comedy The 
Isle of Gulls.58
 Jonson would later find cause to add a second prologue to Epicoene (1609) 
following, as he puts it, “some person’s impertinent exception.”
 
59
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
 He mentioned, as 
ever, no name, but the person concerned was Lady Arabella Stuart (1575-1615), a 
first cousin of the King. She complained that the play introduced an allusion to her, 
58 See Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642, 69-70. 
59 The subheading to “Another” – the second Prologue: Epicoene, in “The Alchemist”, and other plays, 
ed. Gordon Campbell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 122. 
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with inference of a high-profile matrimonial intrigue.60 Jonson insisted again in 
Epicoene that “persons were not touched, [and that he endeavoured only] to tax the 
crimes” (Another [Prologue], 4). He reiterates the complaint that his work is misread 
by those who “make a libel which he made a play” (14), and it is here that Jonson’s 
insistence on a no-name defence is at its most technical. He does allude expressly in 
Epicoene, through the character of La Foole, to the Prince of Moldavia (at V.i.20-1). 
This was not the name of his alleged and, it might be said, too apparent target, 
Stephano Janiculo, but it was the title of the person Janiculo pretended to be. A point 
of curiosity arises here, too. The playwright refers, in La Foole’s same breath, to “his 
[the Prince’s] mistress, Mistress Epicoene” (V.i.21). If we are to accept the respective 
dating of the play and the events of Lady Arabella Stuart’s life, we find a most 
remarkable example of life imitating art. Mistress Epicoene was not, plainly, the name 
of Jonson’s aristocratic complainant, so Jonson could again insist with technical 
accuracy that he had used no name in the play. But Lady Arabella, imprisoned for 
contravening restrictions placed on her marriage in 1610 – the year after the play’s 
production – escaped in 1611 from the Bishop of York, in whose charge she was by 
then, by playing an epicene part in boy’s clothes.61 Jonson scholar D. Heyward 
Brock’s suggestion that the incident may have been alluded to in Epicoene62
                                                 
60 The allusion is consistent with the fact that one Stephano Janiculo, who pretended to be Prince of 
Moldavia, had in 1608 – the year before the production of Epicoene – announced in Venice his 
engagement to Lady Arabella; he was already married to a Venetian woman: ibid., 463 n. 17. 
 
overlooks the fact that the date of the play’s production precedes by two years the 
61 D. Heyward Brock, A Ben Jonson Companion (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1983), 266. On a 
contemporary suggestion that common lawyers preferred Lady Arabella as Elizabeth’s potential 
successor, see Axton, The Queen’s Two Bodies, 96-7. 
62 Brock, A Ben Jonson Companion, 266. 
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real-life drama of the disguised Lady Arabella’s escape from the Bishop of York. 
These things considered, if Jonson was alluding to Lady Arabella in Epicoene – and 
the pointed mention of the Prince of Moldavia suggests he was – the playwright’s 
decision to name and fashion the Lady’s alleged analogue “Mistress Epicoene” seems 
not a libel by Jonson against the house of Stuart but a clever script which a real-life 
character turned out to follow. 
 
What, then, is the relationship between defamation and satire in Poetaster? Jonson not 
only denies defaming individuals in the play – “I vs’d no name” – he expressly 
condemns defamation, through his alter ego Horace. Horace debates the value and 
function of satire with the lawyer Trebatius, who warns him: “There’s iustice, and 
great action may be su’d / ’Gainst such, as wrong mens fames with verses lewd” 
(III.v.128-9). Horace approves enthusiastically, saying in effect that it is poets that 
give satire a bad name. Contrary to being defamatory and seditious, says Jonson, true 
satire performs a valuable function for the state. The poet deters individuals from vice, 
a role that ought to afford, within the notional bounds of poetic decorum, certain 
liberties of subject matter and expression for the writer. The vision corresponds with a 
description of the role of the satiric poet of antiquity by Julius Caesar Scaliger in the 
Poetics, a text which Jonson alludes to in his Discoveries.63 The poet then, said 
Scaliger, “could abuse individuals with impunity, on the ground that a deterrent fear 
of a bad reputation would reconcile men’s minds to virtue and restore them to socially 
beneficent living.”64
                                                 
63 Parallel made in Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England, 65. 
 It may be, finally, that controversy about defamation and anti-
64 Ibid. Kaplan cites an interim source for the quotation: O. J. Campbell, Comicall Satyre and 
Shakespeare’s “Troilus and Cressida” (San Marino, CA: The Huntington Library, 1970), 5-6. The 
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poet/anti-lawyer sentiment in the play perform in part the function of decoy for a 
more dangerous target of satire. Jonson may well be inferring sympathy for the 
Second Earl of Essex, who was executed early in 1601 (the year of the play’s 
composition), following his attempted rebellion in London against the government. 
For all his bravado, Essex’s undoing is said to have come about through malicious 
innuendo.65
 
 In Poetaster, the tribune Lupus is supported by others when in the final 
scene he attempts to defame the ethically centred poets Horace and Virgil before 
Caesar. Jonson has Horace earnestly condemn courtiers who conspire against 
individuals under the specious guise of protecting the state, making a most poignant 
condemnation of defamation, and a daring demonstration of the value of satire to the 
state: 
They are the moths, and scarabes of a state;  
The bane of empires; and the dregs of courts;  
Who (to endeare themselues to any employment)  
Care not, whose fame they blast; whose life they endanger:  
And vnder a disguis’d, and cob-web masque  
Of loue, vnto their soueraigne, vomit forth  
Their owne prodigious malice; and pretending  
To be the props, and columnes of his safety,  
The guards vnto his person, and his peace,  
Disturbe it most, with their false lapwing-cries. (IV.viii.15-24) 
 
 
2.2 Anti-lawyer sentiment in Poetaster 
 
If anti-poet/anti-lawyer sentiment may be a decoy for a more controversial target of 
satire, then particular examples of ostensible anti-lawyer sentiment in Poetaster are 
not to be taken at face value. I put forward four things in support of this. One, I say 
                                                                                                                                            
other writings of Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558) included polemics against Erasmus. He was the 
father of Renaissance scholar Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609). 
65 Cain, introduction to Poetaster, 41. 
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that Jonson plays on the defamation doctrine of mitior sensus, whereby harmful words 
in common law actions for defamation were construed in their mildest sense. Two, I 
say that the dedications of Poetaster and the previous Comicall Satyre, Every Man 
Out of His Humour, demonstrate admiration for the legal profession. Three, I say that 
the inclusion in Poetaster of the revered ancient lawyer Trebatius, who is made a 
kindred spirit for Jonson’s alias Horace, demonstrates the playwright’s sense of 
identification with lawyers. Four, I say that the presence in the narrative of the 
courtroom judgment scene has an ideological function, showing Jonson’s respect for 
legal method. 
The conventional view that Poetaster is hostile to the law as a profession is 
understandable on a surface reading. The play opens with the young Ovid defying his 
father’s wish that his son should become “pleader, not play-maker” (I.ii.9). Ovid 
prefers to “studie not the tedious lawes; / And prostitute [his] voyce in euerie cause” 
(I.i.47-8) – he will devote his time instead to writing poetry.66 A troubled choice 
between the vocations of law and poetry is something members of the audience could 
be expected to relate to: in Law Tricks, Day makes a feature of the son, Polymetes, 
earning his father the duke Ferneze’s disapproval for preferring poetry to law. The 
allusions in Poetaster to the tedium of studying law and of prostituting oneself look 
pejorative. But this represents a point of contact between lawyers and poets: there is 
an element of masochistic boastfulness in the way they construct their vocations as 
the highest challenge to perseverance.67
                                                 
66 The words Jonson uses derive from Marlowe’s translation of Ovid’s Amores. See Cain, introduction 
to Poetaster, 80 n. 43-84. 
 And masochistic boasting would seem only 
67 Prest characterizes the attitude of Coke and contemporary barristers to the rigours of the lawyer’s life 
as one of masochistic boastfulness in The Rise of the Barristers, 258. 
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too appropriate an activity for the personality type proposed in the first section of this 
chapter: the introvert exhibitionist.68
 
 No one spoke more enthusiastically about the 
tedium of studying the law than lawyers themselves: 
I will a little relate unto thee the travail and pains of a lawyer, of whom I may say this, 
that as he is generally a mover in other mens cumbers . . . so hath he this recompense, 
that he never hath rest but is always in cumber himself. For in riding to term, at term 
forenoon he goes to the Hall, in summer in heat, winter in wet and cold, stands there 
bareheaded at the bar . . . after dinner he is tied to his chair and to read evidences while 
he can see, and to advise and be advised, without rest if he be in great practice and if in 
mean it is not worth following abroad and term being done he returns to circuit and 
country practice and so never hath rest and is most a stranger at home.69
 
 
The masochistic boastfulness of the poet, on the other hand, cries willing poverty, 
looking to demonstrate absolute commitment to art through indifference to worldly, 
financial reward. Jonson adapts the words of Ovid’s father in Tristia (IV.v.21.2) to 
this end: “Sape pater dixit, studium quid invtile tentas? / Mæonides nullas ipse 
reliquit opes.” (A. D. 108-9; “Often my father said, ‘why do you try a profitless 
pursuit? Even the Maeonian [i.e. Homer] left no wealth.’”70) Similarly, in Every Man 
in His Humour, Jonson has old Knowell despair of his son’s “Dreaming on naught but 
idle poetry, / That fruitless and unprofitable art” (I.i.17-18).71
                                                 
68 See supra, 85. 
 Both lawyer and poet 
articulate what they think others might think the negatives of their vocations, but both 
anticipate reward for perseverance with their labours. An “ancient song” sung in the 
69 Inner Temple lawyer Sir John Lowther’s “Autobiography,” in Lowther Family Estate Books, 1617-
1675, ed. Colin B. Phillips (Gateshead: Northumberland Press, 1979), 213; cited in Prest, The Rise of 
the Barristers, 11. 
70 Translation by Cain, introduction to Poetaster, 87. 
71 From the 1617 revised version, set in London; reference to Five Plays, ed. G. A. Wilkes (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-97. In the 1598 original, Lorenzo Senior is Knowell’s predecessor. 
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Inner Temple in the early modern period shows that the lawyer might draw strength 
from the knowledge that: 
By learning men advanced be 
To places of high dignity, 
When pains and toils are overpast, 
Thence come the joys which ages last.72
 
 
Swinburne criticized as a confusing flaw Jonson’s decision to introduce his play with 
Ovid,73 but the representation of the young, idealist aesthete (along with his friends 
Gallus, Tibullus, and Propertius) provides in terms of this notion of reward a 
necessary distinction from the two other sets of poets: the ethically preoccupied 
Horace and Virgil, and the poetaster hacks, Crispinus and Demetrius. The renowned 
classical poets are concerned in different ways with honour and reputation: Ovid, 
perhaps more with reputation, Horace and Virgil perhaps more with honour. Ovid’s 
reward will be a reputation beyond this life; in his conversation with his father’s 
servant, Luscus, he declares: “Thy scope is mortall; mine eternall fame” (I.i.47-9).74
Another example of anti-lawyer sentiment comes in the play’s second scene, 
where the tribune Lupus says: “a simple scholer, or none at all may be a lawyer” 
 
By comparison, Horace and Virgil are earthbound, ethically preoccupied. They look 
for justice in this world, and insist on the maintenance of honour. The fictional but 
recognizable poets, Crispinus and Demetrius, will write only what will sell: their own 
honour and reputation figure little in their reckoning, so they are reckless with others’.  
                                                 
72 J. H. Baker, “The Old Songs of the Inns of Court,” LQR, 90 (1974): 188; cited in Prest, The Rise of 
the Barristers, 258. 
73 Algernon Charles Swinburne, A Study of Ben Jonson (London: Chatto & Windus, 1889), 25. Owing 
in part, perhaps, to a misapprehension that the original audience saw a play called Poetaster, when they 
saw a play called The Arraignment: Cain, introduction to Poetaster, 19 n. 40. 
74 The words derive from Ovid, possibly via Marlowe; see n. 62. 
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(I.ii.102-3). This is really an indication of Lupus’s character-type. He is a fool, a 
fawn, an informer, and he represents the stereotype of the self-important magistrate 
without formal legal education. Christopher Brooks finds evidence to show that 
lawyers educated in the Inns of Court were never among the majority on commissions 
of the peace, and that, outside of London, lawyer-Justices’ professional advice was 
often ignored where local loyalties and the desire for patronage influenced non-
lawyers’ judgments in a particular direction.75
 
 Lupus urges Ovid to continue studying 
law partly out of fawning deference to the important Ovid Senior; he does so partly in 
order to perpetuate an image of himself as representative of the law – an image 
subdued by the end of the play by Caesar. Following Lupus’s malicious remark about 
Inns-educated lawyers, it is another foolish and self-important character, the military 
captain Tucca, who diminishes the law as a profession in the play. According to 
Tucca, the prospective lawyer must have “patience to plod inough, talke, and make 
noise inough, be impudent inough, and ’tis inough” (I.ii.106-7). This is the pot calling 
the kettle black for comic purpose. Tucca is every bit the bombastic soldier, as 
Captain Bobadil/Bobadilla is in Every Man in His Humour. He talks, makes noise, 
and holds himself out as superior, while his actions are characterized only by 
opportunism and inconsistency, as Caesar recognizes in the play’s final judgment 
scene. I mentioned in relation to Lupus the malice and envy that motivate the negative 
fashioning of the good and just by those without merit; this is a main theme in the 
play, and one for which Jonson employs the authority of Virgil to put right in the 
play’s final scene: 
First you must know  
That where there is a true and perfect merit,  
There can bee no deiection; and the scorne  
                                                 
75 Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 58. 
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Of humble basenesse, oftentimes, so workes  
In a high soule vpon the grosser spirit,  
That to his bleared, and offended sense,  
There seemes a hideous fault blaz’d in the obiect;  
When only the disease is in his eyes.  
Here-hence it comes, our Horace now stands taxt  
Of impudence, selfe-loue, and arrogance,  
By these, who share no merit in themselues;  
And therefore, thinke his portion is as small.  
For they, from their owne guilt, assure their soules,  
If they should confidently praise their workes,  
In them it would appeare inflation:  
Which, in a full, and wel-digested man,  
Cannot receiue that foule abusiue name,  
But the faire title of erection. (V.iii.341-58) 
 
Virgil might as well be talking to the lawyers in the audience: the impudence, self-
love, and arrogance of which Horace stands accused corresponds with the anti-lawyer 
sentiment dispensed by fawning informer Lupus and bombastic turncoat Tucca – two 
fools who have no merit in themselves. Through the imposing authority of Virgil, 
Jonson says his audience must know that where there is real merit there can be no 
dejection. 
Returning to Ovid’s preference for poetry over law, lawyers agreed too well 
that study of the law was tedious, but turned this into a badge of resilience: as earlier 
indicated, common lawyers characteristically relished grumbling about the rigours of 
the lawyer’s life. As for Ovid’s suggestion in the play that lawyers prostitute their 
voice in every cause, this is the perennial equation of the youthful idealist the young 
Ovid here represents: penury becomes idealistically linked with greatness and 
mythologizing notions of honour, so, by the reverse, the very possibility of earning 
money begins to resemble a sell-out. The young idealist looks back wistfully to a time 
when men 
 
would admire bright knowledge, and their minds  
Should ne’re descend on so vnworthy obiects,  
As gold, or titles: they would dread farre more,  
To be thought ignorant, then be knowne poore.  
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“The time was once, when wit drown’d wealth: but now,  
“Your onely barbarisme is t’haue wit, and want.  
“No matter now in vertue who excells,  
“He, that hath coine, hath all perfection else.[”] (I.ii.212-19) 
Jonson answers directly in the “Apologeticall Dialogue” the accusation that he has, 
“tax’d / The Law, and Lawyers; . . . / By their particular names” (68-70): 
 
those former calumnies you mention’d.  
First, of the Law. Indeed, I brought in Ovid,  
Chid by his angry father, for neglecting  
The study of their lawes, for poetry:  
And I am warranted by his owne words.  
   Sape pater dixit, studium quid invtile tentas?  
   Mæonides nullas ipse reliquit opes.76
And in farre harsher termes elsewhere, as these:  
  
   Non me verbosas leges ediscere, non me  
   Ingrato voces prostituisse foro.77
But how this should relate, vnto our lawes,  
  
Or their iust ministers, with least abuse,  
I reuerence both too much, to vnderstand! (102-14) 
 
Expressly, Jonson reveres contemporary law and lawyers. And if a disclaimer of this 
kind tends rarely to seem genuine in stage satires from this time, this is one of the 
occasions where it does, since Jonson demonstrably reveres both the laws and their 
just ministers (allowing an exception for unjust ministers, as represented in the play 
by Lupus) in Poetaster. 
 
I look now at four matters supporting the idea that ostensible anti-lawyer sentiment in 
Poetaster is not to be taken at face value. First, I examine the defamation doctrine of 
mitior sensus, according to which harmful words in common law actions for 
defamation were construed in their mildest sense. In order to examine the relevance in 
a dramatic context, I begin by outlining the development of common law actions for 
                                                 
76 See supra, 100 n. 70. 
77 “Nor learning garrulous legal lore, nor set my voice for common case in the ungrateful forum.” 
Derived from Ovid’s Amores I.xv.5-6. Translation by Cain, ed., Poetaster, 87. Cf. I.i.47-8. 
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defamation in the sixteenth century. Common law lawyers and judges are typically 
caricatured as attracting litigation, but, as with the Statute of Jeofails of 1540, which 
was passed with the aim of preventing objections on trivial errors of form in court 
pleading (even though it back-fired),78 judges and lawyers sought to limit defamation 
actions, which they felt had become too common, being brought for “every trifling 
thing.”79 In the 1570s, consequently, the courts implemented a policy for reducing the 
high number of defamation cases – they introduced the mitior sensus doctrine. The 
idea of the doctrine was that ambiguous or doubtful words were to be construed in the 
mildest sense possible (in mitior sensu), and, as such, they would not be actionable at 
law. Lawyers and judges recognized even at the time that the policy could be applied 
with absurd results. The case of Holt v. Astgrigg (1607) offers a prime example of the 
absurdities of construction that became possible with the application of the mitior 
sensus doctrine. One aspect of mitior sensus was that defamation actions were 
restricted to allegations of punishable crimes. In Holt v. Astgrigg, the defendant in the 
case said that the plaintiff “struck his cook on the head with a cleaver, and cleaved his 
head; the one part lay on the one shoulder, and another part on the other.”80
                                                 
78 See infra, 151. 
 Construed 
in mitior sensu, the court held that even this vivid description was ambiguous as an 
imputation of a crime. The cook, said the court, could have survived, in which case 
79 Staunford J, approving Dyer J: Anon. (1557), National Archives/Derbyshire Record Office, Anthony 
Gell MS. Report, F32v; cited in Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal History, 638 n. 20. 
80 Holt v. Astgrigg (1607), uncollected report cited in Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal 
History, 643. Location unspecified. 
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there was no punishable crime, but merely a trespass.81
 
 Jonson may be said to adopt 
the policy of mitior sensus in Poetaster. He has Caesar deplore any who would be 
“too wittie in anothers worke” (V.iii.128), and leaves it to the poet Virgil to formulate 
a concept of defamation in the context of satire’s value to the state whereby, in effect, 
the audience (not the satirist) as alleged accuser is the potential miscreant: 
’Tis not the wholesome sharpe moralitie,  
Or modest anger of a satyricke spirit,  
That hurts, or wounds the bodie of a state;  
But the sinister application  
Of the malicious, ignorant, and base  
Interpreter: who will distort, and straine  
The generall scope and purpose of an authour,  
To his particular, and priuate spleene (V.iii.132-9). 
 
The base interpreter is to blame, says Jonson. Ina Habermann’s notion of a slander 
triangle corresponds with Jonson’s idea.82 But Jonson goes a stage further and 
complains of the base interpretation of his own work, while assuming he knew best 
about Marston’s. Jonson’s vision effectively aims at making satire an unusual “pro-
defendant” form in the way that mitior sensus was an unusual pro-defendant form. 
What does this mean? Legal scholar Daniel Klerman argues that the common law 
had, historically, a pro-plaintiff bias: since plaintiffs chose the forum, courts 
competed, he suggests, by making the law more favourable to plaintiffs.83
                                                 
81 Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 442 n. 41. The doctrine continued to exist until 1714, when 
it was ruled that words should be taken in their most natural and obvious sense: Harrison v. 
Thornborough (1714), report cited in Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal History, 645-6. 
 The 
82  Habermann’s slander triangle involves accuser, victim and audience; parties may change positions 
and play different roles at different times: Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England, 2. 
83 Daniel Klerman, “Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law: An 
Hypothesis,” in Boundaries of the Law: Geography, Gender and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early 
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commonplace view in legal education now – that the common law was pro-
defendant – is a result of pro-defendant doctrines developed in the nineteenth 
century.84 The common law courts’ application of the doctrine of mitior sensus 
works against the idea of an historical pro-plaintiff bias, though, and Jonson’s 
rebuttal and counterclaim against “the sinister application / Of the malicious, 
ignorant, and base / Interpreter” is unusual for its attempt to work on a presumption 
of mild meaning.85
 Jonson’s dedications are the second matter supporting the idea that ostensible 
anti-lawyer sentiment is not to be taken at face value. The dedication to lawyers of 
Every Man Out of His Humour and Poetaster demonstrate the playwright’s respect for 
members of the legal profession. In a short paragraph, Jonson’s dedication of Every 
Man Out of His Humour plays off stereotypical ideas about Inns of Court men while 
demonstrating admiration in a distinctly male way: 
 
 
TO THE NOBLEST NOVRCERIES OF HVMANITY, AND LIBERTY, IN THE 
KINGDOME: The Innes of Court. 
 
I vnderstand you, Gentlemen, not your houses: and a worthy succession of you, to all 
time, as being borne the Iudges of these studies. When I wrote this Poeme, I had 
friendship with diuers in your societies; who, as they were great Names in learning, so 
they were no lesse Examples of liuing. Of them, and then (that I say no more) it was 
not despis’d. Now, that the Printer, by a doubled charge, thinkes it worthy a longer life, 
then commonly the ayre of such things doth promise, I am carefull to put it a seruant to 
their pleasures, who are the inheriters of the first fauour borne it. Yet, I command, it lye 
not in the way of your more noble, and vse-full studies to the publike: For so, I shall 
suffer for it. But, when the gowne, and cap is off, and the Lord of liberty raignes; then, 
to take it in your hands, perhaps may make some Bencher, tincted with humanity, 
reade: and not repent him. 
 
By your honourer, Ben. Ionson. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Musson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 149. In connection with the idea that 
courts “competed,” see supra, 17 n. 49. 
84 Klerman, “Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law,” 150. 
85 Klerman acknowledges that defences in defamation law are problematic for his argument: ibid., 163. 
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The opening line, “I vnderstand you, Gentlemen, not your houses”, has the sound of a 
brusque greeting made at arm’s length, but it is Jonson’s reputation that makes the 
reader look too hard for the curt in the courtesy. The playwright deplores base 
interpreters of his work, but the tone of the writing might seem a provocation to 
misinterpretation, as if he is spoiling for a fight. Here, Jonson only makes literal the 
metonymy at the front of the dedication. He is, he explains with deceptive simplicity, 
addressing the gentlemen of the Inns, not the Inns themselves. Realization of the 
mildness of the phrase diffuses the tension initially produced in its sharp sound. 
Jonson is recognized as having had obvious confidence of the Inns’ gentlemen’s 
approval, invoking a bond of common literary sympathies,86 and it has been argued 
that there is also a bond of a complementary corrective function.87
 
 There is obvious 
fondness and respect here: the writer has counted “diuers in [the Inns’] societies” 
among his friends, admiring them as examples of living as he does their 
accomplishment in his beloved learning. He will say no more than that these lawyers 
were “not despis’d.” This is not only a disclaimer of anti-lawyer sentiment made 
authentic by its brevity, but, if the negative expression – not despised – is recognized 
as an example of litotes, it is an emphatic affirmation of laconic male regard. Jonson 
establishes some confederacy with the members of the Inns, then, aiming for the 
private breaking of stereotypes which it might be entertaining or expedient to keep up 
in public. The dedication to Poetaster is a personal one: 
TO THE VERTVOVS, AND MY WORTHY FRIEND, Mr Richard Martin. 
 
                                                 
86 The Works of Ben Jonson, 11 vols., ed. C. H. Herford and Percy and Evelyn Simpson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1925-52), i, 11-12. 
87 Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England, 65. 
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Sir, A thankefull man owes a courtesie euer: the vnthankefull, but when he needes it. 
To make mine owne marke appeare, and shew by which of these seales I am known, I 
send you thu [sic] peece of what may liue of mine; for whose innocence, as for the 
Authors, you were once a noble and timely vndertaker, to the greatest Iustice of this 
kingdome. Enioy now the delight of your goodnesse; which is to see that prosper, you 
preseru’d: and posteritie to owe the reading of that, without offence, to your name; 
which so much ignorance, and malice of the times, then conspir’d to haue supprest. 
 
Your true louer, Ben. Iohnson (5-21). 
 
The virtue and worthiness of Jonson’s dedicatee is emphasized by a subtle distinction 
to someone the author would have considered vicious and unworthy, and both persons 
were legal practitioners. Jonson’s express affection for Richard Martin demonstrates 
his recognition of the virtuous and worthy practitioner of the law. Martin was a 
distinguished lawyer of the Middle Temple. His defence of Poetaster won the King’s 
favour after the play’s early performances attracted controversy.88 Seventeenth 
century antiquarian John Aubrey noted that Martin was “a very handsome man, a 
graceful speaker, facetious, and well beloved.”89 The dedication includes a subtle 
distinction, between the good lawyer of integrity, Martin, and the ironically, 
ambiguously alluded to “greatest Iustice of this kingdome”. The greatest justice of the 
kingdom could seem an all-embracing notion celebrating the probity of English 
justice; it is more likely to have been an ironical allusion to the Lord Chief Justice 
Popham, alleged by critics at the time to be part of a conspiracy against the Earl of 
Essex.90
                                                 
88 Brock, A Ben Jonson Companion, 169. 
 Jonson’s allusion to “what may liue of mine” (13) anticipates the poet’s 
sense of making a mark, perpetuated with Ovid in the play’s first scene: “Thy scope is 
mortall; mine eternall fame” (I.i.49). The play’s dedication to Richard Martin suggests 
it is wrong to say without qualification that Jonson is hostile to the legal profession: 
89 John Aubrey, Aubrey’s Brief Lives, ed. Oliver Lawson Dick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 156. 
90 See Cain, introduction to Poetaster, 42. 
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he respects and admires an upright lawyer, and is hostile only to those who abuse the 
position of administering justice. 
 Jonson’s bond of gratitude to, and respect for, Richard Martin seems to be 
figured in Poetaster in the connection between Horace and Trebatius. The inclusion in 
the play of the revered ancient Roman lawyer and jurist Trebatius is the third matter 
supporting the idea that ostensible anti-lawyer sentiment is not to be taken at face 
value. Gaius Trebatius Testa was a protégé of Cicero; he was made legal advisor to 
Julius Caesar and, subsequently, Augustus Caesar. No primary texts by Trebatius 
survive, but he was revered and cited by, among others, his eminent pupil Marcus 
Antitius Labeo, whose ideas survive in Justinian’s Digest. In act III, scene v satirist 
Horace and lawyer Trebatius find they are kindred spirits in a debate on the value and 
function of satire. There is no evidence to support the idea that the scene was added 
later,91 and the notion that Trebatius’s presence was intended “to silence the legal 
carpers in London”92
                                                 
91 Kaplan goes only so far as to say that “[i]t is possible that III.v. was added later”: The Culture of 
Slander in Early Modern England, 74. 
 would seem to be mistaken for two reasons. In the first place, it 
operates on a presumption that Jonson must have had some ulterior motive for the 
inclusion of material positive in character about lawyers, when the matters discussed 
here suggest this is to insert a disclaimer where there is nothing really to disclaim. 
Secondly, it omits, again, to recognize that original audiences saw a play called not 
Poetaster but the legal-flavoured The Arraignment. The inclusion of an historical 
lawyer in a play called The Arraignment could only have been more to be expected 
than the inclusion of poets and poetasters. Trebatius performs a central function in the 
92 Rationale proposed in The Works of Ben Jonson, ed. Herford and P. & E. Simpson, iv. See also 
Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England, 131 n. 21. 
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play, and his presence demonstrates the playwright’s respect for, and sense of 
identification with, lawyers. Good, right-minded poet and lawyer (represented by 
Horace and Virgil, and Trebatius) are distinguished from bad poet, legal charlatan and 
foolish state official (represented by Crispinus, Demetrius, Lupus and Tuuca). 
 If the connection between Jonson and Richard Martin seems figured in the 
meeting of minds in act V, scene iii between Horace and Trebatius, the identification 
between poet and just representative of the law is perpetuated to its highest level by 
the play’s end, in act V, scene iii, where the poet Virgil is invited by Augustus Caesar 
to preside over the hearing of poetaster Crispinus and play-dresser Demetrius. Taking 
Caesar as the law, and Virgil his poet-judge, the most unifying identification between 
virtuous poet and lawyer is given to Augustus: 
 
Caesar, and Virgil  
Shall differ but in sound; to Caesar, Virgil  
(Of his expressed greatnesse) shall be made  
A second sur-name, and to Virgil, Caesar (V.ii.2-5). 
 
Dedications and identification with lawyers show that Jonson was not hostile to the 
legal profession. But it is the presence in the narrative of the closing judgment scene, 
in which Virgil provides the play’s justice, that provides the fourth and most 
straightforward matter supporting the idea that ostensible anti-lawyer sentiment in 
Poetaster is not to be taken at face value. Jonson’s use of the courtroom has an 
ideological function, taking narrative and aesthetic conflict into a rule-bound legal 
forum. This demonstrates the author’s respect for the law and legal process, and it 
tends to be overlooked as a result of the subsequent imitation by other playwrights of 
this kind of scene as a plot device. 
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Chapter three 
The Phoenix and the rise of the new profession 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter I examine ways in which Middleton articulates problems in England’s 
legal system in The Phoenix, and I argue that the play reflects the contemporary rise 
of what J. H. Baker calls the new profession. The old, stereotypical members of the 
legal profession in the play, Tangle and Falso, represent not what the young lawyers 
and law students in the audience are destined to become, but what they should feel 
confident of overcoming. In the first and main section, I establish ways in which the 
play reflects a confused and complicated legal system in need of change, and I 
suggest that Middleton uses the play’s title as a guiding theme to positive end – 
anticipating the rise of a more efficient profession from, in effect, the ashes of the old. 
In the second section, I examine representations in the play of the politically sensitive 
relationship between law and monarchy at the time in which the play was staged. I 
argue against the view that lawyers “opposed” the King, and I suggest that The 
Phoenix is consistent with a commonsense view: lawyers, of all people, would have 
been aware of the penalties for criticizing the King, and lawyers are to be found on 
both sides of any legal question. 
 
 
If Middleton satirizes a negative in relation to lawyers and law in The Phoenix, he 
simultaneously articulates a positive. The title of the play provides an immediately 
positive connotation: of something new rising, like the mythical bird, with renewed 
youth from the ashes of something old. There are at least four ways in which the play 
can be seen to signify a sense of new-from-old. The first, most obvious one relates to 
the new monarch: James I had recently succeeded Elizabeth I. The eponymous 
character in Middleton’s play, the earnest young prince, bears allusive similarities to 
the new King, and James was often referred to as a phoenix (as Elizabeth I had 
been).1
                                                 
1 W. Power suggests that the ageing Duke is to be identified with Elizabeth, Phoenix with King James, 
and Proditor, who plots to kill the Duke, with Raleigh, contemporaneously found guilty of treason: 
“Thomas Middleton vs King James I,” Notes and Queries, ccii (Dec. 1957); Margot Heinemann 
proposes some alternatives – the young Prince Henry for Phoenix, and Cecil or Northampton for 
Proditor – before questioning the idea of such correspondences: Puritanism and Theatre: Thomas 
 The new King might be considered to have represented for many of his 
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subjects a second sense of new-from-old: three years in, a feeling of a fresh, proper 
beginning to a still-new century. A third sense of new-from-old relates to dramatic 
form: The Phoenix is an example of a new type of comedy that appears when the 
theatres in the locality of the Inns of Court re-open after the plague. I want to 
concentrate on the fourth sense of new-from-old which can be attached to The 
Phoenix: the sense of new things rising from old in England’s legal system.2
 
 
3.1 Tangle and the legal profession 
 
There are two denigrating legal stereotypes in The Phoenix. The main one is Tangle, 
who looks like a straightforward perpetuation of the conventionally negative 
representation of the lawyer. Tangle provides Latin-pattered knavish counsel to clients 
partly in order to finance his own vexatious law-suits. It is clear to an audience before 
Tangle even arrives on the stage that anything he says is to be approached with some 
scepticism, following the exposition from the villainous Captain of his artfulness: 
 
I haue acquaintance with an olde craftie Client, who by the puzzle of suites & shifting 
of Courts, has more tricks & starting holes, then the dizzie pates of fifteene Atturneys: 
one that has beene muzled in Law like a Beare, and lead by the Ring of his spectacles 
from office to office (I.ii.147-51). 
 
Then there is Falso, a corrupt Justice of the Peace whose standpoint on judicial 
bribery and corruption is demonstrated in his open willingness to sell his judgment: 
“Please me and please yourself” (I.vi.2). But Tangle is not a qualified professional – 
                                                                                                                                            
Middleton and opposition drama under the early Stuarts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 72. 
2 It is possible at the same time to find a sense of something ending even as it begins in city comedy: as 
soon as generic conventions become recognizable, they are burlesqued in Eastward Ho! See supra, 3. 
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he is conspicuously an unqualified quasi-lawyer. And Falso admits to having been a 
thief in his youth, and says of his position: “I think I am a greater thief now, and in no 
danger” (III.i.60-1). Importantly, emphasis is placed on Tangle’s and Falso’s age. 
Tangle is old – in years and in practical approach. He has forty-five years’ experience 
in the law (I.iv.122), and the word “old” is applied to him on seven occasions in the 
play. As for Falso, the distinction he makes about his stage in life – “I have been a 
scholar in my time, though I’m a justice now” (I.vi.106-7) – is a statement as much (if 
not more) about age as about position and power. Besides the simple association of 
the word “scholar” with youth, Middleton has Falso imply that, for this Justice of the 
Peace, the position is not compatible with a scholarly approach, and he is content to 
leave sound, reasoned judgment to young lawyers and student-scholars. 
 Tangle’s and Falso’s age and lack of qualification or credibility makes a 
difference. These characteristics set them against the Inns of Court men in the 
audience for the play. Younger, and with an increased focus on qualification, they aim 
at making a new, more organized profession: J. H. Baker writes of “the new [legal] 
profession” arising in this period.3 Only since 1590 had the four Inns had a broadly 
similar set of professional qualifications, these replacing the former vague criteria of 
undefined “learning” and unspecified “convenient continuance.”4
                                                 
3 An Introduction to Legal History, 162-5. Prest says that the profession was, in effect, reconstituted 
along modern lines at this time: The Rise of the Barristers, 2. And Brooks says change came in part as 
the result of a new sense of vocational pride among London lawyers: “The Common Lawyers in 
England,” 52. 
 Increased emphasis 
4 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, i, 346, 431; ii, 207; Minutes of Parliament of the Middle 
Temple, i, 280, 394; ii, 605; The Pension Book of Gray’s Inn (Records of the Honourable Society), 
1569-1669, ed. Reginald J. Fletcher (London, 1901), i, 131, 308-9; The Records of the Honourable 
Society of Lincoln’s Inn, ii, 103, 109. 
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was placed in the law on education and qualification, one author warning against “the 
rash adventures of sundry ignorant men that meddle so much in . . . weighty matters . . 
. [who only] have some law books in their houses”: men offering legal services, he 
said, should have acquired their knowledge and skill “by education, or . . . not have it 
at all.”5 In spite of the stereotypical image of the law student as not much more than a 
playgoing gallant,6 an Inns of Court education of the time encouraged diligence and 
independence. Augustine Baker, who had the uncommon experience of having been 
educated at both the Inner Temple and Gray’s Inn, wrote that: “what is . . . therein to 
be done, he [a student] must do himselfe, and supply with his own industry, 
experience and the assistance of his fellow students.”7
What is new about the representation of legal figures in The Phoenix is that 
Tangle and Falso, in effect, rue their own type’s passing. This becomes clear in a 
curious verbal duel between the two which comes to signify not only a change in the 
method by which men settle their quarrels, but a change in the approach of the young 
men who study and practise the law. The background to this requires some 
explanation. If the formulation of clear qualification for the bar was still relatively 
recent, the approach to dispute resolution generally had changed, too, in the course of 
the sixteenth century. Parties to arguments now preferred by far to settle matters by 
litigation, where many would once have chosen to settle quarrels by means of 
 
                                                 
5 William Sheppard, A Touchstone of Common Assurances, 1641 ed. Richard Preston (London, 1820), 
xxi-xxii; cited in Prest, Inns of Court, 151-2. 
6 See the example by Lenton: supra, 58. 
7 Memorials of Father Augustine Baker, ed. J. McCann & R. H. Connolly (Catholic Record Society, 
xxxiii, 1933), 45; Baker gave up a successful practice to become a Benedictine monk – see Prest, Inns 
of Court, 140, 217; Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 73 n. 59. On Baker, see James Norbert 
Sweeney, Life and Spirit of Father Augustine Baker (London, 1861). 
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physical fighting, taking on opponents on Sundays and public holidays armed with 
sword and buckler.8
 
 Stow says the practice of fight by sword and buckler was: 
frequent with all men until the fight of rapier and dagger took place, and then suddenly 
the general quarrel of fighting abated, which began about the 20 year of Queen 
Elizabeth; for until then it was usual to have frays, fights and quarrels upon the 
Sundays and holidays, sometimes twenty, thirty, and forty swords and bucklers, half as 
well by quarrels of appointment as by chance . . . And although they made great show 
of much fury and fought often, yet seldom [was] any man hurt, for thrusting was not 
then in use; . . . But the ensuing deadly fight of rapier and dagger suddenly suppressed 
the fighting with sword and buckler.9
 
 
This knowledge is significant to understanding what is said in the scene in which 
Tangle and Falso take up foils for a sporting duel while simultaneously conducting a 
verbal duel of legal terms.10 The two characters represent part of an old legal order: 
the old legal disorder. For now, this prevails. But when Tangle advises Falso that “our 
lawyers are good rapier and dagger men” (II.iii.172)11
                                                 
8 A buckler is a small, round shield. On the replacement of violence with resort to law, see Stone, The 
Crisis of the Aristocracy, 240-2;  Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 90-1. 
 he speaks of new lawyers and 
of their aspiration: an approach not cumbersome and dilatory, like the sword and 
buckler men these two are, but thrusting and incisive. Tangle says of the new lawyers: 
“they’ll quickly dispatch your . . . money” (II.iii.172-3). The remark sounds like a 
9 A Survey of London (London, 1603; 1631), 1023. Jean C. Marshall has argued that rapier fencing 
became a rhetorical and practical keystone of the gentleman-courtier’s identity: that it was by no means 
limited to the duel: “‘Come and see the violence inherent in the system’? The Multifarious Nature of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean Rapier Fencing” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Renaissance 
Society of America, Miami, Florida, March 2007), programme and abstract book, 275. 
10 This type of duel has analogies in two of the Comicall Satyres: see IV.vi of Every Man Out of His 
Humour (Fastidius Briske and Signior Luculento), and V.iii & iv of Cynthia’s Revels (Amorphus). 
11 On this allusion, see R. B. Parker, “Middleton’s Experiments with Comedy and Judgement,” in 
Jacobean Theatre: Stratford-upon-Avon Studies 1, ed. J. R. Brown and B. Harris (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1965), 182. 
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description of grasping materialists, whose greed for money outstrips any sense of 
care for their clients’ best interests. But that would be to describe Tangle and Falso 
themselves. The word “dispatch” is used at III.i.11 of A Chaste Maid in Cheapside 
(1611) similarly to signify completion of business, and the word already denotes 
promptitude, efficiency and rapidity at this time12
Elsewhere, Tangle alludes sarcastically to a new type of lawyer, “an honest, 
conscionable fellow [who] takes but ten shillings of a bellows-mender” (IV.i.126-7). 
Tangle’s contempt may be explained by the fact that ten shillings would not have 
been an exorbitant fee for a lawyer to charge, even if it would have represented 
something like two weeks’ wages for a bellows-mender.
 – ideas generally against Tangle’s 
vexatious and dilatory approach to the law. Significance may be found in the use of 
the adverb “quickly,” and the ellipsis (in the play-text) before the word “money.” 
Tangle enjoys being the cause of vexation and delay with his puzzle of suits and 
shifting of courts, so the idea that anything at all should be done quickly in the law is 
anathema to the old, wilfully plodding lawyer that he is. The ellipsis might be taken to 
suggest that Tangle was about to say “case” or “suit” instead of “money,” but he 
corrects what would be an obvious positive by projecting onto the young “rapier and 
dagger men” the negative which describes him and Falso. 
13
                                                 
12 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “dispatch.” 
 Tangle’s vocal inflection 
should become more acerbic, no doubt, as he continues: “Here’s another deals all with 
charity” (IV.i.127-8). It becomes clear that a different type of lawyer is emerging. 
Earlier, Tangle has tried to accuse the new lawyers of quickly dispatching their 
13 A skilled worker’s wages in Elizabethan London seems to have been in the area of ten to fourteen 
pence a day: George B. Harrison, ed., Shakespeare: Major Plays and the Sonnets (London: Benn), 
1084; cited by Brooks, ed., The Phoenix, 341. 
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clients’ money, implying that as a sole purpose. As he becomes more exasperated, 
there is no elliptical hesitation, no self-censorship, and his sarcastic dismissal of 
honest and conscionable lawyers shows an old type threatened by a new type, who 
will be more conscious of trying to deal with cases efficiently, and charging 
conscionable fees, or worse yet, handling charitable matters.14
 What of Tangle’s name? If the character was based on a real person, he has 
been caricatured beyond straight recognition.
 
15 In small part, one syllable-sharing 
candidate may be Inner Temple man Sir Lawrence Tanfield. By this time a judge, 
Tanfield presided at the hearing of a cause to which he was effectively a party, 
apparently untroubled by the possibility of being seen to be not altogether impartial.16 
More clearly, England’s legal system up to this time could rightly be described as a 
tangle. Tangle’s “puzzle of suits and shifting of courts” (I.ii.148) exemplifies the 
confusion and complication generated by the numerous courts and various 
unregulated types of lawyers working within different, conflict-prone jurisdictions.17 
Tangle declares that he is conducting twenty-nine law-suits at the same time, with “all 
not worth forty shillings” (I.iv.129 & 131). One commentator feels this is a clear 
exaggeration – “obviously no real person could or would carry on twenty-nine suits at 
the same time.”18
                                                 
14 See supra, 10. 
 But in 1629 the East India Company’s lawyer’s reported workload 
of twenty-six separate suits was not excessively heavy by contemporary standards, 
while courtier and projector Sir Arthur Ingram was at one point in his career engaged 
in conducting simultaneously twenty-one actions in five different Westminster 
15 So says Brooks, ed. The Phoenix, 226-7 n. 129. 
16 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 304 n. 52. 
17 See supra, 11 n. 28. 
18 Brooks, ed. The Phoenix, 226 n. 129. 
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courts.19 Tangle’s character plays to the ostensibly negative stereotype of the 
vexatious lawyer, but the view might equally be taken that a lawyer who failed to take 
advantage of the manifest flaws of the system as it existed, at least in his client’s best 
interests, would be still more a negative representation.20
The end of The Phoenix brings a strange, exaggerated cure for Tangle’s legal-
type. The mood is sombre, not humorous, and the action seems more like a piece of 
magic realism. A stage direction casually directs that ex-lawyer Quieto “Opens 
Tangle’s vein” in order to bleed him of his vexatious tendencies (V.i.306). Tangle had 
seemed to be rhetorically anticipating a harsh fate when inviting the young lawyers to 
skin him and write sonnets using his blood for ink. But the peculiarity of the play’s 
end points to a serious idea: that the negative idea of the vexatious, dilatory type 
Tangle represents should not be allowed to continue in the public’s perception. The 
dramatic punishment coincides with a characteristically harsh suggestion made around 
this time by Egerton to his colleagues on the Bench for an appropriate real-life 
remedy to slander: the practice of “the Indians by drawing blood out of the tongue and 
ears, to be offered in sacrifice.”
 
21 But the event in the play can be interpreted more 
widely as a call to untangle the confused legal system.22
                                                 
19 Calendar of State Papers Col., 1625-29, 674; A. F. Upton, Sir Arthur Ingram c.1565-1642 (1961), 
204-7; cited in Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 299. 
 Quieto holds up a basin to 
20 See the point made about Henry Sherfield, for example: supra, 12. 
21 Attorney-General v. Pickering (Court of Star Chamber, 14 May 1605): Hawarde, Les Reports del 
Cases in Camera Stellata 1593 to 1609, ed. W. P. Baildon (1894), 229; cited in Knafla, Law and 
Politics in Jacobean England, 63. 
22 At least one sixteenth century lawyer seems also to have practised surgery: in 1533, Lincoln’s Inn 
man Robert Maycote left a collection of books on surgery to his attorney son Richard; J. H. Baker 
interprets this as evidence that Maycote’s Kent practice may have taken in surgical patients, as well: 
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Tangle, and applies oil to his forehead to sooth him. There may be a pun on the Inns 
in Quieto’s incantatory speech – “Thy stormy temples I allay” (V.i.320). There is also 
something of a Christ-like image, as if Tangle is by implication figuratively dying for 
old lawyer-kind’s sins. Quieto’s instruction to give up the devil and “keep thee bare in 
purse and back” (V.i.321, 323) represents conventionally strict Puritan objections to 
excessive earning and ostentatious apparel (the gains of the legal profession could be 
regarded by some as a sign of kinship to the Devil23). Coke performed an ingenious 
reversal of objections of this kind, by suggesting that the prosperity of accomplished 
lawyers such as himself was a clear sign that God looked with special favour on their 
practice.24
Whether or not Tangle represents the tangled legal system, and allowing that 
an image of Christ dying for old lawyer-kind would probably not have been a widely 
shared interpretation, what is significant is that Phoenix, the young heir to Ferrara, 
administers justice in the play, and oversees the reform of Tangle and Falso. This is 
 In the play, for all Tangle’s faults, Quieto’s instruction to keep bare in 
purse and back shows the latter as a fanatic, as vicious by (extremist) virtue of his 
own Puritan fervour as Tangle has been in his vexatious legal meddling. 
                                                                                                                                            
National Archives, PROB11, 8 Hogen; suggested in Baker, “The English Legal Profession, 1450-
1550,” in Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America, ed. Prest (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 22. 
23 Wilfrid Prest, “The English Bar, 1550-1700,” in Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America, ed. 
Prest, (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 70; 83 n.16. The devil-lawyer identification is discussed in: E. F. 
J. Tucker, “Ignoramus and Seventeenth-Century Satire of the Law,” Harvard Library Bulletin, vol. 19 
(1971), 313-30. 
24 Wilfrid Prest, “Counsellors’ Fees and Earnings in the Age of Sir Edward Coke,” in Legal Records 
and the Historian: Papers presented to the Cambridge Legal History Conference, 7-10 July 1975, and 
in Lincoln’s Inn Old Hall on 3 July 1974, ed. J. H. Baker (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 
164; see also Prest, “The English Bar, 1550-1700,” 70. 
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not to suggest that justice resides outside the legal profession. Rather, the message is 
that the King’s central courts dispense justice, and amateur quasi-lawyers such as 
Tangle, and corrupt, old provincial Justices such as Falso are to be distinguished from 
the new profession. 
 When Tangle first meets with Falso, there is the irony of a situation which 
finds two negative legal-types passing negative judgments on a new type of lawyer. 
Expressed in mathematical terms, the sum of the two negatives may be said to amount 
to a positive. Falso connives to profit from his dead brother, who was “too honest to 
live” (I.vi.79-80), making at the same time an incestuous play for his grieving niece. 
By implication, any Justice of the Peace would be in a position to indulge an 
opportunist appetite for all kinds of unethical, even criminal, conduct. But the 
representation of Falso can be interpreted as having a polemical purpose in favour of 
Inns of Court lawyers. Justices of the Peace were drawn mainly from local knights 
and gentry, but all commissions of the peace had been required by statute since the 
fourteenth century to include at least two “men of the law” in their quorum.25 The 
proportion of lawyers to lay J.P.s began to rise noticeably from the mid-sixteenth 
century, inferring both that more lawyers wanted the position, and that more were 
wanted for it. John H. Gleason suggests “there can be no question that most of the 
future J.P.s [of this time] really studied law.”26 But the proportion of J.P.s actually 
qualified in the Inns of Court seems throughout the period not to have exceeded one 
third.27
                                                 
25 Justices of the Peace were supervised in this period by the assize judges acting on the instructions of 
the king’s council; see Cockburn, A History of English Assizes, 153-87, and Baker, An Introduction to 
Legal History, 25. 
 It is possible that the heightened involvement of lawyers may have caused 
26 The Justices of the Peace in England, 1558-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 91. 
27 Ibid., 26, 45. 
 122 
some occasional resentment, but what little evidence there is in this area is taken to 
suggest that lay J.P.s characteristically respected and valued the contribution of their 
Inns of Court lawyer colleagues.28 Lay members may naturally have been influenced 
in their own judgment by that of their qualified colleagues, and a contemporary 
manual writer’s suggestion that J.P.s not legally qualified could “for want of 
knowledge of the many and particular statutes in force . . . seek to be exempt out of 
the commission of the peace”29
 Age reinforces Middleton’s representation of Tangle’s redundancy, as a thing 
about to pass. Tangle’s forty-five years’ experience coincides in length in the text 
with the old Duke’s forty-five year reign (I.i.7) – the Duke anticipates his succession 
by young prince Phoenix – and in the play’s context with the late Elizabeth I’s reign 
(1558-1603). The figure of forty-five years might contemporaneously have seemed a 
topical allusion to a period reasonably long in duration, in many ways respectable, but 
now past. The reign of the old Duke in The Phoenix does not correspond with an 
actual Duke of Ferrara: none of the five Dukes reigned for forty-five years. Thirty-
eight years was the longest reign: Alfonso II, who acquired the title in the year 
 could be interpreted not only as a simple ploy to 
encourage lay J.P.s to buy his book, but a recognition that there was new competition 
for posts, with legally qualified candidates increasingly at an advantage. For these 
reasons, Falso, the unqualified and corrupt J.P., can be seen as a polemical 
representation – in favour of the rising number of Inns of Court men ready and better 
able to do his job. 
                                                 
28 See Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 239 n. 12. Cf. Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, 
61 n. 4. 
29 Michael Dalton, The Countrey Justice (London, 1618), A6v; cited in Prest, The Rise of the 
Barristers, 238. 
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following Elizabeth I’s coronation was the longest reigning Duke of Ferrara (1559-
1597).30
 A less frequently considered aspect of the early modern lawyer-figure is subtly 
represented in Tangle: the matter of the hardship endured in attaining, or maintaining, 
one’s position and standard of living in the early seventeenth century. Middleton 
fleshes out his characterization by including some explanation for the old lawyer’s 
vexatious impulse. Tangle’s look back on his forty-five years’ experience reveals an 
insecure, vicissitudinous life, again by implication not uncharacteristic of any number 
of other lawyers’ careers. He has been “at least sixteen times beggar’d, and got up 
again; and in the mire again, that [he has] stunk again, and yet got up again” (I.iv.123-
25). A degree of malevolence might seem not altogether surprising, and the 
playwright makes potential for sympathy even in Tangle’s negative representation. It 
has been suggested that the common law in early seventeenth century England was 
pre-eminently a career open to talent.
 This adds subtly to making The Phoenix’s Ferrara setting a thinly disguised 
version of England, and in particular London. 
31 But, talent or not, the law could seem a lottery 
for lawyers as much as for litigants, with records documenting professional failures 
supported from their Inns’ poor-boxes and some practitioners who remained 
financially at or below the subsistence level of the yeomanry.32
Nina Taunton singles out Jacobean city comedy when considering dramatic 
genre as giving rise to stereotypical characters (and conventional situations) of age in 
 
                                                 
30 John E. Morby, Handbook of Kings and Queens (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1994), 104. 
31 Prest, Inns of Court, 210. 
32 Ibid., 22; citing Harrison, Description of England, 173-4; The Just Lawyer, his conscionable 
complaint, against auricular or private informing and soliciting of judges, by their menialls, friends, 
and favourites (London, 1631), 18-19; Diary of the Rev. John Ward, A.M., Vicar of Stratford-upon-
Avon, extending from 1648 to 1679, ed. Charles Severn (London: Henry Colburn, 1839), 292. 
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conflict with youth.33 The fact that Middleton represents Tangle and Falso as old men 
does not in itself function as a negative of the kind Georges Minois claims for early 
modern art and literature: simple disgust for decline and decrepitude.34 The conflict 
between the young Inns of Court men in the audience and the figures of old Tangle 
and Falso corresponds with the characterization of city comedy as championing the 
young, and affirming life and continuity, if incidentally.35
Tangle’s copious and unnecessary use of Latin terms may well have been 
another way of showing the young Inns men in the audience how old-fashioned his 
approach to the law was. Taunton examines early modern notions about the 
indecorous use of inkhorn terms and the barbarism of spouting Latin terms as part of 
an argument about the innate indecorousness of old age.
 The principal function of 
Tangle’s and Falso’s age is that it contributes to making them plainly different from 
the young members of a new profession. 
36 But what about the use of 
Latin in particular relation to legal training and practice? The law had been taught and 
conducted in Latin in the early Middle Ages, but it had changed to three languages by 
the thirteenth century – Latin, English, and French – of which the last was 
predominant.37
                                                 
33 Fictions of Old Age in Early Modern Literature and Culture (London: Routledge, 2007), 38-9.  
 By the early seventeenth century, it is doubtful whether the lawyers of 
34 History of Old Age: from Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 249; cited in 
Taunton, Fictions of Old Age, 6. 
35 Fictions of Old Age, 39. 
36 Ibid., 75-8. Such notions are contained in English manuals on court style, including Thomas Wilson, 
The Art of Rhetorique, 1560; George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie, 1589; and Henry 
Peacham, The Compleat Gentleman, 1622. Cf. Sheen and Hutson, introduction to Literature, Politics 
and Law, 8: “Latin learning . . . was associated with a distinctly forensic habit of mind.” 
37 Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 138. 
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the Inns of Court needed more than a rudimentary knowledge of Latin, and the young 
members of the Inns used law-French as a form of technical shorthand.38 Law-French 
was a compound of French, English, and Latin, liked by some lawyers for its 
precision, but disliked by laymen for its supposed obfuscation and “demeaning 
associations with the Norman Yoke.”39
There is another, simple point against the conventional view that Middleton is 
genuinely hostile to the legal profession in The Phoenix. He good-humouredly 
castigates all professions as being corrupt – so why should the law be singled out? 
Phoenix suspects “infectious dealings in most offices, and foul mysteries throughout 
all professions” (I.i.109-10), and towards the play’s end he tells the audience in an 
aside: “I’m sick of all professions” (IV.ii.98). This raises the issue of what a 
“profession” was at the time. Attempts to trace a history of the professions have been 
problematic. Until relatively recently, the concept of the profession as a significant 
historical phenomenon seemed to be regarded by historians and social theorists as a 
 Besides being old-fashioned, continued use of 
classical Latin might present a problem for its closer association with the popish civil 
law. In Middleton’s A Chaste Maid in Cheapside, Yellowhammer struggles with the 
Latin in his son Tim’s letter from university; his wife Maudline recommends he seek 
advice from her cousin at the Inns of Court, to which he responds “Fie they are all for 
French, they speak no Latin” (I.i.80). The satire points to an increasing suspicion of 
classical Latin; Maudline recommends the parson, but even a parson now “disclaims 
it, calls Latin ‘Papistry’” (I.i.82). Here is another degree of separation between the 
old, Latin-spouting stereotype and the young Inns men in the audience – Tangle does 
not represent them. 
                                                 
38 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 108. 
39 Ibid., 109.  
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product of the Industrial Revolution.40 The so-called “learned professions” – law, 
medicine, the clergy – clearly existed long before the arrival of the industrial age. The 
ideological approach of those commentators who associated the modern profession 
with the Industrial Revolution was apparent in the explaining away of old, traditional 
professions as “mere parasitic appendages of the ancien régime’s landed ruling 
elite.”41 More recently, phases much earlier in English history than the industrial age 
have been seen to have had an impact on the professions, and the word itself has come 
to be recognized as a subjective, value-laden term, capable of only broad historical 
tracing.42
Yet The Phoenix demonstrates recognition of a concept of something 
semantically and substantially above the standard trade or occupation, more defined 
than any broad, unqualified sense of profession. The villainous Captain in the play 
interrupts the reading of a deed drafted on his behalf only for the reason that he thinks 
the description in the deed of the type of work he does is insufficient. As Fidelio, 
disguised as a scrivener, recites the deed, the Captain objects furiously: “out with 
‘occupation,’ a captain is of no occupation, man” (II.ii.124). The Captain insists that 
 In any event, the word “profession” can be said to have been more general 
in its application in the early modern period than it was later to become. 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar opens with the tribune Flavius berating a carpenter, 
cobbler, and other Plebeians who, “Being mechanical, . . . ought not walk / Upon a 
labouring day without the sign / Of [their] profession” (I.i.3-5). A profession in this 
period might, then, be taken to mean simply the way a man earned his living. 
                                                 
40 Talcott Parsons, “The Professions and Social Structure,” in Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, 
Ill.: Free Press, 1954), 34-49; M. S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), xvi, chs. 1-2; Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 1 n. 1. 
41 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 1. 
42 Ibid., 2. 
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the work of a ship’s captain is something more than a mere “occupation.” His view of 
what he does points to a pride-driven, status-based concept of something more like a 
profession. The Inns of Court men in the audience may have been amused by the 
seaman’s delusion of grandeur, since having claimed apparently superior status, he 
finds no contradiction in his ready admission to being illiterate: “’Sfoot, dost take me 
to be a penman? I protest I could ne’er write more than A B C, those three letters in 
my life” (II.ii.199-201). 
How might the word “profession” be characterized in an early modern context 
in comparison with the sense in which we now understand its application in the 
concept of a “new profession”? In connection with the law, Prest attempts a broad 
idea of what the word signified in this period: a non-manual, non-commercial 
occupation sharing some measure of institutional self-regulation and reliance upon 
bookish skills or training.43 The one element of Prest’s definition yet to be properly 
implemented in the first decade of the seventeenth century was institutional self-
regulation. The legal profession was amorphous and diverse up to the mid- to late 
sixteenth century – in a sense, even to use the term profession is “to indulge in an 
anachronistic shorthand which makes only a limited contribution to the precise 
description of reality.”44
                                                 
43 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 2. See also Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “profession”: 
references going back to the sixteenth century define a profession as “A vocation in which a professed 
knowledge of some department of learning or science is used in its application to the affairs of others or 
in the practice of an art founded upon it. Applied specifically to the three learned professions of 
divinity, law and medicine.” 
 While recognizing that the word “profession” is more 
general in application in early modern England, I have suggested that the Captain’s 
44 Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 42; idem, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the 
Commonwealth, 12. 
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distaste for the word “occupation” in The Phoenix infers that superiority, notional or 
real, already attached to the classification of “profession.” This finds support in 
connection with the law in one of Middleton’s masques, The World Tost at Tennis 
(1619-20). Here, one lawyer gives another his opinion of “our profession.”45 As with 
the Captain’s (misplaced) pride in The Phoenix, we find in this text a pride-driven, 
status-based concept in direct application to the law. The lawyer in the masque 
describes the legal profession as performing, next to the clergy, “the most grave and 
honorable function / That gives a kingdom blest.”46
It was not unusual for a writer to express a sentiment about bad lawyers while 
acknowledging that the vocation of law itself was a good, virtuous one. Robert 
Herrick saw the potential for individual abuses, but recognized it could be “a 
dangerous madness to envy generally against lawyers.”
 This positive characterization of 
the legal profession does not appear to require its speaker to convey any sense of 
irony, nor does the speaker’s character suggest that the opinion is to be taken 
implicitly ironically – the speaker’s earnest attitude to responsible work means that 
pride is this time not misplaced. 
47 The lyrical apostrophe to 
law in The Phoenix is a significant example of the bad-lawyer / good-law topos. But 
the prince’s soliloquy only makes explicit what I suggest is implicit in this and other 
plays in the genre, and it ought not to seem unusual for Middleton.48
                                                 
45 The Works of Thomas Middleton, ed. A. H. Bullen (London, 1885), vii, 187. 
 There are 
46 Ibid. 
47 The Poems of Robert Herrick, ed. Leonard C. Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 244. 
48 Cf. Daniel B. Dodson, “Thomas Middleton’s City Comedies” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1954), 95: “I know of no other instance in Middleton where law receives other than 
contempt.” Cited in The Phoenix, ed. Brooks, 231. 
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villains, says Phoenix (or one villain, figuratively), but these are only to be expected, 
and there is no reason to turn isolated bad examples into grand over-generalization: 
 
Thou angel sent amongst us, sober Law, 
Made with meek eyes, persuading action, 
No loud, immodest tongue, 
Voic’d like a virgin, and as chaste from sale, 
Save only to be heard, but not to rail; 
How has abuse deform’d thee to all eyes, 
That where thy virtues sat, thy vices rise? 
Yet why so rashly, for one villain’s fault, 
Do I arraign whole man? Admired Law, 
Thy upper parts must need be sacred, pure, 
And incorruptible; they’re grave and wise: 
’Tis but the dross beneath ’em, and the clouds 
That get between thy glory and their praise, 
That make the visible and foul eclipse; 
For those that are near to thee are upright, 
As noble in their conscience as their birth; 
Know that damnation is in every bribe, 
And rarely put it from ’em; rate the presenters, 
And scourge ’em with five years’ imprisonment, 
For offering but to tempt ’em. 
This is true justice exercis’d and us’d: 
Woe to the giver when the bribe’s refus’d! 
’Tis not their will to have law worse than war, 
Where still the poor’st die first; 
To send a man without a sheet to his grave, 
Or bury him in his papers. 
’Tis not their mind it should be, nor to have 
A suit hang longer than a man in chains, 
Let him be ne’er so fasten’d. They least know 
That are above the tedious steps below: 
I thank my time, I do. (I.iv.193-223) 
 
The question “How has abuse deform’d thee to all eyes [?]” may be interpreted in two 
ways. The obvious interpretation relates to workers in the law who have committed 
individual abuses, and who thus unjustly give lawyers a bad name in general. But 
Middleton’s question can be interpreted, too, to apply to sensationalizing, generalized 
negative representations of the legal profession, in which case it is writers who 
commit the abuse by giving a “deform’d” perception of law and lawyers to all eyes. 
All of this begins to sound in keeping with the concerns about comedy and writing 
generally which Jonson expresses in his examples of the genre. 
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 Phoenix praises upright lawyers in the apostrophe, those who would not have 
“A suit hang longer than a man in chains” (220). The allusion points to the arbitrary 
nature of the penal system, but Falso’s subsequent observation that the old “gallant 
swaggerers” (II.iii.176) are gone demonstrates by means of contrast recognition of a 
new profession more conscious of efficiency, and this is reinforced by Tangle’s gibe 
in II.ii about quick dispatch. Another of Tangle’s dismayed comments on the change 
in the Inns of Court men of the day – “Oh, sir, the property’s altered” (II.iii.177) – is 
an allusion to a plea associated with Middle Templar Edmund Plowden (1518-85). 
Plowden is reputed to have once in a while conducted a case in swaggering and 
dilatory fashion, before the promise of an increased fee promptly made him perk up 
and perform at full power, with an announcement that the property or case had altered 
– a story which would become the source for the title of Jonson’s The Case Is 
Altered.49
 I suggested that Phoenix’s question “How has abuse deform’d thee to all 
eyes[?]” could be taken to apply to writers’ abuse in expressing generalized anti-
lawyer sentiment. This thesis argues that the representation of lawyers in city comedy 
is more complex than has hitherto been assumed; in Twelfth Night, a different type of 
comedy, the representation of Malvolio is similarly complex. The treatment of the 
character makes an interesting parallel for several reasons. He can be viewed as a 
paradigm of a contemporary preoccupation with status and advancement
 The allusion in The Phoenix to the phrase associated with Plowden thus 
implies in Tangle fond reminiscence for old ways less likely to be found in a better 
organized and more conscientious new profession. 
50
                                                 
49 Brock says the play was first acted in or around 1598: A Ben Jonson Companion, 34. 
 – a 
preoccupation that often features in representations of lawyers in city comedy; the 
50 See the note on Zagorin: supra, 57 n. 174. 
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character’s name connotes malevolence, and city comedy relates to its social context 
by recognizing the time expressly as “an ill-thinking age.”51 Most of all, there is the 
complex, fluctuating balance of scorn and sympathy with which an audience may be 
left if it agrees with Olivia that Malvolio has been “most notoriously abus’d” 
(V.i.374).52
Malvolio’s sore exit line “I’ll be reveng’d on the whole pack of you!” 
(V.i.377) has no analogue in The Phoenix, though Tangle’s caricature might be 
viewed as an abuse if taken to apply to all lawyers. Tangle perpetrates notorious 
abuses of the legal process, and, with Quieto’s Puritanical bleeding of him, is himself 
notoriously abused in the end. How much sympathy might the audience have for 
Tangle? Not much, perhaps. Middleton provides a degree of sympathy, with the old 
swaggerer’s vicissitudinous forty-five years in the law, but he appears uninterested in 
giving Tangle or Falso the real pathos one can find in Malvolio. Phoenix’s pomposity 
and Quieto’s abject “bare in purse and back” Puritanism might estrange their 
 How much sympathy might an audience have for Malvolio? Then or now, 
depending on how the role is performed, quite a lot, perhaps. He is imprisoned 
effectively for pomposity, and this might seem a miscarriage of justice – a notorious 
abuse which can cause an audience half to laugh, half to sympathize. Even then, 
actresses playing the part of Olivia can inject widely varying degrees of sincerity into 
the sentiment contained in those few words in V.i – quite in the way that apparent 
anti-lawyer sentiment can be expressed with anything between bitter seriousness and 
good-humoured irony. 
                                                 
51 A Mad World, My Masters (III.i.105); cf. Jonson in Poetaster, and Wray CJ in Stanhope v. Blythe 
(1585): see supra, 87. 
52 William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, or What You Will, ed. J. M. Lothian and T. W. Craik (Walton-
on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1997), 152. 
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characters from the audience, but Tangle nonetheless needs untangling. If the strange 
bleeding ritual seems to offer a prospect of rendering Tangle as spiritually and 
mentally harmless as Quieto, it is only because Tangle and his kind are over, and the 
good rapier and dagger men are waiting in the wings. It is they who will, in effect, be 
revenged on the whole pack of Tangles, Falsos and Quietos, while seeking only to 
reform their relationship with, not to oppose, their Phoenix. The apparent anti-lawyer 
sentiment in Middleton’s play is consequently an example of negative fashioning of 
old and unqualified practitioners to which the rising new profession had an antipathy, 
and, as such, the play may be taken implicitly to favour young Inns of Court men. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Law and monarchy in The Phoenix 
 
On one level, The Phoenix is a simple variation on the conventional disguised-duke 
plot.53
                                                 
53 Other examples appearing at or around the same time included Marston’s The Malcontent and The 
Fawn, and Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. See Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 68-74. 
 But it is possible to find topical significance in the play’s detail. Prince 
Phoenix oversees the administration of his idea of justice; he identifies himself on 
occasion with God and the law, and in exposing Proditor’s plot to murder the Duke, 
Phoenix makes treason and irreligion synonymous: Proditor is guilty of treason for 
having “irreligiously” persuaded someone to carry out the prospective murder of the 
sovereign (V.i.71-72). This may have provided some resonance with current affairs 
 133 
for members of the play’s audience. James I had expressed his views on the concept 
of the divine right of kings in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies. A king has a duty to 
do more than rely on his birthright, said James, even if that birthright is not to be 
questioned.54 A connection becomes apparent early on in Middleton’s play, where 
Phoenix announces: “That king stands sur’st who by his virtues rises / More than by 
birth or blood” (I.i.130-1). The play can be seen to flatter the new King, since Phoenix 
is the upholder of law.55
 According to an older view of political history, lawyers, led by Coke, were 
allies of the gentry in a struggle to wrest political power from the absolutist-minded 
James.
 And the prince’s apostrophe to law may have held appeal for 
the Inns of Court men in the audience, who would have shared the antipathy to Tangle 
and Falso. But Phoenix’s assumptions about law and justice would probably have 
been at variance ideologically with the ideas of at least some lawyers in the audience 
for the play, if disagreements between law and monarchy could be misunderstood. 
56 Gibbons adopts this view, saying that lawyers became the spearhead of the 
opposition to absolute government.57 But this can seem now a too-simple description 
of a complex situation, or perhaps even a mistaken view. In practice, while there were 
disagreements in Parliament in the early seventeenth century, most sessions began 
with goodwill and a spirit of compromise on both sides.58
                                                 
54 King James VI and I: Political Writings, 64 
 Even hypothetically, the 
55 It may have been intended for James’s Christmas celebrations in 1603; it was, in any event, probably 
performed before the king on 20 February 1604: Brooks, ed. The Phoenix, 24-63. 
56 Paraphrased from Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 59. 
57 Jacobean City Comedy, 36; following Wallace Notestein, The Winning of the Initiative by the House 
of Commons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 47-8. See supra, 25-6. 
58 According to Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 59. See also Conrad Russell, 
Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 8. 
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idea that lawyers opposed the King might seem doubtful; lawyers, of all people, 
would have been sufficiently aware of the legal penalties for criticizing, let alone 
opposing kingly rule.59 Despite Coke’s dismissal from judicial office in 1616, he was 
not really an opponent of kingly rule. He is fairly characterized as possessing an 
“idiosyncratic but profoundly conservative” view of the common law as arbiter 
between King and parliament;60
 The way in which The Phoenix can be seen to articulate an apt-to-be-
misunderstood problem between law and monarchy is where Proditor and Falso 
complain before the Duke in the closing scene that the disguised prince “has his hand 
fix’d at the throat of law” (V.i.113). I contend that this has to do with a disagreement 
about ideas between law and monarchy. The play can be interpreted to represent some 
lawyers’ desire for recognizing a distinction between law and justice – an aim 
complicated by the King’s ideas about monarchical supremacy. In the play, the 
accusation that Phoenix has his hand fixed at the throat of the law suggests that the 
law (as distinct from justice) will be badly administered if it remains arbitrarily 
determinable by the-King-in-the-name-of-God. An inference of this kind would have 
resembled both treason and heresy in early modern England. Jurisprudential 
statements of the period characteristically invoked God, probably not only because 
they had to, but because of genuine faith. Coke’s pronouncements do this, but he 
begins to articulate ideas about legal thinking which can be viewed as quite new. 
Orthodox legal thinking is represented in The Phoenix. The prince’s apostrophe to 
 his conservatism made him the King’s servant, but 
the outspoken, idiosyncratic articulation of his commitment to the development of the 
common law could make opposition apparent if not real. 
                                                 
59 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 269. See also Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments, 296. 
60 Prest, Inns of Court, 229. 
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law, as but one example drawn from the play, is based on belief in the existence of a 
“true justice” (I.iv.213), and this corresponds with accepted legal thinking: 
 
Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of 
binding in conscience, from the eternal law whence they are derived, according to 
Proverbs viii. 15: “By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” . . . On the 
other hand, laws may be unjust in two ways: first by being contrary to human good . . . 
[Such laws] are acts of violence rather than laws, because, as Augustine says, “A law 
that is not just, seems to be no law at all.” . . . Secondly, laws may be unjust through 
being opposed to the divine good . . . and laws of this kind must nowise be observed 
because, as stated in Acts v. 29, “we ought to obey God rather than men.61
 
 
Aquinas’s Summa Theologica was a key text in the prevailing jurisprudential 
view of James’s time, and this extract from it sets out some of the main ideas on 
which the doctrine of natural law is founded. But in spite of the debate about what is 
just and unjust (and therefore law or seemingly no law) in Aquinas, and for all of the 
prince’s assumption in administering self-defined justice in The Phoenix, nothing 
causes conflict in legal thinking like the conflation of law and justice. The play can be 
seen to articulate a desire for establishing a clear distinction between the two – a 
distinction complicated by the King’s claim to absolute supremacy in the legal 
scheme, and I suggest that Middleton’s notion of a hand fixed at the throat of the law 
coincides with a jurisprudential shift: from the doctrine of natural law to a more 
modern concept of what we would now call legal positivism. Even today, some 
people can find some themselves put off by the key ideas of legal positivism, notably 
the point that “it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain 
demands of morality, though they have often done so.”62
                                                 
61 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Q96 A4; cited in Howard Davies and David Holdcroft, 
Jurisprudence: Texts and Commentary (London: Butterworths, 1991), 158-9. 
 The legal positivist’s 
problem with natural law is well summarized by Alf Ross: 
62 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 181-2. 
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To invoke justice is the same thing as banging on the table: an emotional expression 
which turns one’s demands into an absolute postulate. That is no proper way to mutual 
understanding. . . . The ideology of justice leads to implacability and conflict, since on 
the one hand it incites to the belief that one’s demand is not merely the expression of a 
certain interest in conflict with opposing interests, but that it possesses a higher, 
absolute validity.63
 
 
James made absolute postulates. In doing so, he relied on judgment to which he felt 
God and nature gave higher, absolute validity. But it was the King’s assumption that 
the law was grounded in ordinary reason, so that any logical mind might understand 
it, that drew a response from Coke which, while embracing God and nature, 
distinguished legal thinking from ordinary ethical thinking: 
 
. . . true it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great 
endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of 
England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his 
subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and 
judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study and experience, before 
that a man can attain cognizance of it.64
 
 
 
If Coke’s concept of the law’s “artificial reason” seemed in part the wilful cultivation 
of a mystique, his questioning of “natural reason” as the basis for judging legal causes 
looks now as forthright as then possible a move towards legal positivism. Serious 
ideas about law in The Phoenix are delivered mainly by the prince, whose tone when 
expressing ideas of legal orthodoxy has been characterized as “rather pompous.”65
                                                 
63 On Law and Justice (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958), 274-5. 
 
Elsewhere, the Puritan ex-lawyer Quieto has a kind of proselytizing “born-again” self-
64 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63; M. Allen, B. Thompson, and B. Walsh, Cases and 
Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law, 2nd ed. (London: Blackstone, 1992), 133. Coke 
was capable of some inconsistency when speaking on the matter of the sovereign and the “law of 
nature”: Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political 
Thought, 1603-1642 (London: Macmillan, 1992), 128-9. 
65 Parker, “Middleton’s Experiments with Comedy and Judgement,” 179. 
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righteousness which is unlikely ever to have earned an audience’s fondness. The point 
in this connection is that, while The Phoenix has been dismissed for being an over-
moralizing example of a Middleton yet to mature into the writer he would become,66
 To conclude, I have argued that The Phoenix reflects a change in legal 
thinking, and Coke’s and other lawyers’ problem was not with monarchy itself, but 
with the conflation of law and justice. For this reason, the play contributes to an idea 
of Inns of Court lawyers being expert in a distinct discipline (involving something 
more than natural reason), and this amounts to a positive representation for those 
present in the audience. 
 
the characters doing the moralizing seem often deliberately less-than-credible 
instructors. An audience may have felt persuaded to feel as distanced from the 
ostensibly good Phoenix and Quieto as from the obviously bad Tangle and Falso. 
Perhaps the most serious line about the law – the one about the prince’s hand being 
fixed at the law’s throat – has to be made (as if in disguise, as the prince has been) by 
the play’s unambiguous villain, wife-buyer and would-be regicide Proditor. Even if 
the fixed-hand line is thought to be given to a real villain in order to discredit the 
view, the point is still made. It may be more likely that the line is given to Proditor in 
order to protect the writer, who makes a point, however obliquely, about separating 
law and monarchy, or more specifically separating law and justice (the latter being 
inseparable from God and monarchy). 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
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Chapter four 
Law Tricks for Inns of Court lawyers 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter I say, contrary to authoritative opinion, that John Day’s comedy Law 
Tricks contains legal matter. I argue that there are at least three ways in which this is 
the case. Firstly, the play’s main action turns on a bought-divorce, and the law on 
marriage dissolution was a hotly debated topic in early modern England. Secondly, 
while authoritative opinion describes the play’s legal usages as meaningless, 
gratuitous, and incorrect, I contend that they have a purpose; several are allusions to 
the positive concept of legal fictions (a term capable of translation into the more 
commercially appealing Law Tricks). Thirdly, I propose that the play’s incorporation 
of a negative attitude to the study of law has the purpose of showing that this kind of 
sentiment had become redundant as the universities superseded the Inns of Chancery 
as places of preparatory education for the Inns of Court. It is hoped that the chapter 
goes towards accomplishing two things. One, through examination of the supposedly 
meaningless legal usages, that it shows the play to involve an ironic turnaround of 
anti-lawyer sentiment on client-litigants themselves. Two, by recognizing the play’s 
deceptive approach to its legal matter, that Day should be seen as more than a 
conventional playwright cashing in on the development of city comedy. 
 
 
John Day’s comedy Law Tricks has more to live up to today than it did in its own 
time. Day wrote for the same boy company in the same playhouse at the same time as 
Jonson and Marston.1 But in spite of – or because of – the illustrious company he was 
in, Day is regarded as an inferior writer of conventional plays cashing in on a still 
developing trend.2 A critic struggling to be kind about Day called him “a talent 
somewhat out of sympathy with the main poetic current of his day.”3
                                                 
1 The play was performed in 1604 by the Children of the Queen’s Revels at the Blackfriars. M. E. 
Borish’s suggestion that the play was first produced in 1608 has not found acceptance: “John Day’s 
Law Tricks and George Wilkins,” Modern Philology, vol. 34, no. 3 (Feb., 1937), 256. 
 The opinion is 
reproduced in the nineteenth century Works (the only reprint to date), and it seems at 
odds with the twentieth century classification of Day as mere cash-in playwright. Law 
Tricks shows that the nineteenth century critic was right – Day was out of sympathy 
2 Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 112-16. 
3 E. W. Gosse, cited in The Works of John Day, ed. Bullen, 16. 
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with contemporary writing. But this makes him something other than a cash-in 
playwright. If failing properly to follow convention of one sort or another worked 
against Day in the past, it is what should make him more interesting now.4
 Since Law Tricks is a less well-known (and in some ways an unusual) example 
of city comedy, I now provide a summary of the plot as an aid to reading the chapter. 
The play is set in the court of the Duke of Genoa. As it begins, selfish young 
aristocrat Horatio congratulates himself on the success so far of his plan to win the 
Countess, with whom he has an over-reaching infatuation. Horatio’s rumours about 
the blameless Countess have given her husband, cynical old Count Lurdo, the excuse 
he was looking for to divorce her. The Countess is the sister of the good Duke of 
Genoa, Ferneze. The Duke is distressed by news of his sister’s apparent disgrace, and 
his distress is compounded when he learns from his son, the scholarly Polymetes, that 
his daughter Emilia has been abducted while overseas by Turkish raiders. No sooner 
does the Duke leave Genoa to go in search of his daughter, than she returns, having 
made good her own escape. Emilia has developed a taste for adventure, and she enters 
in her father’s absence into a series of frivolous episodes under the assumed name 
Tristella. Horatio presumes the Countess will be glad of his advances following the 
fall from public grace he orchestrated; he takes it as humiliation when instead she 
asserts her integrity and rejects him. When Lurdo learns that his ex-wife is managing 
to convince friends in high places that the divorce was groundless, he does not have to 
try very hard to persuade the stung Horatio to kill the Countess. The Duke returns 
 
                                                 
4 Law Tricks has received little attention in the last few decades. See Elmer Milton McDonald, John 
Day’s coterie comedy (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1970); Gary Paul Lehmann, A critical 
analysis of the works of John Day (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 
1980); Eric Collum, “‘Sinister shifts’ and ‘secreat exceptions’: early modern legal hermeneutics and 
John Day’s Law Tricks,” Explorations in Renaissance Culture, vol. 28, no. 2 (2002), 285-311. 
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disguised to Genoa to find his son Polymetes transformed unaccountably from scholar 
into Gallant. A funeral for the apparently murdered Countess triggers the play’s 
dénouement. The unexpected hero of the play is Horatio’s page, who has privately 
sided with the Countess against his master. The page’s father is an apothecary, which 
goes to explain how, when Horatio believes he has poisoned the Countess, she turns 
out to have been given instead a potion, substituted by the page, that removes signs of 
life only temporarily (apparently a similar concoction to the one dispensed in IV.i of 
Romeo and Juliet). Horatio is driven to confess to murder when the Countess plays 
her own ghost, and Lurdo’s incitement is revealed. Believing his sister dead, the Duke 
sentences Horatio and Lurdo to be sealed (alive) in the tomb with her corpse. The 
revelation that the Countess is alive brings, by contrast, mild treatment for the villains 
of the piece. Lurdo is to remain married to the Countess (whose honour is restored, 
but who is obviously too virtuous a partner for Lurdo); Horatio is banished from the 
Duke’s court, but not from the country. Finally, the Duke commends Horatio’s page, 
whose “merrit is not triuiall, / That turnd to mirth a Sceane so tragicall” (V.552-3). 
 As with other examples of city comedy, certain allusions in Law Tricks imply 
that the Genoa setting is a thinly disguised version of London. Points concerning law 
and legal history relate, therefore, to English law only, and not to Genoese law. 
Examples of the play’s allusions to areas of London are most prominent in Act IV. 
We find there, for example, a report from Emilia’s page that: “there fell such an 
Inundation of waters in the moneth of Iuly, about the third of dog-dayes, that the 
Owers and Scullers that vse to worke in the Thames, rowd ouer houses & landed their 
faires in the middle Ile of Paules” (IV.250-3). Shortly after, the gallant Julio 
elaborates a London-based conceit: “had not Charing-crosse a tall bow legd Gent: 
taken vp the matter, tis thought Westminster stones would haue bin too hot for some 
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of them: and in parting the fray, Charing-crosse got such a box o'the eare, that hee will 
carry it to his deathsday” (IV.280-3). Setting in the context of English law is shown 
with Julio’s allusion to Charing Cross “looking westward for Termers” (IV.285). 
 
4.1 Legal matter in Law Tricks 
 
The plot of Law Tricks is authoritatively considered to contain no legal matter 
whatsoever.5 Certainly, the word “law” is used numerous times with little gain in 
meaning, and legal terms are used (sometimes) gratuitously or incorrectly.6
 At a straightforward level, the main action turns from beginning to end on 
legal matter in that everything that happens in the play is driven by Count Lurdo’s 
bought-divorce from the Countess. The divorce is an illegal contrivance. Lurdo 
confides in his wife’s admirer, Horatio, the news that he obtained a divorce by paying 
off witnesses and judges: 
 But I 
contend that there is legal matter in Law Tricks, and that certain parts of it favour Inns 
of Court lawyers. 
 
You know the cause on’t, two sufficient men 
Swore her a harlot, and the partiall Bench 
Inspirde by my good Angels (Angels wings7
Sweepe a cleare passage to the seat of Kings) 
 
Seald our diuorce (I.41-5). 
 
 
                                                 
5 Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 112. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “angel”, no. 6; an angel was an English gold coin, called 
more fully at first the Angel-Noble, being originally a new issue of the Noble, having as its device the 
archangel Michael standing upon, and piercing the dragon. The same pun is made in The Phoenix 
(I.vi.29-30), The Merry Wives of Windsor (I.iii.60), Eastward Ho! (II.iii.52), and Volpone (II.iv.21). 
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The indissolubility of marriage had been a topic of widespread legal debate since the 
clash between Henry VIII and Pope Clement VII over the King’s first marriage to 
Katharine of Aragon.8 Lurdo’s nod of approval to an unnamed serial husband – “I 
know one man hath coffind vp sixe wiues” (I.232) – must have made members of the 
audience think of Henry.9 Marriage was the most important contract into which two 
people could enter; yet, unlike any other contract, there was, for the majority of 
ordinary people, no way out of it if it proved unsatisfactory. The suggestion as Law 
Tricks opens that the divorce court was open to bribery and corruption as a means to 
removing impediments to divorce was not a negative one for Inns of Court lawyers. 
The church courts had jurisdiction over matters of divorce, and this was the province 
of the civilians. If Genoa is to be taken anatopically for London, though, the witnesses 
to Lurdo’s wife’s alleged adultery could have been punished for more than perjury in 
the church courts. A law manual suggests that a defamation action may have been 
available at common law – peculiarly, in the city alone: “To call a married Wife, 
Whore, will not hold Action at Common Law; but in London, by custom it hath.”10
 In the play, the validity of Lurdo’s marriage is reasserted by his brother-in-
law, the Duke Ferneze, at the last moment (V.544-5). There is nothing to celebrate in 
the play’s marital reunion. Lurdo acquiesces simply in order to avoid a death sentence 
 
                                                 
8 Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 493. 
9 Even if Anne of Cleeves (1515-57) and Catherine Parr (1512-48) outlived Henry. A less than 
flattering opinion of Henry VIII by an Inns of Court man may be found in Historie, and Lives of the 
Kings of England, published in 1615 by Middle Templar and Recorder of Exeter William Martin 
(Poetaster dedicatee Richard’s brother). Martin criticizes Henry for cruelty and avarice. Reprints in 
1628 and 1638 show the view was no longer an unutterable one. 
10 The Practick Part of the Law Shewing the Office of an Attorney And a Guide for Solicitors (London, 
1681), 109. 
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from the Duke, and the virtuous Countess is reunited with the vicious husband who 
has once already incited her (failed) murder. This is an unhappy ending masquerading 
as a happy one. The final line finds Ferneze praising Horatio’s page for having “turnd 
to mirth a Sceane so tragicall” (V.553), but a lingering dissonance seems clear and 
deliberate. It is possible to interpret this as a representation of the superiority of the 
common law as practised by Inns of Court lawyers, over the canon law which was 
used in the church courts. When England broke with Rome in 1534, some common 
lawyers had advocated abolition of the church courts; some kind of fusion of canon 
law and common law was seriously contemplated, but a satisfactory arrangement 
never arrived, and the church courts continued to operate, managing to distance 
themselves sufficiently from theological debates surrounding the Reformation.11
It is easy to see how a play called Law Tricks could be expected to be negative 
about lawyers. The title implies a stereotypical anti-lawyer sentiment – the law is 
open to tricks, and lawyers are conniving tricksters. Literary critics are inclined to 
cling to the greedy, conniving stereotype, being content with generalizations of this 
type: “many [early seventeenth century] lawyers must have used . . . tricks to defraud 
 If the 
marital reunion at the end of Law Tricks is seen as dissonantly unhappy, therefore, 
canon law could be inferred to be represented as inferior to the common law, in the 
sense that the former was unable (more than unwilling) to evolve as the latter could 
and did, by means of socially harmonizing developments introduced by way of legal 
fiction. 
                                                 
11 See H. B. Vaisey, The Canon Law of the Church of England (London: The Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, 1947), 45-6; Geoffrey R. Elton, Reform and Renewal: Thomas Cromwell and the 
Common Weal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 129-39; Baker, An Introduction to 
Legal History, 130-1. On canon law generally, see Richard H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in 
Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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or intimidate clients into unnecessary litigation.”12
 
 More than a century after the 
production of Law Tricks, an anonymous writer gave his supposedly non-fiction text a 
title similar in character to that of the play: Law Quibbles. Or, A Treatise of the 
Evasions, Tricks, Turns and Quibbles, commonly used in the Profession of the Law, to 
the Prejudice of Clients, and others. The writer claims novelty for the phenomenon of 
the law trick in the book’s short Preface, which is worth reading for two reasons. 
Firstly, for its earnest-seeming expression of a stereotypical attitude to both trick and 
profession – an attitude surviving from Day’s time, but distinguishable here by the 
lack of comic irony; secondly, for a standard disclaimer made towards the end: 
The many Quibbles and Evasions, of late introduc’d in the Practice of the Law, are 
sufficient to Influence any one of the Profession (especially a Person who has suffer’d 
by them) to undertake a Treatise that may expose such Artifices, and give the world a 
necessary Caution against them: And this being a Topick which is wholly New, and of 
great Importance, all sorts of Persons are in some Degree interested therein. 
  For these Reasons, I have ventured upon the Subject; and if I have laid open 
some Things in the Profession, more than they may Approve whose Interest it is to 
oppose the Discovery, this will be an Advantage to the Publick; and the Publick Good 
ought in all Cases to be principally regarded. But tho’ I have inserted many of the 
Tricks and Quirks in the Law, I have not endeavour’d at, neither do I pretend to 
mention them All: The following work is not compos’d of Quibbles alone; for it 
contains the various Turns and Subtilties to be met with in the Practice and Abuse of 
our Laws; what People may do, and what they may not do; what will be Binding, and 
what will not be so; with many extraordinary and curious Cases, proper to be known as 
a Guard against Impositions. 
  I have no where thrown any Reflections on the Profession of the Law, which 
is in it self both Laudable and Honourable: If any Persons are expos’d, they are the foul 
Practisers only, who are a Scandal to it. That this is True, is Manifest throughout.13
 
 
This notion of legal tricks and turns was not wholly or even partly new, of course. If 
there is any surprise here, it is that the text was not published a hundred or more years 
earlier. The author is himself a trickster for more reasons than this. The text’s title 
                                                 
12 Example from E. F. J. Tucker, “Ruggle’s Ignoramus and Humanistic Criticism of the Common 
Law,” Renaissance Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 3 (Autumn, 1977), 350. 
13 Law Quibbles. Or, A Treatise of the Evasions, Tricks, Turns and Quibbles, commonly used in the 
Profession of the Law, to the Prejudice of Clients, and others (London, 1724), Preface. 
 146 
promises prejudicial tricks commonly used, before the Preface limits the inferred slur 
on a laudable and honourable profession to its “foul Practisers only.” And these foul 
practitioners are apparently rare enough for the individual case still to occasion a 
scandal. In terms of the book’s substance, what is held out as an exposé of corrupt 
practices turns out to be instead a fairly routine, alphabetically-arranged law primer. It 
is too slight and uninformed a volume to be of interest to students or practitioners of 
the law, so a note of skulduggery is injected to excite the interest (and tempt open the 
purses) of potential lay readers. It is effectively an old-fashioned instruction manual 
under cover of old-fashioned coney-catching pamphlet-style sensation. 
It is possible to find inbuilt ambiguity in the title Law Tricks. The phrase 
sounds like a pejorative one. Tricks and truth seem mutually exclusive, and the 
ordinary view of the law is that it should be seen to be concerned with the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but. But several legal terms used in the play connect in 
various ways with the jurisprudentially positive concept of legal fictions (I shall 
shortly examine three examples). The presence of these terms may be taken to support 
an interpretation of “law tricks” as a satirically flavoured, more ambiguous version of 
the term legal fictions. Again, the idea of a legal fiction may seem at odds with 
conventional lay conceptions of law – fiction connotes falsehood; falsehood infers 
dishonesty. But in the history of English law fictions were a significant aid to the legal 
system. They were not intended to mislead; they were allowed in the courts only 
where their operation was manifestly fair, and they would produce a result that was 
just in the view of the court – as one legal scholar felt the need to point out: “the aim 
of fictions is not deception; it is to keep records straight.”14
                                                 
14 S. F. C. Milsom, “Trespass from Henry III to Edward III,” Law Quarterly Review, 74 (1958), 223; cf. 
Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 202. Legal fictions of the kind allowed by the courts were 
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Since I suggest that the title Law Tricks has an association with the concept of 
legal fictions, I now explain exactly what it is that gives the fiction a legally positive 
connotation. In the historical sense proposed, the fiction is usefully described as a 
thing by which the law could be brought into harmony with the present needs of a 
changing society; in effect, it functioned to make change while pretending not to.15 A 
notable positive example is the one that benefited Ben Jonson in 1599, after he killed 
the actor Gabriel Spencer – the extension of clerical immunity, of so-called benefit of 
clergy, that enabled the courts to avoid imposing the death penalty. Records go some 
way, incidentally, to diminishing (if not breaking) another legal stereotype: that of the 
inclement, death-dispensing judge. By the end of the sixteenth century, the royal 
judges had shown mercy by way of applying this fiction, allowing benefit of clergy to 
as many as half of all men convicted of felony.16
                                                                                                                                            
abolished in the 1850s, though in a wide sense we still find fictions applied in the law with the 
implying of terms and presumptions. 
 The subtitle of Law Tricks – or, Who 
Would Have Thought It? – indicates that an audience should expect something of the 
unexpected, and playing on a difference between legal (positive) and lay 
(conventionally negative) understanding of fictions and tricks may well have been the 
surprise that attached (and was meant to attach) to the main title for Inns of Court men 
in the audience. I suggest this interpretation of the subtitle is a little more plausible 
15 Paraphrased from Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (1861); see Baker, An Introduction to Legal 
History, 196 n. 6. 
16 J. S. Cockburn, Calendar of Assize Records: Home Circuit Indictments, Introduction (London: 
H.M.S.O., 1985), 117-121: 47% of all convicts for felony between 1559 and 1624 were allowed benefit 
of clergy. The courts applied a legal fiction by treating as a “clerk” anyone who could read. They 
extended the privilege to people who could not read, or who were disqualified from joining the clergy 
(so women could be spared the death penalty): Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 201, 514 n. 72. 
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than that inferred by Gibbons’ response to the play, by which the implied surprise 
would seem to be that its allusions to law are all knowingly empty of meaning. 
 Old Count Lurdo is the main legal-figure in Law Tricks. Lurdo bears some 
similarity to Tangle in The Phoenix. He is not a lawyer; he is an old courtier with 
pretensions to being learned in the law. Three times Lurdo is given the phrase “I know 
the law,”17
 In the royal courts in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a count was the 
plaintiff’s opening pleading. The purpose of the count (the name derives from the 
French word for a tale or story) was to give particulars of a demand or complaint 
summarized in an originating writ.
 and of sixteen other direct allusions to the law, all but two are given to 
him. The character’s name derives presumably from the first-person conjugation of 
the Latin verb “ludere,” giving a meaning of I play, I sport – I trick. There are apt 
similarities, as well, to “luror” (ghastliness), “ludio” (actor), and “lurco” (glutton). 
One way in which Day may be seen to make an allusion to legal fictions in the play is 
in giving Lurdo the title Count. The title can be taken as a pun – one capable of 
influencing lawyers’ perceptions of the character. In legal history, the development of 
the count saw the beginning of pleading in the English courts. The count could not 
itself be called a legal fiction, but it was the blank page on which any number of legal 
fictions and other developments would come to be written.  
18
                                                 
17 Day, Law Tricks, I.71; V.147; V.150. 
 The count saw the beginning of increased 
sophistication in legal thought, in that it came to generate hypothetical and flexible 
issues in law which only a court could decide. These were points deemed beyond the 
remit (and generally the understanding) of jurors, who would remain responsible for 
18 Information concerning the history of the count in court-pleading is informed by Baker, ch. 5 of An 
Introduction to Legal History, 71-96. 
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decisions on matters only of fact, not of law. Following a tortuous history, the count 
went out of use by the fifteenth century. But the numerous manuscript collections of 
counts and defences compiled since its inception remained in educational use in the 
Inns of Court into the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.19 Thus, there may 
have been some resonance for young Inns of Court lawyers and students in the 
audience in hearing Lurdo, the old Count, spew out the language of the jargon-heavy 
old counts they were required to study in the Inns. The audience is reminded of 
Lurdo’s rank on eight occasions over the course of the play,20
 
 and the pun is made 
explicit in an exchange between Horatio and Lurdo in act IV – even with apparently 
appropriate typography in the original 1608 printing, where upper-case title Count is 
punned against lower-case pleading count (a simultaneous punning allusion to legal 
fictions may be seen to be implied by the association of “trickes” with lower-case 
pleading count): 
Horatio 
To all these bad mis-fortunes should the Count vse any trickes?  
 
 
Lurdo 
Ha? a talkes of trickes,  
Of count and tricks, for trickes and count are twins (IV.453-5). 
 
                                                 
19 These were called the Narrationes and Novae Narrationes (derived from the Latin for counts – tales 
or stories – and new counts): ibid., 76, 177. 
20 Horatio addresses Lurdo as Count soon after he enters, at I.35; Polymetes’ servant addresses Lurdo 
as Count as Act II opens; Emilia refers to Lurdo as Count at II.97; Emilia pretends not to know Lurdo 
is present when referring to him as the Count at III.44; Polymetes alludes to Count Lurdo at III.203; 
Horatio sets up Lurdo’s pun at IV.453; Emilia refers to the Count at V.427; finally, the Duke Ferneze 
remarks on the pallor of the Count at V.476. 
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So, Lurdo may be taken to embody, by way of his title, an element from the history of 
court pleading which was by the date of the play already obsolete (inferring that the 
old Count represents an outdated figure). And probably only those educated in the 
Inns of Court could have been expected to get the court pleading pun made explicit in 
the exchange reproduced above. 
 If any one thing could be said to signify the notion of the law trick as frivolous 
objection, it is the demurrer. The word “demurrer” is mentioned five times in Law 
Tricks.21
                                                 
21 At III.299, Lurdo says a demurrer will silence the Countess; at V.160, Lurdo claims a demurrer when 
the Duke accuses him of leading his son astray; at V.308, Lurdo dismisses Emilia’s complaint as a 
groundless demurrer; at V.494, Lurdo seeks a demurrer in disclaiming involvement in the supposed 
poisoning of his (supposed) ex-wife; at V.514, the Duke advises Lurdo to leave behind the idea of 
demurrer. 
 In law French, the term meant to abide or dwell, and, though the concept 
changed over time, by the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century a party 
to a legal action could demur (be it with just cause, or by way of vexatious law trick); 
that is, they could admit all the facts a complainant alleged, and claim that they were 
not obliged by law to respond since the facts amounted to nothing. Lurdo is ever 
ready to demur when trouble is afoot; when, for example, he hears that his would-be 
ex-wife is spreading news of his having obtained a divorce without good reason, his 
immediate response is “We must demurre of this, ile haue a trick” (III.299). Yet 
demurrer is among Lurdo’s pejorative terms of rebuttal when he finds it necessary to 
shout down the inconvenient claims of others; for instance, he attempts to dismiss the 
Duke’s daughter Emilia’s allegations against him: “Ha, . . . Law-trickes, words of Art 
[,] Demurrs and quillets” (V.307). Lurdo abuses the concept to comic effect, though it 
was common lawyers themselves that had attempted to limit the abuse of a useful tool 
in the increasingly sophisticated set of “tricks” at their disposal – “attempted” being 
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the operative word. The Statute of Jeofails of 1540 was passed with the aim of 
preventing objections on trivial errors of form in court pleading – minor 
technicalities.22
 Gibbons condemned Law Tricks for gratuitous or incorrect use of legal terms. 
But to content oneself that they are there without reason would seem to be to accept 
that Day was remarkably careless. The incorrect usages, often Latin terms, come 
 This would be achieved by requiring that any formal exception could 
be taken only by way of demurrer; that is, a party making a challenge on what seemed 
a minor point of legal form needed to admit all of the facts and let the whole case rest 
on the technicality. Those involved in the legislative process assumed this would 
seem so great a risk to litigants that there would surely be few takers. They were 
wrong. The idea backfired – instead of reducing the number of challenges on 
technicality, the number only increased. Litigants were becoming more militant, more 
venturesome. Being forced to risk all on one kind of law trick – having been expected 
by efficiency-minded legislators not to – served only to make litigants embrace the 
gamble. By the end of Day’s play, the duke Ferneze calls for the end of Lurdo’s 
demurs. Lurdo seems about to be closed in the tomb of the wife he apparently played 
a part in killing as Ferneze directs him to: “Leaue demurrs, / Close them into that 
graue, that dead mans Inne, / Pitie true vertue should be lodg’d with sinne” (V.511-
516). After mention of demurs, the notion of a “dead man’s Inne” can seem to play on 
Lurdo’s quasi-lawyer status, and allusion attaches more easily to the in-decline Inns of 
Chancery. Inns of Court men in the audience could consequently feel distanced from, 
and pleased by, the negative representation of old Lurdo, first simply by being 
qualified, and second by being members of the emphatically superior Inns. 
                                                 
22 Statute 32 Henry VIII, c. 30. Information concerning the Statute of Jeofails informed by Baker, An 
Introduction to Legal History, 82-6. 
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characteristically from Lurdo, sometimes with bewildering results. When, for 
example, the Duke of Genoa accuses Lurdo of having led his son into prodigal ways 
the Count expresses righteous indignation in a burst of verbiage: 
 
Non tenet in bocardo I demurre,  
Do but send out your Iterum summoneas, 
Or capias vt legatum to attach, 
And bring him viua voce tongue to tongue,  
And vi & armis Ile reuenge this wrong (V.160-164). 
 
These usages can be seen as gratuitous or incorrect, but there is purpose and meaning 
– even legal meaning of an allusive kind. Lurdo is being covertly insolent by 
suggesting the capias as an alternative to the summons in calling for the prince 
Polymetes to be present. The capias (ad respondendum) was one of a number of 
methods in the so-called “mesne” process (intermediate – between writ and judgment) 
for securing the presence of a defendant outlawed for his failure to appear before a 
court:23 the suggestion that a prince could be outlawed is what makes it insolent. 
Lurdo seems to use the phrase vi et armis (“with force and arms”) simply as a way of 
emphasizing his indignation. Vi et armis was a form of writ, though. Lay members of 
the contemporary audience would have known this, for it was commonly used, and 
there is no denying that writs of vi et armis were used fictitiously.24
                                                 
23 Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 64. 
 This is an 
example of a legal fiction widely (and with just purpose) allowed by the courts. In the 
case of vi et armis, the legal fiction was a way of circumventing undue limitation on 
complainants hopeful of making claims in good faith. Vi et armis was a writ attached 
to actions of trespass – historically a far broader category than it is today, the word 
deriving from the law-French for the Latin transgressio, or wrongdoing. By the 
24 Ibid., 61. 
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fourteenth century, a situation arose whereby non-violent claims of trespass for 
amounts in excess of forty shillings could not, strictly, be heard in any jurisdiction. It 
would have been unjust for apparently legitimate claims to be denied even the 
possibility of remedy, so a lawyer needed to facilitate a claim by being creative with 
the notion of force – not to do so would have been an impediment to fairness. So, in 
the case of vi et armis, where a remedy for a justified claim was not directly available 
at law, actions came to be taken under the pretence that force was involved. Claims 
had to be made, for example, that horses had been injured “with force and arms” 
where blacksmith defendants had accidentally injured horses when attempting to shoe 
them.25
 Lurdo misuses the term Habeas Corpus when conspiring with Horatio to do 
away with the Countess, who has too much to say about the bought-divorce for 
Lurdo’s liking. There is purpose and meaning to this again, with the possibility of an 
esoteric piece of plot-driven irony for law students: 
 A remedy was not available for a claim not involving the element of force. 
 
We must demurre of this, ile haue a tricke  
By way of Habeas Corpus to remoue  
This talking Gossip (III.299-301). 
 
Since Lurdo is deliberately represented as a quasi-lawyer, one with mere pretensions 
to knowing the law, it would be out of character if the old trickster was consistently 
correct in his application of legal terms. In any event, because the term Habeas 
Corpus is much more familiar in a legal context, it is possible to look too hard for 
legal meaning where it appears, and to forget that the phrase may have meaning in a 
                                                 
25 Robert C. Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death 1348-1381: a transformation of 
governance and law (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 364-5; 
Milsom, “Trespass from Henry III to Edward III,” 220-1; Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 61 
n. 37. 
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non-legal sense. In this case, a Latin joke has been missed. Lurdo is at this point the 
flustered and blustering inciter of, and conspirator to, murder. The Latin Habeas 
Corpus translates in English to “have the body,” so Lurdo’s apparent misapplication 
of the term in the legal sense in which it has long been most familiar becomes an apt 
euphemism in the context of a murder plot, made more amusing for its incongruous 
legal pretension. Having the Countess’s (dead) body will rid Lurdo and Horatio of her 
inconvenient protestations of innocence. Day’s interest in etymology and semantic 
ambiguity can be recognized here by the fact that “gossip” is used both in the 
common early modern sense of a familiar acquaintance, and in the sense still really 
quite new in 1604,26
 
 yet more familiar today, of an idle talker, or newsmonger. Lurdo 
uses the term Habeas Corpus again near the play’s end, now in hope of making a 
quick getaway: 
. . . ide giue my goods, 
For a good habeas Corpus, to remoue me 
Into another Countrie (V.511-13). 
 
Perhaps another reason that Day twice invokes Habeas Corpus is because it is an 
example of a legal concept with its own inbuilt paradox, a fact of which at least some 
contemporary law students could be expected to have been aware.27
                                                 
26 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “gossip”; the examples for the idle talker definition date 
back to the second half of the sixteenth century: references are made to Lyly’s Euphues (1579) and to 
Dekker’s Old Fortunatus (1600). The O.E.D. notes that both the familiar acquaintance definition and 
the idle talker definition came to be attached mostly to women. 
 The term Habeas 
Corpus was at first used in court documents for the purpose not of releasing people 
27 Habeas Corpus and its associations were discussed in a contemporary legal text: Lincoln’s Inn 
lawyer and jurist William Lambarde’s Eirenarcha (London, 1581), 436. Richardson notes the text’s 
importance: A History of the Inns of Court, 198; cf. Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 472. 
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from prison but of securing their presence in custody.28
 The suggestion in Lurdo’s case is that he has had no formal education in the 
law at all, making him an object of disdain for Inns of Court lawyers. He has acted as 
a scrivener, but he has never been a lawyer. The oath of the Scriveners’ Company of 
London tells us that the drafting of contracts and conveyances was the main work of 
the scrivener, but the drafting of documents was not peculiarly a legal role, so 
scriveners that were not also attorneys ought not to be classed as lawyers.
 In terms of legal etymology, 
then, there seems a mild joke that Lurdo should be careful what he wishes for. He 
seeks release, but the court has “a good habeas Corpus” in the historical sense that it 
has him in custody. 
29 Lurdo had 
a crooked beginning, but there seems from Day an implicit note of sympathy for a 
class of man born at the low end of the so-called “middling sort,”30
 
 one “Borne to no 
hopes,” who manages still to make his own luck by various means, only one of which 
is amateur legal practice: 
The fitter for my turne, I was a man  
Borne to no hopes, but a few shreds of witt  
A Grammer Scholler, then a Scriuenor.  
Dealing for priuate vse twixt man and man,  
and by close broakeage set them at debate:  
Incenst them vnto Law, which to maintaine,  
                                                 
28 The term appeared in the judicial writs of capias and latitat, in Chancery subpoenas, and in the 
habeas corpora juratorum to compel jurors; Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 146. 
29 At least ten of the scriveners admitted to the Scrivener’s Company of London between 1550 and 
1640 practised as attorneys. See Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 49-50; cf. J. H. Baker, 
“The English Legal Profession, 1450-1550,” in Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America, ed. 
Wilfrid Prest (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 27, 38 n. 46. 
30 See Christopher Brooks, “Professions, Ideology and the Middling Sort in the Late Sixteenth and 
Early Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society and Politics in 
England, 1550-1800, ed. J. Barry and C. Brooks (London: Macmillan, 1994), 113-140. 
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I lent them money vpon Lands and Plate,  
After the rate of seauen-score in the hundred.  
Then did I learne to countefeit mens hands,  
Noble-mens armes, interline Euidences,  
Make false conueyances, yet with a trick,  
Close and cock-sure, I cony-catch’d the world.  
Hauing scrap’d prettie wealth, I fell in League  
With my first wife, and (though I say’t my selfe)  
She had good dooings, her backe commings in  
And priuate goings out, rais’d me aloft:  
I followed cases of the law abroad,  
and she wae merrie with her friends at home (III.90-105). 
 
There is another possibility of sympathy for Lurdo when he is made the butt of an 
unsympathetic character’s cold wit. The duke’s daughter Emilia enters into a series of 
frivolous episodes under the assumed name Tristella when her father goes overseas in 
order to rescue her from Turkish marauders. Emilia’s quest for adventure, while her 
father risks his life to find her, establishes her as an insensitive character. Her disdain 
for Lurdo emphasizes his mere quasi-lawyer status, and corresponds effectively with 
the sentiments of the Inns of Court men who, by the first decade of the seventeenth 
century, had expelled non-barrister members to the Inns of Chancery. At the same 
time, Emilia’s self-important manner can seem to steer an audience in the direction of 
sympathizing with Lurdo, who could only have done so well for himself by resorting 
to illegitimate means – as Emilia puts it, to “bastard actions”: 
 
Lord what a broaking Aduocate is this?  
He was some Squiers Scriuenor, and hath scrapt  
Gentilitie out of Atturneys fees: 
His bastard actions proue him such a one,  
For true worth scornes to turne Camelion (II.199-203). 
 
Though Lurdo is not a qualified lawyer, his servant Winifride praises her master as 
still: “a skilfull Lawyer that can stand out in [a] case at a dead lift, and one that if need 
were, could make a crazy action sound” (III.6-8). The young gentlemen of the Inns of 
Court would have scorned Lurdo’s imposture, but quasi-lawyer impostors could 
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become talented through experience, and in demand for their ability to vex 
opponents.31 This much may be obvious, yet the possibility seems to be forgotten 
when lawyers are caricatured as exploiting clients into unnecessarily extended 
litigation. It was, rather, clients that demanded law tricks by the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries – new, more venturesome clients ready to gamble all on a 
demur, or look for a legal fiction to make an ostensibly crazy action sound.32
 
 
4.2 Polymetes’ attitude to studying law 
 
Polymetes is characterized at the beginning of Law Tricks as a lofty student-scholar. 
He enters in act I carrying a book, and complaining about a decline in standards and 
respect for learning (I.118-136). Students of any discipline may have felt invited to 
consider their own view on the matter. But before Polymetes’ arrival, his father the 
Duke has been talking with Lurdo about how the young scholar might put all his 
learning to good use. For Lurdo, there is only one vocation worth pursuing for a 
young man: “A parlous youth, sharpe and sattyricall, / Would a but spend some study 
in the law, / A would proue a passing subtle Barrister” (I.108-110). Paternal 
encouragement in this direction would have met with recognition from some of the 
Inns of Court men in the play’s audience. Some lawyers actually set out a wish in 
their wills that their sons study law. Middle Templar William Booth included his 
plans for his son straightforwardly among his final wishes: “I desire that my eldest 
                                                 
31 Regarding manorial stewards, town country attorneys, and those who took up legal practice on their 
own initiative, see Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 48-51. 
32 For examples, see Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 82, 86. 
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son William may study the common law.”33 Gray’s Inn man Edward Rolt left it to his 
executors to make a decision about sending “such of [his four sons] as shall be 
thought most fit” to study at the Inns of Court.34 John Marston’s father, himself a 
successful barrister of the Middle Temple, appears to have suspected before his death 
in 1599 that his son’s interest in writing might take him away from a full-time legal 
career: “I have taken great pains with delight and hope that my son would have 
profited in the study of the law, but man purposeth and God disposeth, His will be 
done.”35
 In Law Tricks, Polymetes’ attitude to his father’s wish resembles that of Italian 
Renaissance scholars who had to be persuaded into studying the law, disdaining it as 
an intellectual discipline. Petrarch, for example, claimed that his seven years studying 
law had been time wasted, after his father burnt his copies of literary works “as 
impediments to that study which was supposed to be the source of fat earnings.”
 
36 
Later, Florentine chancellor Leonardo Bruni, recalling his own experience, approved a 
description of legal studies as the “yawning science.”37
                                                 
33 National Archives, PROB11, 6 Lee. Prest discusses these provisions in The Rise of the Barristers, 
130-1. 
 The Italian humanists’ disdain 
was directed against study of the civil law, but in Elizabethan and Jacobean England 
34 National Archives, PROB11, 105 Cope. 
35 National Archives, PROB11, 82 Kidd. 
36 Morris G. Bishop, Petrarch and his World (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964), 26-7; see Prest, The 
Rise of the Barristers, 186. 
37 Geoffrey R. Elton, Renaissance and Reformation 1300-1648, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1968), 
47; cf. P. P. Vergerius, noted in William H. Woodward, Vittorino Da Feltre and other Humanist 
Educators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), 108; Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 186 
n. 4. 
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the sentiment came to be directed typically against study of the common law.38 For 
Erasmus, no discipline could be further removed from true learning.39 His friend 
Thomas More expressed agreement on at least one occasion,40 but the author of 
Utopia could be prone to surprising ambiguity, of course. Abraham Fraunce refuted 
the claim that the study of law was barbarous and difficult, insisting in The Lawiers 
Logike (1588) that with proper methodology, good teaching, and able students, it was 
as interesting, and as easily mastered, as other disciplines.41 Legal historians tend to 
agree that Fraunce’s book seems to have had no impact on lawyers, though, owing 
perhaps to the abstract and impractical character of his attempt to apply philosophical 
methods to legal analysis.42 One account of the common law’s prevalence over its 
competitors saw this kind of criticism as spurring on Inns of Court lawyers in 
Elizabeth’s and James’s reigns to fashion the tougher, fiercely independent identity 
that would overcome attempts to incorporate the common law within rival 
jurisdictions.43
 Day includes an example of the bad-lawyer / good-law topos in Law Tricks. 
When Lurdo and Ferneze urge Polymetes to study law and become a lawyer, the 
young scholar’s reply looks like a piece of standard anti-lawyer sentiment: 
 
                                                 
38 For example, see Harrison: supra, 9. 
39 Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterdami, ed. P. S. and H. M. Allen (1906), iv., 17; cited in 
Chambers, Thomas More, 85. 
40 J. H. Hexter, More’s “Utopia”: The biography of an idea (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1976), 109. 
41 Abraham Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike (London, 1588), Preface. 
42 According to Prest, The Inns of Court, 146; cf. Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 151-2. 
43 F. W. Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance (Cambridge: University Press, 1901), passim; see 
also Prest, The Inns of Court, 187-8. 
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Of all Land monsters, some that beare that name, 
Might well be sparde, whose vultur Avarice 
Devours men living: they of all the rest, 
Deale most with Angells, & yet prove least blest (I.151-4).44
 
 
At least one apparently puritan-inclined lawyer was ambivalent about the potential 
consequences of a life which could be seen to be taken up sinfully with money-
making. Middle Temple barrister Simonds D’Ewes gave up his legal career in 
order, he claimed, “to prepare [his] way to a better life . . . avoiding those two 
dangerous rocks of avarice and ambition.”45
 
 In the play, Lurdo’s caution to “Wrong 
not the law” (I.155) makes the scholar switch quickly from anti-lawyer sentiment to 
encomium of the law: 
I cannot, tis divine: 
And ile compare it to a golden chaine, 
That linkes the body of a common-wealth, 
Into a firme and formall Union. 
It holds the sword, with an impartiall hand, 
Curbs in the raines of an unruly land, 
Tis twin’d to Justice, and with holy zeale, 
Rightly determines the poore mans appeale. 
And those that are lawes true administers, 
Are fathers to the wrong’d, heaven’s Justicers (I.155-65). 
 
The sudden switch from bad-lawyer to good-law sentiment can seem a little 
mechanical. On Gibbons’ view of Day, the routine treatment may be explained as one 
more example of the work of a mere conventional playwright. Leinwand’s view of 
city comedy generally is more persuasively applied in this connection.46
                                                 
44 Day repeats the pun on angel used only a hundred lines before in relation to Lurdo’s bought divorce; 
see supra, 142 n. 7. 
 Day can be 
interpreted to have rehearsed the bad-lawyer / good-law topos with the purpose of 
45 The Autobiography and Correspondence of Sir Simonds D’Ewes, ed. J. O. Halliwell (1845), i, 307; 
cited in Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 289. 
46 See supra, 57. 
 161 
inviting audiences to be sceptical of a paradox about lawyers and their vocation that 
may well by this time have come to seem stale – certainly to young Inns of Court 
connoisseurs of the drama such as the character Spark in the induction to The 
Careless Shepherdess.47
 Polymetes’ negative attitude is not to be taken at face value, in any event. I 
suggest that Day’s characterization is influenced by two main things. Firstly, it would 
not have escaped attention that the Italian humanists’ disdain for studying the 
“yawning science” of the civil law was re-directed opportunistically by England’s 
civilians and their supporters against study of the common law.
 
48
 Day’s choice of name for Polymetes makes him out of place with the play’s 
other characters. In the characterization of his self-image, as well, Polymetes is a type 
out of place in the play. He seems to see himself as following in the tradition of great 
Italian scholars, but his incongruous, classical-sounding name reflects his 
pretentiousness. The “mete” in Polymetes may be taken to signify a limit – there is a 
suggestion that, for all his high ideas, there are limits (many-limits if we read “Poly-
 Secondly, while 
legal studies at the universities had traditionally been confined to the civil law, the 
universities were by now in the process of taking over from the Inns of Chancery in 
their role as preparatory schools for the Inns of Court. In Law Tricks, therefore, Day 
can be interpreted as reflecting the moderation of a former notional rivalry between 
Inns of Court lawyers and university student-scholars, now that the two are no longer 
strictly vocationally distinct. 
                                                 
47 See supra, 3. For an earlier example of the bad-lawyer / good-law topos, see the apostrophe to law in 
The Phoenix, supra, 129-30. 
48 Ruggle’s Ignoramus is the most commonly cited example; see also Barnaby Googe, Eglogs, 
Epytaphes and Sonettes, ed. E. Arber (London, 1871), 12. 
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metes” in this way) on what he seems willing or able actually to do in practical terms. 
Then again, the “mete” could seem a suffixed form of the prefix “meta-”, giving a 
sense of (much) change of position or condition. Polymetes does undergo a change in 
the play, from scholar to gallant; the relationship between university student-scholars 
and Inns of Court lawyers undergoes much change at this time, as well. Allusions in 
the play to the value of using Latin may be connected with a one-time rivalry between 
university scholars and students of the common law who had formerly arrived at the 
Inns of Court typically from the Inns of Chancery. Lurdo is impressed by the 
pompous student-scholar’s mastery of the language: “And a speakes Latin too, / 
Truely and so few Lawyers vse to doe” (I.112-13).49 But, as with Tangle in The 
Phoenix, Lurdo’s use of Latin looks at this time like a way of portraying his approach 
to the law as old-fashioned. As Fulbeck observed, Latin had ceased to be as important 
as it once had been in the common law: “I do not think any exquisite skill of the 
Latine tongue to be necessarie in a Lawyer.”50
 Day makes a deceptively casual parallel in the play between lawyers and 
poets. The implied condemnation of both demonstrates that any apparent criticism is 
ironic, and to be taken light-heartedly. The cynical Lurdo balks at the proverbial 
wisdom that so-called plain dealing in the law is something of great value: “he that 
useth it shall die a begger” (II.46). Polymetes’ servant Adam mocks Lurdo’s 
extension of the proverb in what seems a throwaway remark: “That addition was 
made”, he says, “by some Lawyer or Poet, to avoid which, they cannot indure plaine-
dealing should have a hand in any of their actions” (II.47-9). Poetry was frowned 
 
                                                 
49 Where Lurdo says “so few Lawyers vse to doe”, the tense relates to the present. 
50 A Direction or Preparative to the study of the Lawe, 23. 
 163 
upon by the Puritans for its seductive power,51
Polymetes’ attitude to studying law is a paradoxical one in the first decade of 
the seventeenth century. Inns of Court students once typically underwent preparatory 
education in the Inns of Chancery; increasingly they arrived straight from the 
universities. Polymetes is a caricature of the type of university-scholar that had been 
the rival of the Inns of Court student – dedicated to abstruse learning for its own sake, 
disdainful of the common law as a discipline, owing possibly to resentment of the 
possibility of making money in the law. Day seems to suggest in the Inns of Court 
students’ favour that learning is worthwhile only to the extent that it can be put to use, 
and the message to the end is that no subject is as useful to study as the law: 
 and the ostensibly casual association of 
lawyer and poet unites the two as skilled persuaders. The nature of the implied 
criticism is capable of seeming more comic because of an ironic note of conspiracy in 
Day’s uniting of poet and lawyer and his condemning of both – not only the vocation 
of the lawyer contingent of his audience, but of his own vocation of poet-writer. Even 
the nature of the criticism is comic, since progressive complexity in both legal 
thinking (for example, in the positive concept of legal fictions) and in literature made 
the concept of “plain dealing” seem increasingly a contingent, variable standard. 
 
Polymetes 
. . . what thinke you of Schollership now? 
 
Lurdo 
As of the law, good as it may be vsd (V.542-3). 
                                                 
51 Prompting a famous response: Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, or the Defence of Poesy, 3rd 
ed., ed. Geoffrey Shepherd, rev. ed. R. W. Maslen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). 
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Chapter five 
Wife-selling in early modern comedy 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter I examine the representation in Elizabethan and Jacobean literature of 
wife-selling.1
 
 I argue that the treatment of the topic may be taken to show a positive 
attitude to the law, going beyond the good-law half of the conventional bad-lawyer / 
good-law topos. Wife-selling is inevitably viewed now as a dehumanizing example of 
female oppression. But I contend that representations in early modern texts show a 
complex attitude to this unofficial practice. Such representations demonstrate a 
respect for legal responsibility – an aspiration among ordinary people to conduct 
their lives according to the organizing principles of the law. I suggest that allusions to 
wife-selling in literature are implicitly positive about the law in a way that could be 
expected to have appealed to an audience’s lawyer-contingent. 
 
Wife-selling was not only a useful symbol of satirical fiction in early modern 
England. Evidence exists to show that wife-sale did happen in the period. The two 
main lines of investigation into the practice give only passing mention to literary 
representations. These are the anthropological study of Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, and 
the historical study of E. P. Thompson.2 Because the preponderance of evidence 
derives from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both  
 I begin by examining representations of wife-selling in Elizabethan and 
Jacobean literature. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that attitudes to the 
practice as they are represented in the literature of the time may be seen as positive in 
relation to the law. In addition, I explain how literary representations may be 
writers devote their 
commentary in large part to examples subsequent to 1760. The scarcity of surviving 
evidence from the early modern period, and the lack of detail about the recorded 
cases, makes literary representations of phenomenological interest. 
                                                 
1 This chapter formed the basis of a paper presented on 11 June 2008 at Brasenose College, Oxford. 
2 Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Wives for Sale: An ethnographic study of British popular divorce (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1981); E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common (London: Merlin Press, 1991). 
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interpreted to suggest that wife-sale was more common in the period than the 
surviving evidence suggests, and that the practice was different in character from what 
it would become in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
5.1 Wife-selling in Elizabethan and Jacobean literature 
 
In The Phoenix, a man listens as a deed of conveyance is read aloud for his approval. 
The deed is drafted in the kind of terms ordinarily applied to the transfer of an interest 
in land, but the item of prospective sale is the man’s wife. The deed begins: 
 
To all good and honest Christian people, to whom this present writing shall come: 
know you for a certain, that I, Captain, for and in the consideration of the sum of five 
hundred crowns, have clearly bargained, sold, given, granted, assigned, and set over, 
and by these presents do clearly bargain, sell, give, grant, assign, and set over, all the 
right, estate, title, interest, demand, possession, and term of years to come, which I the 
said Captain have, or ought to have . . . [i]n and to Madonna Castiza, my most virtuous, 
modest, loving, and obedient wife (II.ii.85-93, 95-6). 
 
Middleton’s play contains the most striking early modern literary representation of 
wife-sale. Was it the first dramatic depiction of the practice? Menefee thought so.3
                                                 
3 Wives for Sale, 198. 
 
But this is not the case. Two other dramatic depictions of wife-sale compete as 
possible firsts. An earlier attempt to engage in wife-selling occurs in Thomas 
Dekker’s The Shoemakers’ Holiday. Dekker’s play, first performed in 1599, precedes 
The Phoenix by four or five years. In act V, scene ii of The Shoemakers’ Holiday, the 
city gentleman Hammon offers to pay shoemaker Ralph Damport twenty pounds or 
more for his wife Jane. Dekker’s comedy might, therefore, be regarded as the first 
dramatic depiction of the proposition of one man selling his wife to another man. But 
Dekker depicts a love-struck would-be purchaser, where Middleton provides in The 
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Phoenix the distinctly unsentimental idea of an initiating vendor. Both The Phoenix 
and The Shoemakers’ Holiday contain only attempted wife-sales: both sales fail. The 
young prince Phoenix prevents the sale, while in Dekker’s play, Ralph Damport 
refuses the city gent’s offer, more out of inverse snobbery than any ordinary 
husbandly bond. The first dramatic depiction of wife-sale to go to completion (to 
extend the conveyancing analogy) appears to be in the anonymous play The Honest 
Lawyer, written by one S. S., and performed in 1615, a decade after The Phoenix. In 
this play, a villainous character called Vaster sells his wife Florence for fifty pounds 
in order to recover his losses (I.i.112-15) – not to another man but to the bawd 
Mistress Marmaid, who expects to make five hundred back on Florence in her first 
month as a prostitute. 
Shortly before any of these dramatic depictions, wife-sale featured in non-
dramatic literature – in a 1592 pamphlet by Robert Greene: The Black Book’s 
Messenger. Greene makes himself the sensationalizing ghost-autobiographer of one 
Ned Browne, a real-life rogue about sixteenth century London town.4
                                                 
4 Robert Greene, The Blacke Books Messenger, in Coney-Catching and Bawdy Baskets, ed. Gāmini 
Salgādo (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 325. Cf. Keith Thomas, “The Double Standard,” Journal of 
the History of Ideas, vol. 20, no. 2 (Apr., 1959), 213. See also Christopher Hill, “Sex, Marriage, and the 
Family in England”, The Economic History Review, New Series, vol. 31, no. 3 (Aug., 1978), 458 n. 2. 
 A so-called 
“Pleasant Tale” finds Browne part-exchanging wives with another man, Browne 
promising, disingenuously, to pay the other man the sum of five pounds into the 
bargain. Greene implicitly disapproves the transaction on two counts: on a serious 
level (and with a note of deliberate titillation), for the capriciously erotic nature of the 
decision to exchange rather than sell; on a less serious level, for Browne’s dishonesty 
about the five pounds made a condition of the bargain. The Black Book’s Messenger 
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belongs to the genre of Elizabethan rogue literature, which has been thought 
unreliable in its content, since it characteristically delivers sensational material on the 
pretext of offering sober advice on how to avoid falling prey to tricksters and cheats. 
But Greene took his inspiration from factual sources. This was demonstrated in recent 
years in relation to another pamphlet, A Notable Discovery of Cozenage (1591).5 That 
text included reference to the contemporary practice of crossbiting. Crossbiting 
involved a prostitute luring a client to her room and bed in order for male allies to 
burst in and demand money on threat of public exposure, and Greene’s account of the 
practice accords with descriptions in contemporary court records.6
 Preoccupation with an abstract concept of commodity is central to wife-selling 
in early modern literature. In The Shoemakers’ Holiday, the artisan Ralph is indignant 
about Hammon’s implicit condescension, but he shows no surprise about the idea that 
a city gentleman might expect him to sell his wife “for commodity” (V.ii.85). The 
concept of commodity threatened at the time to become ubiquitous. In 1601, John 
Wheeler suggested in his Treatise of Commerce that more and more unlikely things 
 It is feasible, then, 
that Greene’s ghost-autobiographical wife-sale in The Black Book’s Messenger was 
likewise inspired by a factual source – his rogue subject, Ned Browne, whose pleasant 
tale of a part-exchange wife had no apparent fictional precedent. 
                                                 
5 Bernard Capp, “The Double Standard Revisited: Plebeian Women and Male Sexual Reputation in 
Early Modern England,” Past and Present, No. 162 (Feb., 1999), 87-88. Greene’s A Notable Discovery 
of Cozenage is reprinted in A. V. Judges, ed., The Elizabethan Underworld: A Collection of Tudor and 
Early Stuart Tracts and Ballads (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1930), 137-142. 
6 Capp, “The Double Standard Revisited,” 88. 
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began to seem capable of sale.7 In an expanding market, said Wheeler, “all things 
come into Commerce, and pass into Traffic . . . yea there are some found so subtle and 
cunning merchants, that they persuade and induce men to suffer themselves to be 
bought and sold”.8 And if men could be bought and sold,9 this is one area where early 
modern women achieved equal treatment at the same time. Shakespeare makes the 
point expressly in Measure for Measure, where Elbow scorns the idea of “buy[ing] 
and sell[ing] men and women like beasts” (III.ii.1-4). The discourse of commerce 
extends to allusions in early modern literature to the treatment of wives as temporarily 
saleable commodities. In John Fletcher’s Wit without Money, the servant Lance, 
refusing to accept the prospect that his old master’s house may fall, tells the master’s 
Gallant son that he will pawn his wife before he’ll see it happen (I.i.312). Other 
representations in the period are more in the nature of pandering than substitutes for 
divorce. Corvino seeks to win the favour of Volpone by loaning out his wife Celia for 
favours (II.ii and III.ii). In the same year (1605), Dekker and Middleton’s The Honest 
Whore, Part Two has Matheo attempting to persuade his wife Bellafront to return to 
prostitution so he can live off of immoral earnings. And in The Devil is an Ass, Jonson 
has Fitzdottrel loan out his wife for a quarter of an hour’s conversation in return for a 
cloak (I.ii).10
What of the fact that wife-sale should be represented typically in the genre of 
comedy in the early modern period? This contrasts with Hardy’s tragic treatment of 
 
                                                 
7 John Wheeler, A Treatise of Commerce, wherein are shewed the commodies arising by a wel ordered 
and ruled Trade (Middelburgh, 1601), 3; on Wheeler, see Douglas Bruster, Drama and the Market in 
the Age of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 41. 
8 Wheeler, A Treatise of Commerce, 3. 
9 E. P. Thompson finds nineteenth century evidence of husband-sales: Customs in Common, 459 n. 3. 
10 See Leggatt, Citizen Comedy in the Age of Shakespeare, 144. 
 169 
the sale of Susan Henchard in his 1886 novel The Mayor of Casterbridge.11 There was 
nothing unusual about tackling a serious issue in early modern comic literature.12 
Middleton figures most prominently in the list of texts containing representations of 
wife-selling with part-autobiographical reason. His stepfather Thomas Harvey was a 
seaman, like the wife-selling Captain of The Phoenix. Harvey did not attempt to sell 
Middleton’s mother, but he dragged her and her issue through vexatious and 
protracted litigation with the purpose of gaining control of her property. The 
playwright’s mother was, fortunately, not as meek as Castiza, her hypothetical 
analogue in The Phoenix. She managed to hold on to some of her property and Harvey 
was forced out of the country.13
Middleton has the lawyer Knavesby seek to sell his wife, if only temporarily, 
in exchange for money and preferment in Anything for a Quiet Life (1621). If 
barristers had a reputation for being wealthy, there were some surprising exceptions. 
A 1579 list of readers and chief barristers of the Inns of Court shows that, where 
comment is made on means, there are those “of good lyvynge,” “of greate gayne, very 
welthie” and simply “riche,” but four are expressly described as “pore,” despite one of 
them being “very lerned, . . . smaly practised, [yet] worthie of greate practise.”
 
14
                                                 
11 A report reproduced in Hardy’s Commonplace Book (No. 3) was taken from the Dorset County 
Chronicle of 6 December 1827: “Selling Wife: At Buckland, nr. Frome, a labring man named Charles 
Pearce sold his wife to shoemaker Elton for £5 and delivered her in a halter in the public street. She 
seemed very willing. Bells rang”: The Life and Death of the Mayor of Casterbridge: A Story of a Man 
of Character (London: Macmillan, 1974), 26, 355. 
 
12 See supra, 39. 
13 P. G. Phialas, “Middleton’s Early Contact with the Law,” Studies in Philology, lii (1955), 186-94. 
Point concerning the autobiographical parallel summarized in Heinemann, Puritanism and Theatre, 69. 
14 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, i, 470-1. 
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There are instances of marriage-plans attached to financial gain and advancement in 
the law, but lawyers were not alone in this at the time, of course. Marriage 
preparations for some families in the seventeenth century are said to have resembled 
negotiations for a trade treaty rather than the preparations for the marriage of two 
human beings.15 Duke of Buckingham George Villiers seems to have been involved 
somehow or other in several marriages attached to advancement in the law. Coke is 
thought to have coerced his daughter Frances into marrying Villiers’ brother with a 
view to regaining favour after his dismissal from judicial office in 1616.16 In 1621, 
Chief Justice Sir James Ley of Lincoln’s Inn, then aged seventy-one, married Villiers’ 
seventeen-year-old niece in order “to be of the kindred.”17 And rumour had it that Sir 
Thomas Richardson of Lincoln’s Inn was promoted to Chief Justice of Common Pleas 
by way of reward for marrying Villiers’ relation Lady Elizabeth Ashburnham.18
 
 But 
lawyers were capable as anyone at any time of being ruled by heart more than head in 
connection with marriage. After his wife Mary died in 1614, Henry Sherfield of 
Lincoln’s Inn wrote to his brother insisting he would not remarry only for the purpose 
of paying off his debts: 
I cannot term the selling of my body to be any other than a most base, vile and 
abominable thing and no other thing should I do by such a marriage as I am harkened to 
by your self and others.19
                                                 
15 For example, see The Autobiography and Correspondence of Sir Simonds D’Ewes, 307. See also 
Knights, Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson, 126. 
  
16 Letters written by John Chamberlain during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, ii, 381. Cited in Prest, The 
Rise of the Barristers, 119. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Diary of Walter Yonge, Esq., written at Colyton and Axminster, Co. Devon, from 1604 to 1628, ed. 
George Roberts (London: J. B. Nichols & Son, 1848), 40-1. See Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 119. 
19 Hampshire Record Office, 44M69, Box S13; cited in Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 122, n. 87. 
 171 
Even when Sherfield did remarry in 1617, taking on his new wife Rebecca’s children 
from a previous marriage contributed to continued financial problems, and by the time 
he died in 1634 Sherfield was some £6,000 in debt.20
Mistress Knavesby in Anything for a Quiet Life is no compliant, submissive 
example of early modern womanhood in her husband’s plans to sell her. She prevents 
her own sale, and succeeds in destabilizing the patriarchal order in a sharp and 
articulate rebuke of her would-be purchaser and ostensible social superior, Lord 
Beaumont. His Lordship has, says Mistress Knavesby, “corrupt[ed] a Husband [by] 
stat[ing] him a Pandor / To his own wife, by vertue of a Lease” (III.ii.156-7). This 
kind of characterization perhaps reflects a view of lawyers’ wives being potentially 
more independent in spirit on account of their husbands’ frequent absence from home 
on legal business. After Lincoln’s Inn man Thomas Thornton’s wife Elizabeth died in 
1604, he wrote that: “She only governed the house . . . and received and paid all 
charges, her husband meddling with no charge at home; . . . [and] in a right cause she 
was stout and of great carriage.”
 
21
I now consider the significance of literary representations of wife-sale in their 
wider social context. 
 
 
5.2 Wife-selling in early modern England 
 
Wife-sale did happen in early modern England, if the surviving evidence is scarce and 
lacking in detail. Of an arguable 387 recorded cases in the British Isles, evidence 
                                                 
20 See Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 390. 
21 National Archives/Northamptonshire Record Office, Thornton 2251; cited in Prest, The Rise of the 
Barristers, 124, n. 93; cf. Thompson, Customs in Common, 460-1. 
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survives of only seven examples from the early modern period. The places and dates 
are as follows: (i) London, before 24 November 1553; (ii) Rickmansworth, 
Hertfordshire, before 3 November 1584; (iii) Great Warley, Essex, 1585; (iv) Fife, 
Scotland, 15 August 1613; (v) Stirling, Scotland, before 31 December 1638; (vi) Near 
Warwick, Warwickshire, c. December-January 1643; (vii) Humbie, East Lothian, 
Scotland, before 25 October, 1646.22 Wife-sale was illegal in early modern England, 
as it would have been in any Christian country. When a case was discovered, the 
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction for prosecuting it as a moral offence.23 As in The 
Phoenix, where the prince takes to task the selling Captain and the would-be 
purchaser Proditor, the law charged the husband and purchaser alone – not the wife – 
with the offence.24
 Why bother to sell a wife, as the Captain attempts to in The Phoenix? Why not 
simply desert, disappear, even marry someone else? This was an option. It is not 
 And the canon law of the ecclesiastical courts was not concerned, 
as the common law arguably was, with avoiding rigidity, and facilitating the needs of 
a changing society. 
                                                 
22 Menefee, Wives for Sale, 211-59. Cf. Thompson, Customs in Common, 408-9. The earliest purported 
record derives from Scotland or Ireland in July to November 1073. The detail derives from a complaint 
by Pope Gregory VII to Lanfranc: cited in A. O. Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, vol. 2 
(Edinburgh, 1922), 74. See also Martin Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570-
1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 207 n. 47. Thanks to Martin Ingram for his 
comments on the paper mentioned at n. 1. 
23 The 1836 edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, edited by Christian, refers expressly to wife-selling 
in a footnote to “Offences Against God and Religion”: Menefee, Wives for Sale, 138, 140. 
24 This might be interpreted as suggesting that the woman was considered a mere chattel. Menefee 
suggests an alternate, but less likely, interpretation: that “husband and wife were counted as a single 
unit, a legal fiction that was responsible for the rule that wives could not be forced to testify against 
their husbands”: Menefee, Wives for Sale, 144. 
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possible to quantify with any degree of real certainty how common desertion was, but 
the 1570 Norwich census of the poor showed that close to a tenth of the women on 
poor relief were deserted wives.25 If divorce and re-marriage were effectively 
impossible for all but the very rich in early modern England, some historians say it 
was relatively easy for a poor man to desert his wife, move on, and re-marry.26 
Lawrence Stone writes of getting the strong impression that the number of bigamists 
in early modern England must have been quite large.27 But this seems not to take 
account of the introduction in 1539 of registers of births, marriages and deaths, which 
saw a move towards increased regulation of marriage, even if problems could 
continue to arise in connection with marriages which were privately (not publicly) 
conducted. Privately conducted marriages were punishable in late-Tudor England, but 
it was not only the poorer members of society who engaged in them. Sir Edward 
Coke, attorney-general in 1598, married his second wife in a private house.28
                                                 
25 John F. Pound, The Norwich Census of the Poor, 1570 (Norfolk Record Society Publications, Vol. 
40), 18. See also Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 142 n. 2. 
 The 
26 De facto divorce, if the church prohibited it de jure; Hill, “Sex, Marriage, and the Family in 
England,” 458. See J. A. Sharp, “Crime and Delinquency in an Essex Parish, 1600-40,” in Crime in 
England, 1550-1800, ed. J. S. Cockburn (London: Methuen, 1977), 99-100. 
27 Stone, Road to Divorce, 142. 
28 See “Clandestine Marriages,” in Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 4th ed., 481-3. For a 
discussion of early modern England’s regulation of marriage, see Catherine Belsey, “Alice Arden’s 
Crime,” in New Historicism and Renaissance Drama, ed. R. Wilson and R. Dutton (London: Longman, 
1994), 138-42. 
 174 
move towards increased regulation of marriage coincided with a tendency for many 
people, in the context of the Reformation, to think in more liberal terms about it.29
 Official marriage carried legal obligations: a husband had responsibility for his 
wife’s upkeep and for her actions, and a husband’s failure to perform his obligation 
could result in his being classed as a vagrant.
  
30 Simple desertion showed no attempt to 
deal with the responsibility attached to marriage. The church authorities would, 
through the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, compel couples of middling 
status and below to stay together. Churchwardens were required to report married 
couples living separately, and an example can be found in a report by a warden in 
Chichester, Sussex, who reported two men in 1626: “for that they have not kept 
company with their wives for the space of half a year, the former leaving her without 
necessary maintenance, the latter left his with 3 small children upon the parish.”31
                                                 
29 This produced a debate about divorce which would remain (excluding the short period of the 
commonwealth) unresolved at law until the implementation of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, under 
which provision was made for the establishment of a secular divorce court; Catherine Belsey, “Alice 
Arden’s Crime,” 139; Belsey examines the complexities at 138-142 . 
 The 
matter of maintenance was of significance in any such case, but there might be other 
eventualities, too. A husband would find himself liable to a criminal charge if his 
absent wife ran up debts, which remained his responsibility officially. Alternatively, 
wives who could manage to make a new home and earn money might be powerless to 
30 Menefee, Wives for Sale, 8, 262. Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-
1800 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 54. 
31 Churchwardens’ Presentments, ed. Hilda Johnstone, Sussex Record Society 49 (1947-8), 62. On the 
subject of churchwardens’ reports, see Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 5. 
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prevent the unscrupulous husband who decided to break in and appropriate what he 
could, since by law all that was hers remained officially his.32
Wife-sale became a notional form of closure beyond mere separation and 
desertion. And short of murder: The Phoenix reminds its audience that wife-selling is 
a measure life-sparingly short of a last resort – at least for the would-be wife-selling 
ship’s Captain: “any way to be rid of her would rid my torment. If all means fail, I’ll 
kill or poison her and purge my fault at sea. But first I’ll make gentle try of a divorce” 
(I.ii.142-4). The illegality of wife-sale may go some way to explaining the scarcity of 
surviving evidence from the early modern period. E. P. Thompson finds historians 
capable of “underestimat[ing] the opacity of the plebeian culture to polite 
inspection.”
 
33
It is difficult now to speak of finding in wife-selling anything other than an 
extreme example of patriarchal female oppression. The practice is capable of being 
seen at least in part, though, as a responsible attempt to alienate matrimonial 
responsibility. A notion attached to wife-sale was that a husband sold not only his 
wife but his responsibility for her.
 This is yet more the case where an unofficial, plainly illegal act is 
involved. Those who act outside the law tend to put some effort into covering their 
tracks: they try very hard to avoid leaving evidence. Wife-sale could at least serve to 
prevent arguably worse immoral and illegal acts involving physical harm: continuing, 
extreme cruelty, and murder. 
34
                                                 
32 For speculation on the problems, see Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 143-4. 
 This point is reflected in early modern comedy: 
wife-sale is represented in The Phoenix and The Shoemaker’s Holiday as a substitute 
33 Thompson’s comment on Stone: Customs in Common, 412 n. 4. Hill observed that wife-selling was 
at least as likely to be a survival as a novelty: “Sex, Marriage, and the Family in England,” 458. 
34 Jacqueline Simpson and Steve Roud, A Dictionary of English Folklore (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 390. 
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for unavailable divorce. Both plays articulate, however ambivalently in Middleton’s 
case, the rights and responsibilities of marriage. In The Shoemaker’s Holiday, 
Hammon seeks to buy right to, and responsibility for, Jane, asking her husband: “wilt 
thou freely cease thy claim in her [?]” (V.ii.82). And the deed in The Phoenix aims to 
assign “all the right, estate, title, interest, demand, possession, and term of years to 
come.” This has been called the rankest scene in The Phoenix: “the terms ordinarily 
applied, in a deed or conveyance, to a piece of real estate are applied to a lady, by her 
son, to gratify the greed of her husband and the lust of her admirer, Proditor.”35
                                                 
35 Brooks, notes to The Phoenix, 265. See Paul S. Clarkson and Clyde T. Warren, The Law of Property 
in Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Drama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 124-5. 
 But it 
is important not to overlook the conscientious side of what is attempted in these 
negotiations of matrimonial right and responsibility. The Norwich census statistic 
cited at the beginning of this section shows that desertion was not uncommon in early 
modern England. And desertion could leave a woman of ordinary means destitute. So, 
notwithstanding the oppressive character of selling a human being, the practice could 
be taken to represent an attempt to deal responsibly with the legal responsibility 
attaching to marriage. Even where the parties to a wife-sale sought to defend 
themselves in 1646 criminal proceedings, the evidence they gave in hope of 
exculpating themselves had the character more of a contractual argument about a lack 
of notional formal propriety. The contractual character of the parties’ stories may be 
interpreted to imply awareness that an attempt to sell a wife was simultaneously an 
attempt by the seller to alienate legal responsibility for her maintenance and by the 
buyer to assume it, thus demonstrating the proposed positive, conscientious side of 
early modern wife-sale. The alleged seller, James Steill, admitted that “he took his 
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wife be [sic] the hand to give her to the other, but the other denys that he received her; 
the woman also denys that her husband took her by the hand to deliver her.”36
 The case punished in London in 1553, some fifty years before Middleton 
wrote The Phoenix,  is documented in the diary of merchant taylor Henry Machyn: 
“The xxiiii of November, dyd ryde in a cart Cheken, parsun of sant Necolas 
Coldabby, round about London, for he sold ys wyff to a bowcher.”
 
37
The ecclesiastical courts of the sixteenth century were, in any event, much 
opposed to wife-sale, and, the courts prosecuted offenders on the very rare occasions, 
 The catholic 
Queen Mary succeeded the protestant Edward VI on 6 July 1553. Since catholic 
priests were not allowed to marry, Cheken may well have sold his wife out of 
necessity, and been singled out for punishment a few months into Mary’s reign for 
being, or having been, a protestant. Even so, the fact that the first early modern wife-
seller of which evidence survives was a member of the clergy shows that satire 
sometimes simply writes itself. 
                                                 
36 MS. register of the Kirk Session of Humbie, 25 October 1646, ch 2/389/1, 33a/b (Scottish Record 
Office); MS. register of the Kirk Session of Humbie, 22 November 1646, ch 2/389/1, 34a (Scottish 
Record Office); cited in Menefee, Wives for Sale, 71. 
37 The Diary of Henry Machyn, Citizen and Merchant Taylor of London, From A. D. 1550 to A. D. 
1563, ed. John Gough Nichols, Camden Society, vol. 42 (London: J. B. Nichols and Son, 1848), 48. 
See also Notes & Queries, 4th Series, Vol. 10, July-December 1872, 311 (author: C.C.), citing W. C. 
Hazlitt’s edition of John Brand’s Popular Antiquities of Great Britain (ii, 63). The public humiliation 
of the parson recorded by Henry Machyn resembles punishments dispensed in the ecclesiastical courts 
for persons found guilty of adultery and fornication; offenders might be made to confess their sin 
publicly before a market-place crowd, or before a Sunday congregation: Stone, Road to Divorce, 232. 
Stone summarizes the penalty imposed by the ecclesiastical courts as the doing of public penance: 
ibid., 144. Menefee says that some penances were commuted to monetary fines: Wives for Sale, 144-5, 
299 n. 22. 
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it is said,38
When the city gentleman Hammon offers to buy Ralph’s wife in The 
Shoemaker’s Holiday, Ralph is stirred to righteous indignation by what he perceives 
 on which they found them. Yet it seems more plausible to think of the 
ecclesiastical courts being informed of cases: not necessarily of their finding them. 
Had the practice not been seen to facilitate an increasing desire for a legitimate way to 
end a broken-down marriage, it may seem probable that a greater number of cases 
than seven would have been reported to, and brought before, the church courts. The 
fact that there are several allusions to wife-selling in Elizabethan and Jacobean 
literature may likewise be taken as an indication that the practice was not so rare as 
the surviving evidence of seven cases in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has 
been thought to suggest. True, in The Phoenix, the young prince is apparently 
horrified to find that wife-selling goes on at all. There is a stagy apostrophe to 
marriage in the play, in which he declares that: “To make sale of a wife [ . . . is 
something] monstrous and foul, / An act abhorr’d in nature, cold in soul” (II.ii.190-1). 
But the prince has a tendency to declamatory outbursts that paints him as sometimes a 
bit too worthy. The lawyer-figure in the play, Tangle, is surprised that the young man 
who engages him in conversation – the disguised prince – should not have heard 
before of wife-sale. Tangle says directly of wife-sale: “why, . . . ’tis common” 
(I.iv.254), and he enumerates three recent cases. “Pistor, a baker, sold his wife t’other 
day to a cheese-monger, that made cake and cheese, another to a cofferer; a third to a 
common player” (I.iv.252-4). Though there is no evidence to connect these details to 
actual cases, the express indication that wife-sale is common among ordinary, 
working people provides at least reasonable doubt that wife-selling was as scarce as 
the surviving evidence suggests. 
                                                 
38 Stone, Road to Divorce, 144.  
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as a condescending presumption about his morals as an artisan. But no surprise at all 
attaches to the substance of Hammon’s proposal: that a man might be persuaded to 
sell his wife (V.ii.85). The fact that Ralph is moved by class-based pride, and not at 
all by surprise about the nature of the offer, is capable of being interpreted to suggest 
that wife-sale was not a freak occurrence in 1599. 
A structural decision Middleton makes about The Phoenix supports the idea 
that wife-selling was not uncommon. In the play, the Captain’s prospective wife-sale 
is first in a sequence of otherwise enduringly familiar practices (such as theft, sexual 
deviance, and sedition) that the young prince discovers on a mission to search out and 
rectify vice. It might seem pointless for a satirist to give prime position to a practice 
that was too rare strictly to qualify as an indictable vice. The exchange between the 
lawyer-figure and the self-righteous, inexperienced prince may be taken to suggest 
that wife-selling could be a familiar, efficacious custom to those at, or acquainted 
through business with, members of the lower end of the social scale. At the same 
time, more privileged members of society may have wished to be seen to take news of 
the practice as an assault on their credulity.39
                                                 
39 Phoenix’s incredulity may represent artificial propriety. The apparently high-minded prince 
demonstrates a moral ambiguity. Having rescued Castiza from being sold, Phoenix’s ethical bearing 
resolves on a discordant note of prurient suspicion; he announces that, “Thus happily prevented, [she’s] 
set free, / Or else made over to adultery” (II.ii.312-13). Phoenix rescues a woman who epitomizes the 
contemporary ideal of female virtue, yet his closing remark to her demonstrates that even an entirely 
virtuous woman cannot escape the obsession in early modern drama, and by extension in contemporary 
society, with cuckoldry. Phoenix’s moral ambiguity is again apparent when the would-be wife-selling 
Captain is reduced to begging for spare change. Phoenix advises his companion Fidelio, after tossing 
the Captain a few crowns, to “Use slaves like slaves” (II.ii.335). 
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 Representations of wife-sale in early modern comedy suggest that the practice 
was in several ways different at this time from what it would become in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. A great deal more evidence survives from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, which are regarded as, in Stone’s phrase, the “boom period” of 
wife-sale.40 Hardy’s The Mayor of Casterbridge reflects something like the public, 
ritualistic practice wife-selling would become: a practice usually involving, historians 
say, a procedure based on the sale of cattle.41 Four things characterize these later 
cases. One, the event generally took place in a public space, such as a marketplace or 
an inn. Two, the woman commonly wore a halter around her neck, 42 possibly a 
symbolic one, made of ribbon or straw.43
                                                 
40 Stone, Road to Divorce, 147. 
 Three, the woman was supposedly willing – 
it has been suggested that, in most cases from this time, the wife knew and had a 
41 Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 40-1. Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in 
England, abridged ed., 35-6. Stone, Road to Divorce, 144-5, 147. Stone draws the cattle-market parallel 
closer with his assertion that some early sales even involved the nominal selling of the wife by her 
weight (Road to Divorce, 145). If the word “early” infers or includes “early modern,” I am not aware of 
any examples of this. Perhaps those Victorians who sought to erase wife-sale from British historical 
memory decided that the best method was to render the practice yet more incredible. 
42 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “halter” (1.a): “A rope, cord, or strap with a noose or head-
stall by which horses or cattle are led or fastened up.” Examples go back to the year 1000, with literary 
usages from Gower in 1390 and Heywood in 1546. Cf. 2.a.: “A rope with a noose for hanging 
malefactors.” 
43 “It [wife-selling] would appear to have been mainly an 18th-century practice, both rural and urban. 
There was a common procedure for selling a wife. She would be led to a market place or inn with a 
symbolic halter around her neck, sometimes made out of ribbon or straw”: Alun Howkins, University 
of Sussex, BBC Radio 4 Making History web-page: http://www.bbc.co.uk/education/beyond/ 
factsheets/makhist/makhist7_prog1d.shtml (accessed: 13 August, 2006). 
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relationship with the man to whom, by mutual agreement, she was going.44 And four, 
the procedure is considered to have been confined for the most part to the poor.45
 With the exception of the point about a wife knowing the prospective buyer, 
early modern comedy depicts wife-sale in a different way. It is nowhere a ritualized 
public spectacle. There is no evidence, in literature or otherwise, of an early modern 
wife-sale amounting to an open, public invitation to treat.
 
46
                                                 
44 By Howkins, ibid. 
 There is no allusion to 
women being made to wear halters, like cattle. If this had been the case, satirists 
would surely have been too pleased to include it in their depictions. Rather there is – 
in particular in The Phoenix and The Shoemakers’ Holiday – an emphasis on the 
quasi-legal formality being proposed. The reading of the deed of conveyance in The 
Phoenix is a private affair, and in Dekker’s play Hammon’s offer is aimed at the 
surrender of a claim. What of the idea that wife-selling was confined for the most part 
to the poor? The status of the would-be wife-seller in The Phoenix is ambiguous. 
Stung by a description of his livelihood as mere “occupation,” the Captain claims 
superior status: “a captain is of no occupation, man” (II.ii.124). 
45 Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 40-1. Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in 
England, abridged ed., 35-6. Thompson and John Gillis believe that wife-sale was most strongly 
supported in plebeian or proto-industrial communities; Thompson, Customs in Common, 446; John R. 
Gillis, For Better, For Worse: British Marriages, 1600 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 218. 
46 Distinguishing an “invitation to treat” from an “offer” is step one in a modern contract law education; 
an invitation to treat is an attempt to induce offers, not an offer itself. See M. P. Furmston, Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 12th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1991), 30-36. 
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 Wife-sale has been classified as an “unofficial folk custom.”47
It cannot help but seem strange to say that wife-sale in early modern literature 
and society demonstrates a positive response to law – for at least four reasons. Firstly, 
the practice now in the interdisciplinary study of law and literature – in particular 
relation to law in literature – tends to be to deploy literature in rebuke to law, or to 
endorse literature’s own rebukes of law.
 The description 
suits the public, ritualistic practice that the practice became in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, but it is not so appropriate for the early modern period. For one 
thing, if historians and anthropologists are satisfied that the practice was as scarce as 
the evidence suggests, unofficial it was, but seven cases seem not enough to make it a 
custom. Early modern literary representations are the best available evidence of the 
nature of the practice and attitudes to it, and the phrase “unofficial folk custom” 
discounts an element that is apparent in literature: the participants’ pragmatic attempts 
to deal formally with the responsibility of marriages irretrievably broken down. Day’s 
Law Tricks does not contain a representation of wife-selling, but it is of interest in 
connection with the practice because Day’s plot rests on a bought-divorce, and the 
marriage in question is officially recognized as continuing at the end of the play. The 
bought-divorce in Law Tricks is analogous to wife-sale for being an attempt 
improperly to dissolve a marriage, yet the bought-divorce is in a sense implicitly more 
of a negative prospect, because it is a knowing corruption of a legitimate process, in 
contrast to wife-sale’s potential for satisfying an aspiration to legitimacy. 
48
                                                 
47 Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 40; Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in 
England, abridged ed., 35. 
 Secondly, the practice was illegal, so to say 
that the cultivation of an illegal practice affirms law looks paradoxical. Thirdly, it is 
48 See supra, 69. 
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unusual, to say that literary representations of wife-sale are positive in relation to the 
law, because Elizabethan and Jacobean literature – in particular city comedy – is 
commonly interpreted as being hostile to the law. And lastly, it goes against the idea 
that the legal system was unpopular not only in literary convention but in the 
everyday life of early modern England49 to say that wife-selling in practice, regardless 
of its illegality, was a positive response to law. In spite of all this, however, the 
practice and representation of wife-sale in the period may be seen as an example of an 
increasing desire for organization according to what a certain part of the law does. Not 
the part of the law that imposes obligations, but that which confers powers. In lieu of 
any legitimate means of dealing with the continuing responsibility attached to a 
broken-down marriage, wife-sale was capable of satisfying at least notionally one or 
more of the parties’ respect and desire for the legitimizing facilities law can provide 
for the realization of people’s wishes.50
 
 It is the potential for satisfying a party’s 
respect and desire for legitimacy which makes wife-sale a positive response to law. 
                                                 
49 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 287. 
50 Paraphrasing H. L. A. Hart’s description of the law’s “secondary rules,” which confer powers; 
primary rules impose obligations: The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 30-2. 
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Chapter six 
Ram Alley and the Inns of Chancery 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter I examine the unusual targeting of the Inns of Chancery in Lording 
Barry’s Ram Alley. Up to near the end of the sixteenth century, satisfactory 
completion of a year or more at an Inn of Chancery was viewed, and had been for 
something like two hundred years, as a prerequisite of joining an Inn of Court. Ram 
Alley articulates a newly unambiguous diminution of the professional and 
educational role of the Inns of Chancery, as contradistinguished from the Inns of 
Court. I argue that the complexity of the social and cultural attitudes underpinning 
this change make two narratives possible. If the organizational aim of the barristers is 
to be admired as necessary, this remains inseparable from the arbitrary, class-based 
ideal underpinning it, which can be interpreted as enforced social segregation – 
social-cleansing by King’s Writ. It is hoped that the chapter shows the importance of 
distinguishing the Inns of Court and the Inns of Chancery in literature in the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Barry was providing Inns of Court men with what 
they could be expected to want at this time – hostility to practitioners not belonging to 
the Inns of Court. Negative representation of the Inns of Chancery operates so as to 
infer positive representation of the Inns of Court. 
 
 
The phrase “Inns of Court” is common in city comedy. The phrase “Inns of 
Chancery” is not. It appears four times in Ram Alley1
                                                 
1 The first is Adriana’s exposure of Throte’s incompetence in act II. In act III, Throte recalls: “Shreds a 
Taylor / Comming once late by an Inne of Chancerie” (III.i.106-7); in act IV, Taffata’s characterization 
of a Gallant includes the image of his shirt being: “more foule, / Then an in of chancery table cloth” 
(IV.i.144-5); again in act IV, Frances tells a Sergeant of: “Foure pound and fourteene pence giuen by a 
Clarke / Of an Inne of Chancerie” (IV.i.264-5). The phrase “Inns of Court” is mentioned five times in 
the play: I.i.96; II.i.297; III.i.104; III.i.414; V.i.274. 
 – more than in any other 
surviving play in the genre. It is fitting in a way that Ram Alley should be the play 
with more to say about the Inns of Chancery than any other surviving Jacobean city 
comedy. As the Inns of Chancery were long known as the lesser houses to the Inns of 
Court, so is Barry commonly recognized as the lesser writer to those celebrated as the 
masters of the genre – Jonson, Middleton, and Marston. Not that shared experience of 
inferior status gives Barry any sense of solidarity with the Inns of Chancery. I want to 
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examine Barry’s unusual explicit targeting of the Inns of Chancery to the end of 
showing that he was providing the young lawyers and students of the Inns of Court in 
the audience at the Whitefriars with something which they wanted at this time – 
hostility to legal practitioners not educated and qualified at the Inns of Court. 
Since Ram Alley is another of the less well-known examples of city comedy, I 
now provide a summary of the plot as an aid to reading the chapter. William 
Smalshankes is the young prodigal-gallant figure at the centre of the play. Having lost 
his money and land to the lawyer-usurer figure Throte, Smalshankes formulates a plan 
to recoup. He will pretend that he is to marry the rich heiress Constantia Somerfield, 
and he enlists the help of his punk Frances (the meretrix to which the play’s punning 
subtitle Merrie-Trickes half refers) to impersonate Constantia. Throte gets to hear 
both of Smalshankes’ (pretended) arrest for debt, and of his (pretended) engagement. 
Throte, as expected, decides that he would like to marry the heiress himself, and 
Smalshankes, feigning reluctance, accepts Throte’s assistance and the return of his 
mortgage in exchange for his marital claim on (the pretend) Constantia. Throte, 
delighted at the end of Act III about the prospect of quick and easy upward social 
mobility – “My fate lookes big” (III.i.578) – becomes an obvious candidate for double 
punishment by the end of the play: he both loses the land and undergoes the 
conventional humiliation of marriage to the play’s whore-figure, Frances. Pretence is 
central to Ram Alley. Smalshankes pretends to be in debt in order to win back lost 
land; his punk Frances pretends to be more interested in helping herself than William 
when, as part of his plan, she pretends to be rich heiress Constantia Somerfield; the 
expedience of desirable young widow Taffata’s planned marriage to William’s father, 
old stinkard Sir Oliver Smalshankes, will involve, if carried through, a pretence of 
willingness on the widow’s part; the real Constantia Somerfield pretends to be a male 
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page in the presence of the man she loves, Boutcher, who botches an attempt to hang 
himself – perhaps he was only pretending to want to die? If all of this were not 
pretence enough, the play’s lawyer-figure, Throte, is actually a pretend-lawyer. 
 
6.1 Throte and the decline of the Inns of Chancery 
 
Ram Alley is normally regarded as containing conventional anti-lawyer sentiment.2
 
 
But Barry’s representation of Throte is polemical in favour of Inns of Court lawyers. 
Throte is depicted as a pretend-lawyer owing to the fact that he is not an Inns of Court 
man – he only seems a lawyer, being (merely) an Inns of Chancery man. Throte 
admits his imposture to the audience in the play’s first Act: “Thus must I seeme a 
Lawyer which am indeed, / But merely dregs and off scumme of the Law” (I.i.481-2). 
Barry leaves it to a chambermaid – the widow Taffata’s maid, Adriana – to reveal in 
Act Two the details of Throte’s pretence. Asked by her mistress whether Throte might 
make a good husband, Adriana sniffs:  
Were the Rogue a Lawyer, but he is none, 
He never was of any Inne of court; 
But Inne of Chancery, where a was knowne, 
But onely for a swaggering whyfler” (II.i.296-9). 
 
                                                 
2 “The principal objects of satire are . . . the court and the law”: Claude E. Jones, ed., Ram-Alley or 
Merrie-Trickes, by Lording Barry (Uystrrvyst: Louvain Librairie Universitaire, 1952), xix; Leggatt 
concludes that Throte’s “definition of the law . . . is clearly a general comment, not just a description of 
his own shady practice” without taking into account Barry’s emphasis of Throte’s lack of qualification 
in the Inns of Court: Citizen Comedy in the Age of Shakespeare, 61; Leinwand rightly identifies Throte 
as “a counterfeit lawyer,” and says that Barry “introduces us to a cast of discredited types, [. . . but,] 
whatever his intention, never permits us to see them as anything else”: The City Staged, 69. Throte is a 
counterfeit lawyer, and the depiction is expressly contrasted with the Inns of Court-qualified lawyer. 
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The phrase “swaggering whyfler” probably imparted then as now a cheerful sense of 
roguish bravado on Throte’s part, made the more amusing for its delivery in the 
unbroken voice of a boy actor. But these are a sharp few lines, made sharper in the 
mouth of a servant. Hostility to amateur, quasi-lawyers was one thing, but specifically 
targeted denigration of the Inns of Chancery was something unusual in the drama. The 
lines given to Adriana articulate a newly unambiguous diminution of the professional 
and educational role of the Inns of Chancery. Not much more than a century earlier, a 
member of an Inn of Chancery could still assert capacity as one “learned in the law” 
of the land.3
 Where the Inns of Chancery are mentioned in literary commentaries, it tends 
to be in generalized association with the Inns of Court, without recognition of the 
important division that took place between the two in the context of legal education 
and the profession in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century.
 No longer. The right to make the claim had been chipped away in the 
interim, as part of a process of gradual and uncertain change. Decisive action came in 
the decade in which city comedy was in its ascent. The Inns of Chancery were on the 
wane. Everyone – even the chambermaid – knew it. 
4 I now 
provide background information on the Inns of Chancery and their changing relation 
to the Inns of Court for the purpose of contextualizing Barry’s targeting of the Inns of 
Chancery in Ram Alley. The history of the Inns of Court was already unclear by the 
close of the sixteenth century. Francis Thynne wrote in 1600: “it is hard to know . . . 
the original of these inns of lawyers which we now have.”5
                                                 
3 Baker, “The English Legal Profession, 1450-1550,” 17, 36 n. 8. 
 Unlike the Inns of Court, 
4 For example, Cook, The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare’s London, 18, 68; Finkelpearl, John 
Marston of the Middle Temple, 5; Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 3rd ed., 79. 
5 Quoted in Thomas Hearne, A Collection of Curious Discourses (Oxford, 1720), 110. 
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the Inns of Chancery have not survived, and their history is still more obscure. What 
of the difference in name between the Inns of Court and Inns of Chancery? Broadly 
speaking, the Inns of Court became, simply, establishments for men of the courts. 
There may be a connotation, too, of “some flavour of the court,” in the sense of the 
sovereign’s court, but one eminent commentator on the history of the Inns 
acknowledges that this notion may be in part simply a poetic rationalization.6
 Sir John Fortescue was the first to provide a literary account of the Inns of 
Court and Inns of Chancery, in or around 1468. Fortescue identified the function of 
the Inns of Chancery as preparatory schools or junior colleges to the Inns of Court.
 
7 
There is no definitive explanation of the name “Inns of Chancery.” Historically, we 
are most familiar with the word “Chancery” in connection with the law of Equity, and 
the Court of Chancery, where Equity law is administered. But the Inns of Chancery 
are not connected with the Court of Chancery – several of the Inns of Chancery were 
established before the emergence of the law of Equity.8
                                                 
6 Robert Megarry, Inns Ancient and Modern: A Topographical and Historical Introduction to the Inns 
of Court, Inns of Chancery, and Serjeants’ Inns (London: Selden Society, 1972), 32. Where not 
otherwise indicated, material concerning the Inns of Chancery is informed by Megarry’s text, 27-48. 
 The Inns of Chancery are 
suspected to have been named after the medieval Lord Chancellor responsible for 
reorganizing the Chancery, John de Stratford (Bishop of Winchester, and later 
Archbishop of Canterbury). De Stratford is thought to have established the earliest 
Inns of Chancery for the purpose of training law clerks in the drafting of common law 
7 De Laudibus Legum Angliae, tr. S. B. Chrimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), 117-
21; see Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 110. 
8 Before the sixteenth century, the Court of Chancery and the common law courts had enjoyed a 
harmonious relationship, but the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought increasing discord: Baker, 
An Introduction to Legal History, 108-9. 
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writs.9 Fortescue wrote of ten Inns of Chancery, but he did not identify them by name. 
One of the Inns may be presumed to have closed within the seventy years after 
Fortescue published his book (perhaps Symond’s Inn), as a report on legal studies 
written in or around 1540 for Henry VIII declares there to be nine Inns of Chancery at 
that time.10 Another of the Inns of Chancery was gone within the next sixty years. In 
or around 1600, Coke wrote that there were by then eight Inns of Chancery.11 This 
involves a known closure: in 1549, the Lord Protector Somerset ordered the 
demolition of Strand Inn (also known as Chester Inn) for the purpose of building the 
first Somerset House on the site.12
The Inns of Court could assert full control over the Inns of Chancery by the 
middle of the sixteenth century, when the Lord Chancellor delegated responsibility for 
each of the Inns of Chancery to one of the four Inns of Court, so that each of the Inns 
of Chancery now “belonged” to one of the Inns of Court. Up to this time, an applicant 
to one of the Inns of Court could normally expect to receive preferential treatment if 
he was a member of a correspondingly affiliated Inn of Chancery. Not that it was 
necessary to proceed to the Inn of Court to which a student’s Inn of Chancery was 
affiliated. Thomas More was a student at New Inn (the Inn of Chancery connected to 
the Middle Temple), but he went on instead to Lincoln’s Inn. The Inns of Court thus 
had their superiority confirmed. Each of the Inns of Chancery was affiliated to one of 
 
                                                 
9 Richardson’s assertion that the ten Inns of Chancery were named after their location offers an 
elegantly simple explanation: they were situated in two groups, one at either end of Chancery Lane: A 
History of the Inns of Court, 4. 
10 The report was written by Thomas Denton, Nicholas Bacon, and Robert Cary; see Megarry, Inns 
Ancient and Modern, 27. 
11 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, iii, Preface. 
12 The present-day Somerset House was built in the late eighteenth century. 
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the Inns of Court, generally corresponding to geographical location, each Inn of 
Chancery being within half a mile of the Inn of Court to which it was affiliated, and 
most within a quarter of a mile. The playhouses were similarly convenient. Of the 
eight Inns of Chancery that Coke mentioned, four were more to the north, in Holborn; 
eight were more to the south, around the Strand and Fleet Street. The two more 
northerly Inns of Court are Lincoln’s Inn and Gray’s Inn. Two of the more northerly 
Inns of Chancery, Furnival’s Inn and Thavies Inn, were affiliated to Lincoln’s Inn. 
The other two northerly Inns of Chancery, Staple Inn and Barnard’s Inn, were 
affiliated to Gray’s Inn. The four more southerly Inns of Chancery were not divided 
evenly between the more southerly Inns of Court. Clement’s Inn, Clifford’s Inn, and 
Lyon’s Inn were affiliated to the Inner Temple; the Middle Temple had only New 
Inn.13
Up to the last decade of the sixteenth century, satisfactory completion of a 
year or more at an Inn of Chancery was viewed, and had been for something in the 
region of two hundred years, as a prerequisite of joining an Inn of Court. The most 
respected, most powerful senior common lawyers of the Jacobean period had passed 
through the halls of the Inns of Chancery. Egerton entered Furnivall’s Inn in 1560 
before proceeding in 1561 to Lincoln’s Inn; Coke, having first attended Cambridge’s 
Trinity College, spent a year at Clifford’s Inn before proceeding in 1572 to the Inner 
Temple. The expectation that attendance at an Inn of Chancery was a prerequisite of 
joining an Inn of Court changed notably, though, in the first decade of the seventeenth 
century. The number of students admitted from the Inns of Chancery had already 
begun to diminish in the last decade of the sixteenth century. For example, Gray’s Inn 
 
                                                 
13 For the locations of the Inns of Chancery, see Megarry, Inns Ancient and Modern, 28, 35-45. 
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admitted one hundred and twenty-four students from the Inns of Chancery between 
1586 and 1591, and between 1596 and 1600 the figure was down to forty-seven.14
Prest shows that admissions from the Inns of Chancery fell precipitously in the early 
seventeenth century, by which time the association was no longer regarded as a mark 
of distinction for a young barrister.
 
15
A combination of factors accounts for the decline in status of the Inns of 
Chancery. A key practical one, explaining why the decline became marked by the first 
decade of the seventeenth century, was the 1589 ruling of Broughton vs. Prince. This 
made call to the bar of an Inn of Court the definitive qualification for rights of 
audience before the superior common law courts.
 Thus, by 1608, the year in which Ram Alley was 
produced, it would have been quite unusual for a student of the Inns of Court to have 
been at an Inn of Chancery as Egerton and Coke had a few decades before. 
16 Post-1589, Ram Alley’s Throte 
lacks the qualification for rights of audience. His education is limited to the Inns of 
Chancery, so he ought not to perform the role of court pleader, and the negative 
representation of this unqualified lawyer is one which the young lawyers and students 
of the Inns of Court could be expected to have appreciated. Throte has at least an 
affiliation with an Inn of Chancery – there would have been those who held 
themselves out as lawyers having perhaps some talent for speaking but no official 
legal connection.17
                                                 
14 Register of Admissions to Gray’s Inn, ed. J. Foster (London, 1889); see also Brooks, Pettyfoggers 
and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 163. 
 In the late sixteenth century, unofficial practitioners took 
15 See Table 15 in The Inns of Court, 129. 
16 Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law (London: Hambledon, 1986), 129-134. 
17 See Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 43, 50-1, 62 n. 37, citing Yorkshireman Edmund 
Cundy, whose diary is preserved in National Archives/Sheffield City Library, Wharncliffe MSS 
Wh.M.D. 01. 
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advantage of the lack of clear regulation in the law by supplying legal services in 
response to greatly increasing demand, and this generated concern about standards of 
qualification and professional integrity. Gray’s Inn man William Hudson, for 
example, followed Egerton’s caterpillar metaphor in singling out unofficial, 
unqualified legal practitioners for giving the profession a bad name, calling them 
“grasshoppers . . . [who] devour the whole land.”18
Leinwand suggests that “the clear sense of a playwright self-consciously 
composing types” is missing in Ram Alley,
 Throte’s positive-sounding 
declaration of liberty – “How happy are we that we joy the law, / So freely as we do” 
(I.i.428-9) – begins an ironic articulation of this grievance of the Inns of Court men. 
The unqualified court-pleader celebrates the ease with which he has managed to 
inveigle his way into their respectable vocation: “to this renown’d estate, / Have I by 
indirect and cunning means, / In-woven myself” (I.i.432-4). 
19 but amateur, unofficial providers of legal 
services could not be easily stereotyped. On the generally acceptable side, clergymen 
might help parishioners with disputes;20 not so acceptably, unqualified con-men could 
engineer their way into matters connected with legal processes which should have 
been performed by men with legal training.21
                                                 
18 “A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber,” in Collectanea Juridica. Consisting of Tracts relative to 
the Law and Constitution of England, ed. F. Hargrave (London, 1791), 95. On Egerton’s dictum, see 
supra, 16. 
 So, the fact that quasi-lawyers eluded 
easy stereotyping could explain Leinwand’s observation about a lack of self-
consciously composed types, at least in the case of Throte as a lawyer-figure. The 
19 The City Staged, 69. 
20 Edmund Cundy appears to have been a curate; see supra, 191 n. 17. 
21 See M. J. Ingram, “Communities and Courts; Law and Disorder in Early Seventeenth-Century 
Wiltshire,” in Crime in England 1550-1800, ed. J. S. Cockburn (London: Methuen, 1977), 122-5. 
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difficulty of stereotyping quasi-lawyers is also a reason for more general 
misinterpretation of representations of lawyers in city comedy – a genre steeped in 
stereotypes. 
 The decisive cause of the decline of the Inns of Chancery came as the 
seventeenth century began, when the Inns of Court enforced new rules which would 
lead to definitive segregation between different types of common lawyer – on one 
hand, barristers; on the other, attorneys and various other practitioners. This was the 
beginning of the modern legal profession’s division between barristers and solicitors. 
It would be wrong to treat this segregation as being too strictly in line with the 
modern divided legal profession, though. In 1600, for example, judges ruled that only 
sworn attorneys, barristers, and personal servants could act in the capacity of 
solicitors.22
 There are two ways of looking at the change which led to the decline of the 
Inns of Chancery – two narratives that might be applied to the turn of events. From 
the side of the barristers of the Inns of Court, if the law was to become more 
organized by means of a suitable level of regulation, it must be right to take moves 
which would both oust amateur, quasi-lawyers, and enforce the maintenance of 
distinct functions for different types of lawyer. The ruling in Broughton vs. Prince, 
would survive four centuries of the ongoing evolution of the English legal system, 
until Lord Woolf’s reforms of 1990, when solicitors were given rights of audience in 
 This is an idea far removed from the modern legal system, and from the 
modern understanding of the word “solicitor.” Historically, though the word was long 
in use in the English legal system, it is the attorneys in medieval and early modern 
times that are more, and still very broadly, the forerunners of the solicitors of today. 
                                                 
22 George Cooke, Rules, Orders and Notices in the Court of King’s Bench and Common Pleas (1747), 
ii, Michaelmas Term 1573, 142; cited in Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, 117. 
 194 
the courts broadly equal to those of barristers. The 1589 ruling brought, anyway, an 
increasing sense of vocational pride among Inns of Court lawyers, which would see 
increased hostility towards the men that had been performing legal services in 
provincial jurisdictions, who came to be characterized as unlearned and amateur. For 
example, Churms is an amateur, provincial lawyer-figure in the anonymous play Wily 
Beguiled (a country-set city comedy, performed at Paul’s in or around 160623). 
Reflecting on London’s increasing dominance in the law, he looks to move on to a 
new vocation, one worthy of his cunning but reflecting his lack of qualification and 
virtue: “I have beene . . . in the Country a Lawyer, and the next degree shal be a 
Connicatcher” (I.i.68-70). Inns of Court men worked, meanwhile, at supporting the 
position they had and the reputation they inferred for themselves for providing more 
expert, more reliable, generally more “professional” service than those that had 
practised untroubled up to now without connection to London.24
The beginning of the exclusion from the Inns of Court of attorneys and the early 
modern version of solicitors could, at the same time, be viewed as enforced social 
segregation – social-cleansing by King’s Writ. It may be difficult to see it in a social 
context as anything else. In Ram Alley, Throte’s description early in the play of 
himself as “dregs and off scumme of the Law” (I.i.482) might have been well 
delivered with some subtle ambivalence: not only in approval of the organizational 
intentions of the practising and student counsellors of the Inns of Court, but with a 
note of resentfully ironic self-deprecation for the numerous conscientious lawyers 
 
                                                 
23 Date proposed in The Malone Society reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912). 
24 See Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 52, 63 n. 43. 
 195 
there no doubt were in the Inns of Chancery.25 Taking the view that this was enforced 
social segregation, a twentieth century historical account from a senior member of the 
bar can sound something like a revised colonial spin. Megarry summarizes the time of 
transition in this way: “as the years went by it was the attorneys and the solicitors who 
virtually took over the Inns of Chancery” (my italics).26 This makes the attorneys and 
solicitors sound like proactive, colonizing settlers. This was not the case. Megarry’s 
account glosses the fact that attorneys and solicitors were forcibly ejected from the 
Inns of Court to the Inns of Chancery, while any barrister members left at the Inns of 
Chancery made the reverse move, to the Inns of Court.27
There are these two ways, then, of viewing the segregation of the Inns of Court 
and Chancery. If the organizational aim is to be admired as necessary, this remains 
inseparable from the arbitrary, class-based ideal underpinning it. The civilian Cowell 
wrote in 1607, disinterestedly or not, of the situation in the common law. Cowell’s 
words reflect a newly defined, imperative view of the barrister as automatically 
superior, and an analogy Cowell makes demonstrates the extent to which the 
professional distinction was a class-based issue: 
 
 
It is true, that I have knowne some Attorneyes and Sollicitors put on a Counsailors 
gowne, without treading the same usuall path to the barre… But indeed, I never looke 
upon them, but I thinke of the Taylor, who in one of his customers cast suits had thrust 
himselfe in amongst the Nobility at a Court Maske, where pulling out his Handkercher, 
he let fall his Thimble, and was so discovered, and handled, and dandled from hand to 
foot, till the Guard delivered him at the great chamber doore, and cryed, farewell good 
feeble.28
                                                 
25 But the attorneys lacked two qualities usually associated with professions as we might define them 
today: self-regulation, and control over the admission of new practitioners; see Brooks, “The Common 
Lawyers in England,” 53. 
 
26 Megarry, Inns Ancient and Modern, 30. 
27 In this connection, see Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 4-5. 
28 Powell, The Art of Thriving. Or, The Plaine Pathway to Preferment, 58-9. 
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A first tentative move towards excluding attorneys and solicitors from the Inns of 
Court had been made in a series of judicial orders beginning in 1556.29
 
 Slow to 
change as the law tends to be, and contingent in its constructions, the orders admitted 
various exceptions which meant that attorneys and solicitors did not leave all at once. 
The method of expelling them was aided by the mounting of a cumulative denigration 
of their social status. It would be a thick-skinned attorney that wished to stay put at 
the Inns of Court following the 1614 Order designed to exclude them once and for all: 
There ought always to be observed a difference betwene a Councelar at Law which is 
the principal person next to Sergeants and Judges in the administration of Justice and 
attorneys and solicitors w[hi]ch are but ministeriall persons and of an inferior nature.30
 
 
 
When Barry has the chambermaid of Ram Alley look down on the Inn of Chancery 
man, the jibe could be expected to please the Inns of Court man in the audience, 
because the broad conclusion is that Throte is no lawyer. The light-hearted addition of 
his being known there “onely for a swaggering whyfler” is made as if indifferent to 
the fact that there were lawyers at the Inns of Chancery; only, they came to be 
grouped in the Orders of the Inns of Court as persons of an inferior nature as much as, 
if not more than, inferior lawyers. This was the pivotal moment for the Inns of 
Chancery, and though they survived physically for some time, and were used as a 
meeting place for attorneys and solicitors, they would never again be an important 
part of London’s legal life. The smallest of the eight Inns identified in 1600 by Coke, 
Thavies Inn, closed in the late Eighteenth century, and the others closed (and the 
buildings were for the most part demolished) during Victoria’s reign.31
                                                 
29 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, i, 190. 
 
30 The Pension Book of Gray’s Inn 1569-1669, i, 212-13. 
31 For details, see Megarry, Inns Ancient and Modern, 35-45; Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the 
Commonwealth, 158, 329 n. 29. 
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 Shakespeare gives a subtle indication of the beginning of the decline of the 
Inns of Chancery in 2 Henry IV (written between 1596 and 1600). Justice Shallow 
talks about his cousin William to Justice Silent. William is presently a student at 
Oxford University, says Shallow, and he is about to enter one of the Inns of Court. 
Conspicuous by its absence is any expectation that William should first put in a 
preparatory year at an Inn of Chancery. Shallow reminisces about the different path 
taken in his own legal education, which involved some “mad days” at Clement’s Inn – 
one of the Inns of Chancery (III.ii.12-14, 32).32
 In Ram Alley, a speech of Throte’s infers polemically that the mad days of an 
Inns of Chancery student could threaten something more sinister than could be 
expected of an Inns of Court man. The un-named Gentlemen of the Inns of Court in 
act III of the play show no sign of wanting to assist Throte land his rich heiress. 
Throte addresses them as if he is their colleague, but they remain aloof from him, and 
Throte’s ostensibly casual change of topic from the Inns of Court to the Inns of 
 The allusion would serve no purpose 
as one belonging historically to the reign of Henry IV (1399-1413). This is an 
example of Shakespeare seasoning an historical drama with a contemporary, topical 
allusion: the change in expectation about preparatory education for the Inns of Court. 
Shallow’s cousin – presently at Oxford in preparation for entering an Inn of Court – is 
the legitimate antithesis of Inns of Chancery man Throte in Ram Alley. Even 
Shallow’s reminiscence of mad days at Clement’s Inn imports ambiguity in 
connection with the Inns of Chancery, the phrase connoting not only the normally 
assumed figurative image of youthful high spirits, but a literal image of regrettable 
foolishness or even mental disorder. 
                                                 
32 The Second Part of King Henry IV, Arden edition, ed. A. R. Humphreys (London: Methuen, 1980). 
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Chancery is significant. Responding to the Gentlemen’s reservations about potential 
danger, Throte exclaims: 
 
Dangerous? Lord where be those gallant spirits,  
The time has beene when scarce an honest woman,  
Much lesse a wench could passe an Inn of court,  
But some of the fry would have bene doing  
With her: I knew the day when Shreds a Taylor  
Comming once late by an Inne of Chancerie,  
Was layd a long, and muffled in his cloake,  
His wife tooke in, Stytcht up, turnd out againe,  
And he perswaded all was but in jest,  
Tut those brave boyes are gone, these which are left,  
Are wary lads, live poring on their bookes (III.i.112). 
 
Throte’s suggestion that the days of reckless and rowdy “gallant spirits” are gone can 
be interpreted as something more than simple nostalgia. Throte characterizes his past 
as amiably reckless by pairing the Inns of Court and Inns of Chancery. He makes a 
generalization that appears to flatter past Inns of Court men as incorrigible and always 
successful womanizers – scarce an honest woman could pass them by. But when 
Throte particularizes an incident, Barry has the anecdote relate expressly to an Inn of 
Chancery. It is an impassively offensive and criminal anecdote about a man, Shreds 
the taylor, forcibly detained while his wife is abducted, assaulted, and casually 
ejected. What looks like a jocular pairing of the Inns of Chancery and the Inns of 
Court instead lays open with new polemical purpose a contrast between the self-aware 
charm of Inns of Court men and the potential for graceless depravity in this 
representative of men whose legal education was limited to an Inn of Chancery.33
                                                 
33 In the fifteenth century, there were incidents among students of the Inns of Court and the universities 
of Oxford and Cambridge of serious violence and even homicide; see J. H. Baker, The Third University 
of England: The Inns of Court and the common-law tradition (London: Selden Society, 1990), 12. 
 
Throte’s nostalgia infers again that the current students of the Inns of Court were self-
consciously industrious: they are “wary lads, . . . poring on their bookes.” The still 
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new, greater availability of books affected all types of education – certainly the 
approach to learning the law was changed by the increased availability of printed legal 
texts. Fulbeck highlighted the new possibility of putting “bookes in every mans 
hands,”34 and the proverbial ethic he attached to legal study demonstrates that 
qualification as a lawyer was regarded as a valuable accomplishment: “nothing of 
price and accompt is purchased without great labour.”35
 The increased availability of books, and awareness of the difference they 
made, generated interest in the new generation of students, who were marked apart by 
the term “the younger sort.” In his Survey of London of 1603, John Stow observes that 
“the younger sort [of the Inns of Court] are either gentlemen of the sons of gentlemen, 
or of other most wealthie persons.”
 
36 Stow is up-to-date in his tacit recognition that a 
stay at an Inn of Chancery was no longer a prerequisite of admission to an Inn of 
Court. He writes only of Inns of Court students “having come thither sometimes from 
one of the Universities, and sometimes immediately from Grammar schooles.”37
 
 If it 
seems everyone from judge to servant was aware of the decline of the Inns of 
Chancery, there could still be found a few who held on to obsolete tradition. As late as 
1635, Thomas Powell was still expressing a preference for the younger sort to follow 
older ways: 
                                                 
34 A Direction or Preparative to the study of the Lawe, 29. 
35 Ibid., 14. Close study of the law is the subject of a joke which was the sole omission from Ram Alley 
in its 1636 second quarto printing. When, in act I, Boutcher finds Throte sitting in a wooden chair, a 
legal text open before him, he observes: “You study hard”; Throte returns: “No I have a cushion” 
(I.i.483-4): Jones, ed., Ram-Alley or Merrie-Trickes. A third quarto was printed in 1639. 
36 Stow, A Survey of London, 77. 
37 Ibid., 78. 
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Onely (for my part) I doe much commend the ancient custome of breeding of the 
younger students. First in the Innes of Chancery; there to be the better prepared for the 
Innes of Court. And this must needs be the better way, seeing too much liberty at the 
first proves very fatall, to many of the younger sort.38
 
 
Powell was out of date in preferring the Inns of Chancery by this time. But outmoded 
guidance could not have been completely unexpected from a manual-writer whose 
description of himself shows charm but offers something short of full confidence in 
his legal know-how: “an old Travailer in the sea of Experience, amongst the inchanted 
islands of ill Fortune.”39
 
 Another provision of the 1614 Orders for the better 
government of the Inns of Court picked up on the phrase “the younger sort”: 
For that all government is strenthned or slackned by the observing or neglectinge of the 
reverence & respect which is to be used towards the governors of the same therefore it 
is required that due Reverence & Respect be had by the younger sort of gent: to the 
Readers, Benchers, & Antients of every house.40
 
 
On an orthodox reading, this looks like a conservative insistence that supposedly 
unruly young members of the Inns of Court toe the line. But it is possible to detect at 
the same time (or instead) a sense that an older sort of lawyer may have begun to feel 
threatened, and that this was a joint attempt by some of the older members of the Inns 
to guard their positions and assert power over young exemplars of a new profession 
interested in working towards a more organized legal system. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Powell, The Art of Thriving. Or, The Plaine Pathway to Preferment, 56. 
39 Thomas Powell, Tom of All Trades. Or, The Plaine Pathway to Preferment (London, 1631), 1. 
40 The Pension Book of Gray’s Inn 1569-1669, i, 214. 
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6.2 Other legal matter in Ram Alley 
 
There is an explicit call for statutory reform in the play. As Barry maximizes the 
denigration of Throte’s imposture by having a servant look down on the Inns of 
Chancery man, so does the playwright invest more weight in the issue of reform by 
putting the related critique in the mouth of a senior Justice. Justice Tutchin is the 
uncle of the real Constantia Somerfield, and Throte and Tutchin cross paths only as a 
result of the confusion that arises out of Throte’s desire to marry the woman he has 
been gulled into thinking is the rich heiress. Tutchin is a peripheral figure to the plot 
of the play, but it is his position that is of importance in the articulation of the call for 
reform: “for the lawes, / There are so many that men do stand in awe, / Of none at all” 
(IV.i.513-515). If the number of law-suits and men involved in conducting them were 
in a sense a symptom of the confusion in the law at this time, one of the key causes 
was the excess of law itself. Ellesmere’s Parliamentary speech of 1604 had been a 
more than usually important one, being the first following the accession of James I. In 
it, Ellesmere made a particular point of identifying the need for major reform of 
England’s statutory law. Much of this had become, the Chancellor indicated, 
superfluous, imperfect, or insufficient, and he sought an examination of all statutes 
since the reign of Edward I, with the aim of repealing outdated ones, and rewriting 
others.41
                                                 
41 Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, 83, 86. 
 Francis Bacon had made statutory reform one of the key issues advanced for 
consideration, too, in his Advancement of Learning of 1605: “what is the best means 
to keep them [the laws] from being too vast in volumes or too full of multiplicity and 
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crossness [?]”42
 I have argued that the ostensibly generalized anti-lawyer sentiment in Ram 
Alley is actually directed at the members of the Inns of Chancery, and that the play is 
thus in favour of Inns of Court lawyers, who were at the time in the process of 
distancing themselves from the Inns of Chancery. Part of the rationale underpinning 
this thesis is that Inns of Court lawyers were a recognized part of city comedy’s target 
audience, and so it would have been bad practice commercially, besides anything else, 
for the writers of the plays to alienate them. But Throte is a negative representation of 
an Inns of Chancery man, and this would surely have served to alienate another 
potential section of the audience: any member of the Inns of Chancery who might be 
interested in attending a performance of the play. 
 The recognition in Ram Alley that there had come to be simply too 
much law provides another example of the play’s serious implication and satirical 
purpose. The call for reform does not make the play anti-law. Rather, it articulates the 
position of those Inns of Court men who supported the wishes of senior lawyers such 
as Ellesmere and Bacon for practical and profession-advancing reform of the law. 
It may be enough to say that maintaining the patronage of discerning Inns of 
Court playgoers by denigrating the Inns of Chancery justified alienating another 
potential section of the Whitefriars audience. But there is one ambiguous part of 
Throte’s characterization which could simultaneously appeal to the Inns of Court man 
and appease the Inns of Chancery playgoer. When Boutcher seeks Throte’s help on 
behalf of Will Smalshankes, as part of the latter’s plan to recover his losses, Throte 
agrees, secretly following Will’s expectation that he would develop an interest in 
marrying Constantia Somerfield, the rich heiress that Smalshankes will have his punk 
                                                 
42 In Francis Bacon: A Critical Edition of the Major Works, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 287. 
 203 
Frances pretend to be. Throte finds himself accounting for his motives before 
Boutcher, and an audience might be expected to take it as an affectation, concealing 
only greed, when Throte explains that he kept Smalshankes’s mortgage “To let him 
know what tis to live in want” (I.i.552). This could be performed in such a way as to 
make Throte seem disingenuous – he took from Smalshankes because he could, and 
now he is manoeuvring by any means plausible into what he believes will be a 
profitable match. This construction would satisfy the Inns of Court man for whom 
Throte is an inferior legal practitioner, giving his vocation a bad name. But the 
articulation of the idea of removing property from a privileged young man “To let him 
know what tis to live in want” – be it disingenuously or not from a rascal like Throte, 
who has had to make his own chances – can be taken, generally, as quite a modern 
statement, a serious expression of social conscience. More to the point, it held the 
possibility of satisfying any present in the Whitefriars audience who were, and would 
remain, “only” members of the Inns of Chancery. It had become the done thing to 
diminish the Inns of Chancery as the irredeemably unconnected inferior of the Inns of 
Court,43
 Gibbons regards Ram Alley as the most successful of “conventional” city 
comedies, for its fast-moving and well-controlled plotting and “sinewy economy” of 
dialogue.
 but it seems right that Throte’s express pretext for aiding Smalshankes would 
conceal (besides the motive of winning himself a rich heiress) some note of 
resentment about the part social and pecuniary advantage had to play in the decline of 
the Inns of Chancery and its newly downgraded associations. 
44
                                                 
43 Inns of Court lawyers became generally much better regarded than Inns of Chancery men, whose 
roles were characterized as mechanical and plebeian: Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 115, 287, 313. 
 But he finds the play lacks the serious implications and the satiric purpose 
44 Jacobean City Comedy, 113, 115. 
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of Middleton or Jonson, and that what good points it has have been copied from 
contemporary successful examples of the genre.45 I have suggested already that the 
play’s legal matter has serious implications and the satiric purpose. There may seem 
serious implications in Barry’s treatment of wrongs and injustices. And if one shares 
Leggatt’s view that Barry’s comedy conveys only a sense of gleeful participation in 
immoral acts,46 then the playwright’s set of apparently nihilistic values – that is, no 
values to speak of – could seem in itself a serious comment on the time in which Ram 
Alley was written. Barry may be seen actively to celebrate the decadence which the 
studiously detached Middleton chooses only silently to observe.47
Barry appears only to follow convention in his take on the bad-lawyer / good-
law topos. Throte’s clerk Dash gives the expected glowing report when asked what 
(or how) he thinks of the law: 
 
 
                                         Most reverently,  
Law is the worlds great light, a second sunne,  
To this terrestriall Globe, by which all things  
Have life and being, and with-out which  
Confusion and disorder soone would seaze  
The generall state of men, warres, outrages,  
The ulcerous deeds of peace, it curbes and cures,  
It is the kingdomes eye, by which she sees  
The acts and thoughts of men (I.i.463-471). 
 
Critically, the bad-lawyer part of the topos is given to the play’s (bad) lawyer-figure, 
Throte, who responds to his clerk’s earnest encomium in cynical terms: 
  
 
                                                 
45 Principally A Trick to Catch the Old One and Volpone: Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 116. 
46 Leggatt, Citizen Comedy in the Age of Shakespeare, 61. 
47 Middleton “has no point of view, is neither sentimental nor cynical; he is neither resigned, nor 
disillusioned, nor romantic; he has no message”: T. S. Eliot, “Thomas Middleton,” in Selected Prose of 
T.S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), 189. 
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                                         The kingdomes eye,  
I tell thee foole, it is the kingdomes nose,  
By which she smells out all these rich transgressors,  
Nor ist of flesh but meerely made of wax,  
And tis, within the power of us Lawiers,  
To wrest this nose of waxe which way we please.  
Or it may be as thou saist an eye indeed.  
But if it be tis sure a womans eye . . . 
Thats ever rowling (I.i.471-479). 
 
The perception that lawyers could turn a matter which way they pleased was reflected 
in the understanding that Inns of Court men were “of the same profession with the 
rhetors of Rome, as much used to defend the wrong as to perfect and maintain the 
upright answer.”48
The play’s title is capable of providing a sense of the approach to its legal 
matter. In a piece of geographic irony, Ram Alley was something like a vein of 
illegality running into the heart of legal London. It was one of the avenues leading 
into the Temple from Fleet Street, described in one of Lenton’s caricatures as the 
castle of broken citizens.
 This much a member of the Inns of Court might acknowledge. But 
this vacillating sequence of metaphors from a negative example of an Inns of 
Chancery man looks in part a dramatic technique designed to invite scorn from Inns 
of Court men – not so much for Throte’s uneven rhetorical skills, as for his 
presumption in speaking on generalized behalf of “us Lawiers.” 
49
                                                 
48 From John Williams’ 1621 inaugural speech as Chancellor; The Huntington Library, Ellesmere MS 
7974; cited in Prest, “The English Bar, 1550-1700,” 74. 
 Barry may have flattered Inns of Court men by 
characterizing them as successful womanizers, but mere flattery on the page can take 
on a curious (to the modern mind, a more sinister) kind of suggestiveness when 
viewed in context of the play’s performance by the boy actors of the King’s Revels 
company. For example, bearing in mind that the play was produced at the Whitefriars 
49 Characterismi: or, Lentons Leasures, C2: “9. A broken Citizen.” 
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(a former monastery in what became a notorious brothel district on Fleet Street50
 
), the 
boy actor playing Throte might have attracted from certain members of the audience a 
prurient interest in his own imaginable inexperience when the worldly adult character 
he plays scoffs at Smalshankes, his brother Thomas, and Boutcher: “are you mad? / 
Come you to seeke a Virgin in Ram-alley / Soe neere an Inne of Court [?]” (III.i.416-
418). The suggested unlikelihood of finding a virgin near an Inn of Court might 
perpetuate the stereotype of the womanizing Inns of Court gallant, but there were 
most likely members of the audience who would come to view the fresh-faced, virgin-
looking boy actors on stage. Such a dynamic has been explored in relation to 
Marston’s Dutch Courtesan: 
. . . a boy plays a bewitchingly pretty girl whore whose beauty is on offer and at issue – 
in May 1605 between an audience and some schoolboys on stage, at the Blackfriars 
theatre close by the Inns of Court and within walking distance of a very different 
commercial London to the east. . . . The lust a man might feel in the theatre . . ., 
watching a play, is easy to feel because without consequence, unreal. If the whole 
situation is non-realistic, . . . one can feel lust with greater ease, even if the pretty 
young girl when she appears is in fact a pretty young boy.51
 
 
Barry’s joke about the difficulty of finding a virgin near an Inn of Court was capable 
of seeming at the same time, therefore, both overt heterosexual flattery of the Inns 
men, and covert pederast tease. Another example of this can be found in an invented 
term for a law-suit in the play. It is possible to find a colloquial pun on suing and 
sodomizing where Throte’s clerk Dash tells Constantia, a young lady (played by a 
                                                 
50 See Joseph Quincy Adams Jr., “Lordinge (alias ‘Lodowick’) Barry,” Modern Philology, vol. 9, no. 4, 
(Apr. 1912), 567-570, 568-9. 
51 David Crane, “Patterns of Audience Involvement at the Blackfriars Theatre in the Early Seventeenth 
Century: Some Moments in Marston’s The Dutch Courtesan,” in Plotting Early Modern London: New 
Essays on Jacobean City Comedy, ed. Dieter Mehl, Angela Stock, and Anne-Julia Zwierlein 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 98, 102. 
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boy) in winsome disguise as a page, about “An action boy, cald firking the Posteriors” 
(I.i.560). This is presumably an example of the kind of thing which caused Barry’s 
biographer regretfully to describe Ram Alley as being “marred by indecent situations 
and dialogue.”52
I began the chapter saying that pretence was central to Ram Alley. It seems apt 
to close by noting that Barry’s critical reception has been in one respect characterized 
by pretence, too. Ram Alley was thought for centuries to be Barry’s only surviving 
play. It now seems likely that he was sole author of the anonymous play The Family 
of Love, long thought to be Middleton’s.
 
53 Some authoritative names have categorized 
Barry as a conventional, copycat writer for the play known to be his, simultaneously 
finding unseen depth in The Family of Love while it was thought to be Middleton’s.54
                                                 
52 C. L’Estrange Ewen, Lording Barry, Poet and Pirate (London: n.p., 1938), 1. 
 
It has been fine to call Ram Alley a competent retread of A Trick to Catch the Old 
One, but there is supposed to be more than meets the eye in The Family of Love. For 
53 The Family of Love has been excluded from the 2008 Collected Works. See Jonathan Bate, “Dampit 
and Moll: Sexing the language, languaging the sex, doubting all truth, mastering all dramatic modes: 
enough of a case for Thomas Middleton?” Times Literary Supplement, 25 April 2008, 5; Brissenden, 
“Middletonian Families,” 29; David J. Lake, The Canon of Thomas Middleton’s Plays: Internal 
Evidence for the Major Problems of Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 91-
107; Gary Taylor, Paul Mulholland, and MacD. P. Jackson, “Thomas Middleton, Lording Barry, and 
‘The Family of Love’,” Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 93 (1999), 213-41. Charles 
Cathcart recently made a case for Marston having had a hand in the play’s composition: “‘The Family 
of Love’ and John Marston,” ch. 7 in Marston, Rivalry, Rapprochement, and Jonson (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008), 79-140. 
54 Gibbons initiated this by putting Barry’s achievement down to imitation of Middleton: Jacobean City 
Comedy, 113, 115; see also Leggatt, Citizen Comedy in the Age of Shakespeare, 10 n. 22; Leinwand, 
The City Staged, 68-9; Brissenden, “Middletonian Families,” 29 n. 4. 
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example: The Family of Love foreshadows the social framework of the later A Chaste 
Maid in Cheapside, Middleton “had more in mind” than an attack on the sect – the 
play extends beyond its sectaries, and Middleton might have some expectation of 
sound judgment “from a few” in his audience.55 But will Middleton become Barry’s 
copier if The Family of Love is taken, as Leinwand suggests, to foreshadow A Chaste 
Maid in Cheapside? Barry’s certain authorship of Ram Alley, and the case for his 
authorship of The Family of Love, make it appropriate to view him as a talented but 
unlucky (at least in the arts56
                                                 
55 Leinwand, The City Staged, 68. 
) and less persevering part of a community of writers 
taking inspiration from, and often playing off, each other. Ram Alley shows Barry 
following the leading names of city comedy in so far as he makes Inns of Court 
lawyers a favoured part of the target audience for his play, but his unusual explicit 
56 Barry started out as a pirate, in or before 1607. An attempt at managing the Whitefriars playhouse 
and the King’s Revels company was short-lived, ending mainly because of plague-closings and failure 
to make good on debts. The troupe disbanded following a law-suit in the Court of Chancery. A 1912 
article suggests tactfully that, since “we do not again hear of [Barry] in connection with the drama,” 
financial problems indicated by the law-suit must have led him into “other fields of endeavour”: 
Adams, “Lordinge (alias ‘Lodowick’) Barry,” 570. Indeed – he returned to piracy. Barry 
commandeered a boat and raided a Flemish vessel near Tilbury. Most of his accomplices hanged for 
their part in the matter, but Barry managed to survive. He went on to become a ship’s Captain. In 
November 1617, Barry was a Captain on Ralegh’s expedition to Guinea. He bought into a trading 
vessel before dying peacefully in London. Informed by Ewen, Lording Barry, Poet and Pirate, 14; 
Jones, ed., Ram-Alley or Merrie-Trickes, ix; William C. Carroll, “Recent Studies in Tudor and Stuart 
Drama,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, vol. 41, no. 2, Tudor and Stuart Drama. (Spring, 
2001), 418. Bruster cites Barry’s diversion into piracy as an example of the proximity between legal 
and illegal commercial activity in the period: Drama and the Market in the Age of Shakespeare, 113. 
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targeting of the Inns of Chancery is one sign that he is no mere imitator of Middleton 
and Jonson. 
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Chapter seven 
Michaelmas Term and Slade’s Case 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The conventional ending of Michaelmas Term is more complex than it may appear. I 
argue in this chapter that Middleton makes it possible to find a dramatic conflict 
between expectations of literary genre and expectations of law. The judgment at the 
play’s ending conforms to literary convention, but it is capable of interpretation as 
being contrary to an expectation in law relating to contractual promises, following a 
momentous legal decision of some four years earlier. This interpretation of 
Michaelmas Term is consistent with one of the play’s themes, deceptive appearances, 
and I propose that the possibility of making this interpretation contributes to the idea 
that Inns of Court lawyers were a favoured part of city comedy’s audience. 
 
 
The main plot of Michaelmas Term concerns the gulling of young Essex gentleman 
Richard Easy by woollen draper Ephestian Quomodo and his protean accomplices 
Shortyard and Falselight. The trick in the play is a complex and ingenious one. 
Blastfield (Shortyard in disguise) works his way into Easy’s affections. Blastfield 
pretends to need money, and fast. He goes in search of a loan from Quomodo, taking 
Easy with him. Quomodo agrees to lend Blastfield two hundred pounds for a term of 
one month, calling in the scrivener Dustbox to attend to the bond, and insisting on a 
co-signatory. After Quomodo has feigned reluctance about accepting him, Easy 
allows himself to be talked into standing surety for his new drinking companion and 
bedfellow, and mortgages his estate against a loan made in over-priced cloth. The loan 
is unable to be repaid. Blastfield disappears into thin air, and after Shortyard has led 
the inevitably failed search for his alter ego, Quomodo is left only to foreclose. Easy 
has his lands restored in the final judgment scene. 
I want first to examine Middleton’s apparently straightforward obedience to 
literary convention in the play’s conclusion in the context of what was going on in the 
law at this time. In the second part of the chapter, I question the apparent anti-lawyer 
sentiment of the play’s Induction. 
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7.1 Legal precedent and Michaelmas Term 
 
The plot and characterization of Michaelmas Term may be seen to be influenced in 
part by a law-case. Quomodo bears a resemblance to a real-life cozener, broker 
William Howe, convicted on 18 June 1596 in the Court of Star Chamber.1
 
 The 
character’s name is the Latin word for “how,” and Quomodo’s ingenious gulling of 
Easy is comparable to the acts for which Howe and his co-defendant, solicitor Francis 
Easte, were convicted. On the conclusion of the trial, the Lord Treasurer invited 
those yt make the playes to make a Comedie hereof, & to acte it wth these names, & 
gaue good Counsell to there Fathers, yt when they sende there sonnes to th’innes of 
Cowrte to haue one or too superintendents ouer them that maye looke ouer them.2
 
 
Howe and Easte were convicted for “coseninge diuers yonge gentlemen,” and 
procuring them to enter into bonds, statutes, recognizances and confessions of action 
by attorney (which bound them although under age).3 The two drew a bill and an 
answer to it, and wrote two counsellors’ names to these, without their knowledge, and 
these “cosiners” procured money from the “erle Lincolne” for the said gentlemen, and 
a condition with promise of defeasance. For this they were sentenced by the whole 
Court to be imprisoned for a year, and to be on the pillory at Westminster, at Temple 
Gate, and in Cheapside, with papers on their heads, to be whipped all through the city 
in the four terms of the year, and fined each £20 (actually £40 each4
                                                 
1 Richard Levin makes the parallel in his introduction to Michaelmas Term (London: Edward Arnold 
Publishers Ltd., 1967), xii-xiii. 
).  
2 Hawarde, Les Reportes del Cases in Camera Stellata, 1593-1609, 47-8. 
3 Summary of the case adapted from Levin, introduction to Michaelmas Term, xiii. 
4 Ibid., xiii n. 7. 
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 Richard Levin wondered if the passage of some eight to ten years after the 
Lord Treasurer’s 1596 call for dramatists to write a play about Howe and Easte’s 
cozenages meant that Michaelmas Term might not be Middleton’s response to the 
invitation.5
The decision in Slade’s Case (1602) was famous in the early years of the 
seventeenth century.
 In connection with the idea that Quomodo may be in part an allusion to 
Howe, I want to argue that another, far more significant legal decision is capable of 
producing an alternative interpretation of Michaelmas Term, and that the said legal 
landmark may therefore have renewed any interest Middleton may have had in the 
open invitation from the Lord Treasurer to compose a play based on a law-case. 
6
                                                 
5 Ibid., xiii. 
 This was a decision concerning debt recovery, newly binding 
England’s common law courts. It represented something like the beginning of English 
contract law as we know it today. It is possible that this momentous case stimulated a 
complex playwright to compose a more complex play than the simple didactic 
dramatization of the 1596 trial encouraged by the Lord Treasurer. Taking into account 
the new ruling in Slade’s Case, the play’s conclusion is capable of seeming more than 
a swipe at deceitful cozeners. Considering the case’s ruling in relation to the play’s 
conclusion makes it possible to interpret Michaelmas Term as a paradoxical 
examination of how a party which city comedy conventionally treated as the victim of 
a cozening (the privileged young gentleman typified by Easy) might now be regarded 
as the deceitful party in given sets of circumstances relating to a promise made in a 
contract. It could be expected that allowing the possibility of a different interpretation 
based on knowledge of recent legal developments would be an exercise which would 
6 4 Co Rep 91a, Yelverton 21, Moore KB 433, 667. W. J. Jones puts Slade’s Case first in a short list of 
cases “of great fame”: Politics and the Bench, 49-50. 
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appeal to lawyers in the audience. At the same time, Slade’s Case was famous enough 
for educated lay spectators also to reflect on the possibility of the alternative 
interpretation proposed. The possibility of such a reading corresponds with the most 
straightforward lesson of Michaelmas Term – that appearances can be deceptive. It 
offers a solution to Middleton’s strange assurance in the Induction – that a play named 
after the inaugural term of the legal year has nothing much to say about the law: 
 
Why call we this play by such a dear and chargeable title, Michaelmas Term? Know it 
consents happily to our purpose, though perhaps faintly to the interpretation of many, 
for he that expects any great quarrels in law to be handled here will be fondly deceived 
(Ind. 66-71). 
 
 
Gail Kern Paster is happy to accept that Michaelmas Term has not much to say about 
the law, arriving at a conventional conclusion: “In this regard the play deceives just as 
the lawyers and the justice system do.”7
 In order to explain the interpretation proposed I now provide background 
information on Slade’s Case. The main importance of the case was that it provided a 
single form of action at common law – the action of assumpsit – for failure to pay a 
definite sum of money, or a failure to do something else.
 Paster hopefully means that the play says 
things which are ambiguous, capable of more than one interpretation, as lawyers and 
the justice system do. To suggest merely that play, lawyers and legal system are all 
characterized by falsehood would seem too broad and unsatisfying a generalization. 
8
                                                 
7 Paster, ed. Michaelmas Term, 62 n. 71. 
 Assumpsit was formerly an 
action with no apparent connection to the law of contract – it had been an action only 
in tort law, for remedying wrongs or torts (then called trespasses). A case of 
8 Material concerning the law relating to debt and its recovery informed by A. W. B. Simpson, 
introduction to Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 12th ed., by M. P. Furmston 
(London: Butterworths, 1991), 1-16. 
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negligence, say, was actionable by alleging in the Latin pleadings that a defendant 
undertook (assumpsit) to do something, only then to do it badly. There would long 
have been a tortious assumpsit, for example, in the circumstances proposed in a law 
manual from the later seventeenth century: “An Action . . . lies against a Chirurgeon, 
who undertakes to cure a man of a wound, and neglects it, whereby a man grows 
worse, and makes it through his negligence incurable.”9 Had the patient paid for the 
operation, he could only have been certain of being able to pursue an action of 
contractual assumpsit from 1602, for what consolation that might have been. Where 
life was not at stake, though, the evolution of contractual assumpsit really was a 
momentous innovation. Through a complicated history, the common law developed, 
or acquired, in the sixteenth century an action by which, in principle, any undertaking 
could be sued upon; be it, for example, for sale of goods, provision of services, 
conveyance of land, or failure to pay a debt. It was the adoption in contract law of the 
tort remedy of assumpsit that gave contract law a single, general action for breach of 
promise.10
                                                 
9 The Practick Part of the Law Shewing the Office of an Attorney And a Guide for Solicitors (London, 
1681), 115. 
 This is not to say that there existed beforehand no means of pursuing legal 
remedies in contractual matters; only that remedies could not be sought in the central 
common law courts. Applications needed to be made in whichever might be 
appropriate of the bewildering array of county courts, borough courts, market and fair 
courts, Church courts, manorial courts, and so on. The development of this common 
law action for breach of promise generated two problems, though, which would cause 
disagreement between the courts for the remainder of the sixteenth century. One was 
10 The action for breach of promise evolved through a series of cases culminating in 1533; see 
Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 12th ed., 5. 
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the relationship between assumpsit and older forms of contractual remedy. The other 
was how to define which promises were actionable and which were not – how to 
define the scope of promissory liability at law. 
 I shall outline the older forms of contractual remedy as a preliminary to 
looking at the nature of the change made by Slade’s Case, and considering how this 
impacts on events in Michaelmas Term. What were the older remedies? There were 
three main forms of action: the action of covenant, for contracts under seal; penal 
bonds; and an action known as debt sur contract. From the early fourteenth century, 
the action of covenant was the appropriate action for formal agreements, made “under 
seal.” The action of covenant was an action for damages, assessed by a jury, for the 
wrongful breaking of a covenant. A seal made a written contract a formal agreement: 
it was in the early fourteenth century that the term “covenant” came to mean not 
simply “agreement” but “agreement under seal” – the meaning it has to this day. A 
seal might be highly elaborate or a simple blob of wax with a finger-nail imprint. In 
practice, and as legal scholar A. W. B. Simpson puts it, “for reasons which are not 
fully understood,”11
Important agreements were more commonly made using “penal bonds.” Howe 
and Easte’s cozenages – in the Star Chamber source for Quomodo’s gulling of Easy – 
were made using penal bonds. This is apparent because of the mention in the report of 
that technical term: the condition with promise of defeasance. What this meant was 
that the borrowing parties entered into bonds to pay penal sums of money unless they 
carried out their side of a bargain. L would lend B £100, for example, and B would 
contract to pay L £200 (a penal sum) on an agreed date; the bond would include a 
condition that it would become void (the condition of defeasance) if £100 were paid 
 the action of covenant was rarely used. 
                                                 
11 Simpson, introduction to Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 3. 
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before that day, and B would give L this bond as he received the £100 loan.12
Informal or “parol” (oral) agreements for debt claims to a specific sum were 
actionable by a remedy known as debt sur contract. This action focused on the sum or 
the property in a contract, on trying to enforce a defendant simply to pay what he 
owed. There was obviously a big demand for an action like this, but there were 
considerable problems with the law on debt recovery in the early sixteenth century. 
There was, for example, the possibility of a defendant entering a plea in 
“compurgation” or “wager of law.” A defendant could swear on oath that he owed 
nothing, and, providing he brought eleven others to support his oath, and they carried 
the relevant ritual through to conclusion, the action was lost, in the reckoning that 
twelve people would not endanger their souls by perjuring themselves. As might be 
imagined, by the sixteenth century the idea of wager of law had become an out and 
out farce – the threat of the soul’s eternal damnation was no longer enough to prevent 
jobbing oath-swearers casually hiring themselves out at a reasonable rate to support 
the bogus denials of defaulting debtors.
 These 
penal bonds with conditional defeasance were adaptable to cover most transactions – 
Antonio and Shylock’s peculiar agreement in The Merchant of Venice is figured on 
the common penal bond. As is very nearly the case in Shakespeare’s play, though, the 
law could be harsh about penal bonds. If a creditor lost his bond, or the seal came off, 
he lost his remedy; if a debtor paid, but did not have the bond defaced, his liability 
continued. A debtor in default was at his creditor’s mercy: a creditor could have a 
debtor imprisoned indefinitely for default. 
13
                                                 
12 Ibid., 2-3. 
 
13 Baker, “New Light on Slade’s Case, Part II,” 228-230. See also Simpson, introduction to Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 4. 
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 The problems of the law on debt recovery in the fifteenth century inspired 
England’s chancellors to bring in equitable remedies. Cowell defined in his 
Interpreter the role of the law of Equity to be one of “moderating the rigour of other 
courtes, that are more streightly tyed to the leter of the lawe.”14
 The other important innovation in the law of contract in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century was the founding of the doctrine of “consideration.” The doctrine 
of consideration evolved in assumpsit cases in the mid-sixteenth century,
 In the case of debt 
recovery, Equity might be said in the fifteenth century to have instituted a degree of 
rigour where the law was too confused for different jurisdictions to be able to arrive at 
any suitable level of agreement on quite what the law’s letter might be. Equity’s 
interception was probably a partial influence on the common law courts’ initiative to 
amend the flaws in their own system for debt recovery. 
15
 One way in which the importance of the principle in Slade’s Case is 
demonstrated is by its six-year passage through a series of appeals following the 
 and it was 
this that served to define the scope of promissory liability following the recognition of 
new liabilities in contract law. Previously, the hearing of a debt action centred on the 
money or property exchanged; the fundamental difference made by the doctrine of 
consideration was that the motivating reason why a promise had been made became a 
material consideration in an action for debt recovery in informal contracts: that is, the 
reason for the promise became the reason why it should (or should not) be enforced. 
                                                 
14 Cowell, The Interpreter, s.v. “Chancerie (cancellaria).” 
15 The history of consideration remains controversial. The key disagreement is whether consideration 
was purely a home-grown development (perhaps deriving, for but one example, from the doctrine of 
quid pro quo, as found in medieval case law on debt), or ultimately derived from canon and civil law, 
in particular relation to uses of land (the use was the forerunner of the modern trust). See Simpson, 
introduction to Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 1 n. 1, 7 n. 3, 8-9. 
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decision of the court of first instance in 1596 (the Exeter assize court). The particular 
question in the matter was whether an oral agreement, here an agreement to purchase 
grain, implied a promise to pay for it where a promise had not been made expressly. 
After prolonged argument, the ratio in the case was that a bargain constituted a 
binding contract notwithstanding the absence of an express promise. Another 
demonstration of the contemporary importance of the case was the stature of the legal-
minds charged with making the final appeal decision. Coke’s judgment was based on 
the presumption that a party to a contract entered into it knowingly, and he stated that 
a failure to perform the contract constituted deceit.16 Bacon and others argued for the 
respondent that assumpsit required deceit, and failure to perform a contract requiring 
the payment of money did not necessarily imply intention to deceive. Coke disagreed: 
“It is clear that when a man contracts with another to pay money or do anything, and 
does not perform it, this is a deceit.”17
What impact has all of this on Michaelmas Term? After Slade’s Case, it 
becomes possible to see Easy – as much as if not more than Quomodo – as a deceiver 
in the play. In line with literary convention, a roguish merchant citizen (Quomodo) 
gets the upper-hand in dealing with a well-to-do young gentleman (Easy), before the 
“traditional order” is restored at the end of the play. Easy is certainly cajoled into 
 Slade’s Case was a landmark legal precedent 
that had a direct impact on the public at large, in that it changed people’s 
understanding of debt and debt recovery – the focus shifted from property to promise 
in debt matters involving informal contracts. 
                                                 
16 The synopsis of Coke’s and Bacon’s judgments is informed by Nina Levine’s analysis: “Extending 
Credit in the Henry IV Plays,” Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 51, no. 4 (Winter, 2000), 403-431. 
17 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt., ii, 94. See Baker, “New Light on Slade’s Case, Part I,” 62; 
Levine, “Extending Credit in the Henry IV Plays,” 423. 
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being second surety, and Quomodo’s gulling of him is undoubtedly crafty. But the 
dubious morality of the route to entering into legal relations does not automatically 
render void the formal agreement into which both parties enter. In legal terms, 
Quomodo may be interpreted to provide the play’s most important, concrete didactic 
message – not to be frivolous when entering into a legally binding agreement. In the 
agreement executed in the central gulling scene (act II, scene iii), Easy agrees to the 
terms Quomodo proposes, and, after some verbal to-ing and fro-ing, he signs the 
deed. An important ethic concerning legal responsibility is articulated in the play – by 
the character that is supposed to be the conventional rogue, Quomodo: 
 
Mark but this note; I’ll give you good counsel now. As often as you give your name to 
a bond, you must think you christen a child, and take the charge on’t, too; for as the 
one, the bigger it grows, the more cost it requires, so the other, the longer it lies, the 
more charges it puts you to. Only here’s the difference: a child must be broke, and a 
bond must not; the more you break children, the more you keep ’em under, but the 
more you break bonds, the more they’ll leap in your face . . . (III.iv.134-142). 
 
Easy learns (if only for a short while) that there is nothing “mere” about legal 
formality, or, as I explain below, legal evidencing. Easy enters into the agreement 
assuming his role is something like nominal ballast, without obligation – he is too 
infatuated with Shortyard to question the suggestion that “the second man enters [as 
surety] but for custom sake” (II.iii.238). In contemporary England, he would be 
wrong (in legal London, more obviously wrong), and it may be only the peculiar rules 
of the forum in this play’s final scene, dictated by literary convention, that could see 
him emerge triumphant. 
 One thing which can be taken to support the idea that Middleton is quietly 
setting up an ironic ending to Michaelmas Term (in favour of Quomodo) is that it is 
difficult to find sympathy for Easy at any point in the play. As Levin says: 
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. . . we are never wholly convinced that we should rejoice in the defeat of those whose 
cleverness has been the principal source of our pleasure, or in the victory of one of the 
weakest and least interesting characters in the play.18
 
 
Easy has none of the wit and charm of the young gallants to be found in other city 
comedies. His infatuation with absent bedfellow Blastfield/Shortyard makes him at 
times an uncommonly over-sentimental figure in the genre: “Methinks I have no 
being without his company; ’tis so full of kindness and delight, I hold him to be the 
only companion in earth” (III.ii.6-8). For audiences with a taste for sharp satire, this 
level of mawkishness could have seemed a deliberate invitation to scorn the character. 
Certainly, the play’s minor legal-figure has no patience with him. When Easy asks 
Dustbox how he likes his Roman style of handwriting, the scrivener’s response 
shows, light-heartededly or not, contempt for an indulgent, over-privileged young 
man: “Exceeding well, sir, but that you rest too much upon your R’s, and make your 
E’s too little” (II.iii.347-8). 
 When it comes to making the agreement, Easy signs the document aware of 
the possibility of forfeiture, and the bond in this drama concerns land, not flesh – 
properly alienable real property. In The Merchant of Venice, execution based on strict 
construction of the bond promises the egregious incident of Antonio’s gory death; 
Michaelmas Term is different. Easy is the casual – the too-casual – signatory to a 
formally sound agreement. He takes on a risk in which breach threatens something 
undesirable to him (as contracts normally do), but nothing extraordinary or 
inequitable. Easy signs the bond, but no mention is made, in an otherwise fairly 
detailed scene, of the document being sealed (II.iii.297-353). Quomodo has gone to 
                                                 
18 Levin, ed. Michaelmas Term, xix 
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the trouble of getting in a scrivener19 to attend to formality, but is this a formal 
agreement? No. The bond should be presumed to be an informal agreement, because 
there is not a mention even of a blob of wax and a finger-nail. Is Dustbox, whose 
name defines him as the ink-blotting scrivener,20
I suggested earlier that Slade’s Case may have jogged Middleton’s memory 
about the Lord Treasurer’s invitation to compose a play based on the matter of Howe 
and Easte. I shall explain the possible connection. With Howe and Easte, we are 
looking at criminal acts. Cowell says in his Interpreter that “Cosening, is an offence 
 therefore remiss in his duties? No. 
There is a quiet formality, and an appealing, understated acerbity to Dustbox that 
gives an impression that he would do exactly what was necessary for his client, 
Quomodo. And, following the decision in Slade’s Case, he does: it is immaterial that 
this is not a contract under seal. Quomodo has an informal agreement, and the 
document signed by hand is, even without a seal, evidence still of Easy’s promise in 
the agreement, which is now actionable using assumpsit in the common law courts. 
                                                 
19 Dustbox presents the deed in II.iii. The main work of scriveners was the drafting of contracts and 
conveyances. The deed-drafting work of scriveners led some of them into money-lending, but, while 
drafting documents was not invariably a legal role, at least ten men admitted to the Scriveners’ 
Company of London between 1550 and 1640 practised at the same time as attorneys: Bodleian Library, 
Rawlinson MS D.51/24-29; cited in Brooks, “The Common Lawyers in England,” 49-50, 62 n. 36. An 
early modern scrivener’s practice is outlined in A. E. B. Owen, “A Scrivener’s Notebook from Bury St 
Edmund’s,” Archives, vol. 14 (1979), 16-22; see also Baker, “The English Legal Profession, 1450-
1550,” 27, 38 n. 46. On the matter of legal practitioners lending money, Dampit in A Trick to Catch the 
Old One (1605-6) is ostensibly a lawyer, but he is more prominently a usurer in the play. Dampit refers 
to Barnard’s Inn (III.iv.59), an Inn of Chancery, so the representation of Dampit in the undesirable role 
of money-lender would have suited the purpose of the Inns of Court men fashioning their role as 
specialist professionals; see “The New Profession” in Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 162-5. 
20 Scriveners would carry a “dustbox” containing sand for the purpose of blotting ink. 
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unnamed, whereby any thing is done guilefully in or out of contracts which cannot be 
fitly termed by any speciall name.”21
By way of contrast, in Michaelmas Term, Quomodo’s actions leading up to the 
making of the agreement, though morally questionable, do not strictly appear, at any 
material time, to be criminally dishonest. He even gives Easy good counsel about not 
breaking bonds. If Quomodo is crafty, it is Easy who shirks legal responsibility. 
Easy’s denial of liability – “You tell me of that still which is no fault of mine, Master 
Quomodo” (III.iv.131-2) – should have provoked technical objections from the Inns 
of Court men in the audience, for its denial of a new understanding of the promise in 
an agreement. Quomodo’s response to Easy’s protest turns on him the matter of 
dishonesty, of deceit, in fact – there is more than dramatic irony of characterization 
when Quomodo enquires blithely “what’s a man but his honesty, Master Easy?” 
(III.iv.133). Breaking one’s word is “a fault amongst most of us all” (134), Quomodo 
continues, and Easy’s light treatment of his responsibility conflicts with the increased 
 Cowell’s concept of anything in or out of a 
contract without a special name seems today an imponderably broad semantic catch-
all. In relation to Howe’s and Easte’s convictions, the material issue is not the class-
based one whereby “diuers yonge gentlemen” are gulled by their social inferiors (as is 
often the case in literary convention where city comedy is concerned); what seems 
clear in the case of Howe and Easte is that dishonest intentions coincided with 
culpable procedural irregularities. There were fraudulent representations made in 
connection with the young gentlemen’s ages, and there was the attendant forgery of 
the counsellors’ names. These two real miscreants had criminal minds as they 
performed their criminal acts – this was inventive theft by clever people (if not so 
clever that they could escape being caught). 
                                                 
21 Cowell, The Interpreter, s.v. “cozening.” 
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sense of responsibility newly expected of, or at least ascribed in case of default, to 
borrowers, or, in Easy’s case, borrowers’ sureties. 
The jurisdiction of the hearing in the play’s final scene is not clear. Alexander 
Dyce, editor of the nineteenth century edition of Middleton’s works, decided the 
play’s final scene took place in the Judge’s house.22
In the final scene, the Judge has a firm presumption against the plaintiff, 
Quomodo. Easy’s insistence that the lands are his again – “the lands know the right 
heir; / I am their master once more” (V.iii.76-7) – rests on acceptance of a sequence of 
events that should be regarded as legally valid only in the event of Quomodo’s actual 
 This would be a questionable 
start to the validity of the proceedings. The judge expresses surprise that Quomodo is 
the plaintiff in what should be a contractual matter (V.iii.1), preferring the idea of 
trying him criminally as a cozener (l.20). But Quomodo should be the plaintiff in a 
contractual matter – in a common law action of assumpsit, following Easy’s 
complacent insistence that default on his responsibility as surety is “no fault of mine.” 
The change in Quomodo’s character in this scene (from being all the way through a 
sharp-witted, voluble opportunist, he becomes suddenly and strangely passive) may 
well be meant to imply a discrepancy between the artificiality of literary convention, 
with city comedy’s restoring of the traditional order, and law-structured reality – 
where vigilance is needed when entering into contracts, since sharp-witted 
opportunists do not care about tradition and convention, but they do care about default 
on promises and the attendant possibilities within the law in actions of assumpsit. 
                                                 
22 See Levin, ed., Michaelmas Term, 120. 
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death. Like Volpone,23 Quomodo fakes his death in the play, in order to see what the 
after-effects of his life will be. His wife’s and son’s lack of affection apart, no sooner 
is Quomodo’s son, Sim, taken to inherit the lands than Shortyard cozens him out of 
his apparent hereditament,24 and, as the play nears its end, sharp dealer Shortyard is 
mystifyingly humbled into surrendering the lands (at this stage, the invalidly acquired 
subject of an inheritance void ab initio25
Easy’s apparent acceptance of the lands from Shortyard in V.i infers, in fact, 
that Easy accepts (rightly) that the lands were validly forfeited to Quomodo. It 
demonstrates furthermore that Easy is prepared to have the lands returned on the basis 
of what would be (had Sim’s purported hereditary entitlement been valid) ill-gotten 
gain. On this reading, Easy can be viewed as a crook. And if Quomodo’s name can be 
read as a Latinized “Howe,” so is Easy’s name capable of seeming in part an allusion 
to “Easte.” The interest in the lands should remain Quomodo’s, and Quomodo is 
understandably surprised in the final scene to hear Easy declare to the Judge that the 
interest in the lands he forfeited by bond are his again. “Have you the lands?” 
Quomodo jumps to ask Easy (V.iii.77); Quomodo’s follow-up question – “Is this 
) to Easy. But Quomodo lives. The faked 
death amounts to nothing more than an elaborate practical joke, and the consequent 
sequence of transfer of the lands should be regarded as void. 
                                                 
23 It is not known which came first of Jonson’s more famous Volpone, with its similar faked death and 
final judgment scenes, and Middleton’s Michaelmas Term. It is known only that the two plays appeared 
contemporaneously. 
24 In law, a right that is heritable; that is, a right capable of passing by way of descent to heirs. 
25 In law, a transfer may be judged void from the beginning. Jonson uses the term in the Prologue to 
Every Man Out of His Humour, where Cordatus and Mitis discuss the laws of comedy: “If those lawes 
you speake of, had beene deliuered vs, ab initio, and in their present vertue and perfection, there had 
beene some reason of obeying their powers” (252-3). 
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good dealing?” – appears to be addressed at once to Easy, the Judge, and the audience 
(l.78). It should have been delivered in imploring fashion – it is reminiscent of a real-
life courtroom utterance. The judge at first instance in the matter that would be finally 
reported as Slade’s Case might have earned Quomodo’s incredulity, as well. In the 
1596 ruling that would be soundly overruled on appeal, Mr Justice Walmsley called it 
“plain dealing” for a man not to pay if he had no money.26
Quomodo’s scheme in the play is opportunistic, but, as the name suggests, 
Easy is an opportunity waiting to be had. Easy entered knowingly into the bond as 
surety for a loan; as it happened, the other signatory was an imposter – Shortyard 
played Blastfield. But a bargain was formulated, and despite Quomodo’s knowledge 
(his supervision even) of Shortyard’s imposture, to enter into an agreement brings 
with it a responsibility to honour the agreement, and several liability in the event of 
default is the principal rationale for involving a surety. Certainly, Quomodo only 
feigns disappointment that Easy does not perform the contract – it is all part of the 
plan. But what purpose would it serve to have a guarantor to a bond if he was not to 
take his liability seriously? The law on debt recovery before the 1602 decision in 
Slade’s Case seemed unduly to favour defendants: the availability of wager of law 
made it easy for them to escape debt liability by perjuring themselves, and finding 
eleven more people prepared to risk the spiritual consequences for a fee. The law on 
debt recovery after Slade’s Case came to be seen by some conversely to make it too 
easy for plaintiffs, who could bring assumpsit actions on parol agreements 
insufficiently proved – the law, always evolving, would acknowledge the criticism 
 
                                                 
26 Baker, “New Light on Slade’s Case, Part II,” 220; see also Levine, “Extending Credit in the Henry 
IV Plays,” 423. 
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and eventually legislate for it.27
The arguably happy ending to Michaelmas Term, in which unsympathetic 
character Easy has his lands restored to him, is capable of interpretation as an 
invitation to question why Easy should succeed – both in a literary sense, as Levin 
suggests, and in a legal sense, following Slade’s Case. Generic convention may 
demand that the traditional order be restored, but after Slade’s Case even a privileged 
litigant could not be given invariably to expect success by crying “unfair” when the 
law pointed to a loss on his part as a result of his failure to take sufficiently seriously 
his role as party to a debt agreement. What I suggest here is that Michaelmas Term 
ends on a note of high irony, being left open to interpretation as a complex treatment 
of complacent presumptions about the interface of law and social privilege. The 
surface vigour of the play is brought to an abrupt halt in the final scene, where the 
hitherto appealing and vital Quomodo becomes suddenly passive, while the 
previously ineffectual Easy is transformed into a harder, sharp-witted individual. The 
possibly intended purpose of highlighting the difference between artificial literary 
convention and law-based reality may be to demonstrate the lack of credibility in the 
expectation that social superiority alone would continue automatically to win favour 
 In any event, the great importance of Slade’s Case 
was the increased sense of personal responsibility it placed on parties entering into an 
agreement – irrespective of social rank or occupation. 
                                                 
27 See Simpson’s commentary on the Statute of Frauds (1677) in the introduction to Cheshire, Fifoot 
and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 10. Daniel Klerman recently asserted that the common law had a pro-
Plaintiff bias, while acknowledging (a) that the existence of the bias was controversial, and required 
substantiations, and (b) that counter-examples of something more like a pro-Defendant bias exist, such 
as defences in defamation law: “Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law: An 
Hypothesis,” in Boundaries of the Law: Geography, Gender and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Musson (Ashgate: Ashgate, 2005), 149, 163. 
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at law, irrespective of an individual dispute’s merit. The literary genre of city comedy 
would have been a suitable medium for making such a point, since genre is, like 
social classification, all about great expectations. Part of the “how(e)” of Quomodo is 
how he could lose in the end, when Slade’s Case had in the last few years changed the 
law on the promise in what should have been his favour. Playgoers expecting a great 
quarrel in the law in Michaelmas Term should not have gone away disappointed. 
 
7.2 The Induction to Michaelmas Term 
 
The Induction to Michaelmas Term looks like an obvious example of anti-lawyer 
sentiment. The formidable Michaelmas walks on stage and removes a whitish cloak 
before slipping into the black gown of a lawyer. He explains to the audience as much 
as to his lagging boy assistant the symbolic substitution of black for white: 
 
Lay by my conscience, 
Give me my gown, that weed is for the country; 
We must be civil now, and match our evil; 
Who first made civil black, he pleas’d the devil. 
So, now know I where I am . . . (Ind. 5). 
 
Michaelmas seems the embodiment of corruption in the law as he continues: “From 
wronger and from wronged I have fee” (Ind. 8). Paster affirms the conventional view 
that the Induction is a “sharp satire against the law as a mercenary system run for its 
own benefit.”28
                                                 
28 Paster, ed., Michaelmas Term, 57. 
 The original audience at Paul’s would not have seen the written text 
before witnessing the play, so it is easy to go along with the idea that playgoers must 
at first have taken this to be the case. But only at line 35, where another of the 
personified Terms hails Michaelmas as “father of the Terms,” do Michaelmas’s and 
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the other Terms’ identities begin to become apparent.29 It makes a difference that the 
speaker of the Induction is not a lawyer, as the figure first appears, but a personified 
period of time, and a period of time associated with a particular space: “now know I 
where I am.” It is easy to overlook the unreal, fantastical character of the Induction, 
with the inaugural law-term given dramatic representation as corporeal, city-bound 
lawyer. With knowledge of the Induction’s characters’ immateriality should come 
recognition that the Induction is an insubstantial pageant, and that all stuff about 
devilish black fabric is baseless. Michaelmas is made to look like the stereotypical 
figure of an ambidexter lawyer, profiting from both sides.30
Editors favour the construction of Michaelmas’s use of the word “civil” as 
“citified,”
 But the law-term does 
have fee “from wronger and from wronged” because both parties must come cash-in-
hand to the city when Michaelmas is there (or when there it is Michaelmas) for the 
purpose of settling their disputes. 
31
                                                 
29 Though Michaelmas is regarded by his three subordinates as “father of the Terms” (Induction 35), he 
has already declared himself childless (Induction 19). 
 and not simply because he is “new come up out of the country” (Ind. 0.1). 
It is the city, not the lawyer or the lawyer’s gown, that has come to signify evil: 
London is given later in the play the vivid description of “man-devouring city” 
(II.ii.21). This notion may be presumed to be in part a reflection of increasingly 
overwhelming, increasingly impersonal, commercial urban expansion. So, in this 
30 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “ambidexter”: the earliest sense in English is that in law, for 
one who takes bribes from both sides; examples date back to 1532: Use of Dice Play. 
31 Levin, ed., Michaelmas Term, 3 n. 3. 
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connection, the change into the black cloak may be taken to represent the city of 
London in at least as negative a light as its lawyers.32
The inclusion of a dumb-show is a telling indication of the attitude set up by 
the Induction. The example in the play mimes the career of Andrew Lethe, and 
Michaelmas’s immediate enquiry on the character’s exit – “What subtlety have we 
here?” (Ind. 30) – is ironic for its description of the dumb-show as a subtle device. At 
the time Michaelmas Term was first performed, the dumb-show miming an aspect of a 
play’s story was used by “some of the more acid playwrights” for the reason that it 
had become laughably archaic.
 
33
Might there be further significance in the matter of the black gown? A small 
number of common lawyers did not wear black. The most prestigious branch of the 
early modern legal profession was that of the serjeants-at-law – the exclusive 
practitioners of Westminster’s principal common law court, the Court of Common 
Pleas. The serjeants-at-law were distinguishable by their colourful monkish habits and 
 We cannot know whether a boy actor would have 
delivered Michaelmas’s enquiry comically askance, but the dumb-show represented, 
as the playwright knew, the opposite of subtlety for fashionable theatre-goers, 
irrespective of its function in the text. So, the dumb-show is out of vogue in 1606 (the 
year in which the play was first performed), and this “acid” playwright’s purposeful 
use of an over-obvious dramatic device amounts to an invitation to the dramatic 
connoisseurs in the audience to look beneath the surface for alternative meaning, such 
as that described above in relation to the negative representation of the city. 
                                                 
32 Lawyers became increasingly associated with London in sixteenth century satire: Gieskes, 
Representing the Professions: Administration, Law, and Theater in Early Modern England, 139. 
33 Dumb-shows became fashionable again for some years after Pericles in 1607: Gurr, The 
Shakespearean Stage, 1574-1642, 234. Michaelmas Term was produced a year before Pericles. 
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white linen coifs.34 In Slade’s Case, the serjeants-at-law lost the argument to the 
black-wearing lawyers in the Court of King’s Bench; so, if the playwright of 
Michaelmas Term intended to leave the play open to the interpretation proposed in the 
previous section, Michaelmas’s pointed change into a black gown at the front of the 
play can be taken as support for the more numerous (and theatre-going) black-wearing 
lawyers against the white coifed serjeants-at-law. Among young lawyers themselves, 
while there were doubtless many who wore their black robes and gowns with pride, 
there seems to have been some resistance to this in the Inns of Court, where, even 
away from the city’s courtrooms, full court dress was required to be worn. 
Disciplinary procedures were taken against those who “presumed to come into Hall in 
coats or cloakes and not in gownes,” with one barrister reported as wearing a scarlet 
coat; such infractions were punished by periods of suspension.35
                                                 
34 Baker, “The English Legal Profession, 1450-1550,” 18-19. Cowell, The Interpreter, s.v. “Sergeant”: 
“[a word] diversly used in our law . . . Sergeant at lawe [is the] highest degree taken in that profession 
[the common law], as a Doctor is in the civill lawe.” Prest says the rise of the barristers paralleled the 
decline and foreshadowed the eventual extinction of the serjeants: “The English Bar, 1550-1700,” 72. 
 There is, 
incidentally, another allusion to lawyers’ gowns in Michaelmas Term besides the one 
in the Induction. Quomodo explains in a joke that making his son Sim a lawyer will 
be good for his drapers’ trade, because it “increaseth the number of cloth gowns” 
(II.iii.418-420). At the time Michaelmas Term was produced, and for some eighty 
years after, it was only students, not qualified lawyers, who wore the plain, sleeveless 
black cloth gown, with a round, black cloth cap. Different ranks could be 
distinguished by their apparel. Barristers wore uncomfortable, long, black grogram (a 
mixture of silk, mohair and wool) robes with two velvet welts on long, hanging 
35 The Records of the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, 1422-1914. The Black Books, ii, 319, 324; 
see Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 265. 
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sleeves; the high-ranking benchers wore knee-length gowns tufted with silk and 
velvet.36 Not until 1685 did barristers adopt as their professional dress the lightweight 
black cloth gown, following its introduction as mourning for the death of Charles II.37
 In connection with Michaelmas Term’s replacement of a white gown by a 
black one, the colour white does not always have good associations in the play. 
Quomodo’s wife, Thomasine, does not like her prospective son-in-law Lethe, and 
Middleton borrows from The White Devil in having Thomasine observe of him: “how 
does he [Lethe] appear to me when his white satin suit’s on, but like a maggot crept 
out of a nutshell” (II.iii.12-13).
 
38
Lethe’s exchanges with the Judge as his fate is decided in the final judgment 
scene provide another sign of Middleton’s readiness to play around with literary 
convention, as I suggest he does in relation to the apparent anti-lawyer sentiment in 
the Induction, and in the play’s conclusion, which I proposed in the previous section 
was conspicuously at odds with the notable new law on the promise. There are made 
 Lethe is again given a bad-white association in an 
allusion by the gallant Rearage, Lethe’s rival for Quomodo’s daughter Susan, to the 
custom of doing public penance; as far as Rearage is concerned, Lethe’s “name stands 
in a white sheet . . . and does penance for him” (III.v.3-4). 
                                                 
36 William Dugdale, Origines Juridicales (London, 1663), 278; cited in Prest, The Inns of Court, 48. 
See also William N. Hargreaves-Mawdsley, A History of Legal Dress in Europe until the end of the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 92-4; J. H. Baker, “The Origin of the Bar Gown,” 
Law Guardian, 49 (June, 1969), 17-18. 
37 J. H. Baker, “History of the Gowns Worn at the English Bar,” Costume, Vol. 9 (1975), 15-21; Prest, 
“The English Bar, 1550-1700,” 81, 85 n. 58. 
38 The Machiavellian Flamineo says of Camillo: “when he wears white satin, one would take him by 
his black muzzle to be no other creature than a maggot” (I.ii.142-4): The White Devil, in Three 
Jacobean Tragedies, ed. Gāmini Salgādo (London: Penguin, 1987), 150. 
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to seem not many worse fates in city comedy than marriage to courtesan, whore, punk 
or prostitute. Subtle, in The Alchemist, for example, splutters: “Marry a whore! Fate, 
let me wed a witch first” (IV.i.90). In Michaelmas Term, ordered by way of 
punishment to marry Country Wench, Lethe responds at first conventionally: “Oh, 
intolerable!” (V.iii.109). Shortly after, his attitude in an aside is more pragmatic: 
“Marry a harlot, why not?” (V.iii.122) 
 The theme of deceptive appearance pervades the play in connection with both 
language and apparel. Midway through the play, Lethe’s pander Hellgill poses a series 
of questions clearly intended as rhetorical forms of truth by the character (as Polonius 
assumes the truth in Hamlet [I.iii.72] of his proverb about apparel oft proclaiming the 
man): “What base birth does not raiment make glorious? And what glorious births do 
not rags make infamous?” (III.i.1-3). Hellgill’s rhetoric is itself deceptive – the 
character means it, but the playwright is being ironic. Like Lethe, who tries to bury 
the past by means of fancy name and fancy clothes, Country Wench comes to the city 
in order to be a gentlewoman, an ambition she believes she achieves by dressing 
impressively while becoming a prostitute. Hellgill’s rhetoric invites an audience’s 
derision, therefore, in view of Lethe’s and Country Wench’s failure to match the 
stereotypical or popularly connotative character of their apparel. Michaelmas Term’s 
immediate, obvious switch from white to black law-gown may consequently be seen 
to become still more questionable in retrospect, as it becomes apparent that Middleton 
plays consistently against stereotypical connotations of apparel. 
 I referred in the first section to the claim made in the Induction that 
Michaelmas Term contains no real legal matter, a claim I suggested to be 
mischievously deceptive. The disingenuous disclaimer was common enough to be 
considered a convention in city comedy. For example, the dedicatory epistle to 
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Marston’s The Malcontent has something to say in connection with the writer’s 
reputation for satire: 
 
(I heartily protest) it was my care to write so far from reasonable offence, that even 
strangers, in whose state I laid my scene, should not from thence draw any disgrace to 
any, dead or living (Ded. 9-13). 
 
Marston reiterates his protest a few lines later (l.20), giving the unavoidable 
impression that he is protesting too much his innocence of personal and topical 
allusion. It is the case that there is no prominent legal-figure in Michaelmas Term. 
The first mentioned, Master Difficult the lawyer, is not even actually in the play – so 
busy was he in term time, he had to wait for the recent vacation to die (I.i.28-30). The 
lack of a prominent legal-figure could lead the audience member or reader into 
reading nothing extra into the Induction’s seemingly earnest suggestion that the play 
“only presents those familiar accidents which happen’d in town in the circumference 
of those six weeks whereof Michaelmas Term is lord” (Ind. 71-3). But there is a 
wake-up call tagged on to the Induction: “Sat sapienti;39 I hope there’s no fools 
i’th’house” (Ind. 73-4). Swapan Chakravorty sees the Inns of Court men in the 
audience as being committed to smart laughter by this line.40
                                                 
39 Shortened form of a proverbial expression contained in Plautus’s Persa (l.729) and Terence’s 
Phormio (l.541): dictum sapienti sat est – “a word to the wise is sufficient”: Levin, ed., Michaelmas 
Term, by Thomas Middleton, 6 n. 73. 
 Chakravorty finds a 
connection between the line and Quomodo’s show of bravado at the end of the gulling 
scene, suggesting that the Inns men’s desire to participate in clever amusement is 
betrayed into uneasy complicity in laughing at the draper’s invitation to “Admire me, 
all you students at Inns of Cozenage” (II.iii.441-2). But it may be a mistake to see the 
use of the word “cozenage” as always necessarily implying a pejorative. Attitudes to 
40 Society and Politics in the Plays of Thomas Middleton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 52. 
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cozenage can be matched in this respect with contemporary attitudes to casuistry, the 
method of reasoning that evolved from early medieval Christian theology. Casuistry 
came in the early modern period to be seen by some as a devious misuse of a 
philosophical art, a superior talent put to malicious ends.41 There is a similarity in 
ideas about the powers of poetry to seduce minds, as answered by Sidney and 
Jonson.42 The ambiguous relation of playwright and audience in Michaelmas Term is 
established early on, when Middleton has Michaelmas say in the Induction that “the 
interpretation of many” may well be the result of their having been “fondly deceived” 
(Ind. 69, 71). Levin remarks on the adverb, favouring a construction that attaches to 
the audience member, who is foolishly deceived.43 But the O.E.D. gives examples of 
“fondly” meaning “affectionately, lovingly, tenderly” dating back to 1593,44
                                                 
41 Casuistry’s final fall into disrepute is commonly attributed in substantial part to Pascal. Pascal 
published his Provincial Letter in 1656. Writing on behalf of the Catholic Jansenists, his polemic 
caricatured their political enemies, the Jesuit casuists, as “ingenious defenders of moral laxity, capable 
of justifying virtually any outrage by way of shrewd moral manoeuvring.” Carl Elliott, “Solving the 
doctor’s dilemma?” New Scientist, 11 January 1992, 42. On the history of casuistry and its revival in 
medical ethics in the late 1980s: Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A 
History of Moral Reasoning (London: University of California Press, 1989). In connection with 
humanist education’s renewed interest in rhetoric, ancient eloquence was contrasted to the language of 
the law, and simultaneously proposed as a means of improving its verbal form: Kahn and Hutson, 
Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe, 1. 
 so the 
42 Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, or the Defence of Poesy (supra, 163 n. 51); Jonson, Timber (supra, 
39 n. 116). 
43 Levin, ed., Michaelmas Term, 6 n. 71. 
44 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “fondly,” definition 3. The 1593 example is Shakespeare’s 
Richard II (III.ii.9): “As a long-parted mother with her child / Plays fondly with her tears, and smiles in 
meeting, / So, weeping, smiling, greet I thee my earth, / And do thee favours with my royal hands.” 
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adverb may attach equally to the playwright, who affectionately and light-heartedly 
deceives only at the beginning of the play with the claim that he has nothing special to 
say about the law. Whether or not the playwright intended as much, the potential there 
existed in the text for making an alternative, law-based interpretation of the play’s 
conclusion could bring any who recognized it – as members of the Inns of Court 
could have been expected to – to relate to the writer as, again, “mutually constituting 
members of a self-identifying community.”45
                                                 
45 See supra, 42. 
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Chapter eight 
Conclusion 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
One extraordinary aspect of city comedy is its association with lawyers. More perhaps 
than any other literary genre these are texts with a strong connection in terms of 
allusion and audience to the legal profession. For this reason, it is surprising that a 
full-length study of lawyers in city comedy has not been made before. If there is a 
reason for the absence of a study before now, it is perhaps that city comedy’s 
participation in a tradition of anti-lawyer sentiment has been taken largely at face 
value. This thesis aims to open up the topic, and to demonstrate that city comedy’s 
treatment of lawyers and the law is more complex than has been assumed. 
 I divide this conclusion into four parts: contribution, significance, limitations, 
and suggestions for further work. 
 
 
8.1 Contribution 
 
Four main contributions to knowledge are proposed. 
The first is that Inns of Court lawyers were a favoured part of the target 
audience of the private playhouses, making it questionable that they would be 
represented negatively in city comedy. 
The second is that lawyers as represented in city comedy are not a single or a 
simple category. I provide examples of instances in the plays where negative allusions 
are to be taken as read, for the reason that such allusions amount to negative 
fashioning of contemporary legal practitioners to whom the members of the Inns of 
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Court had some antipathy; for example, common law attorneys, civil lawyers, and 
amateur, quasi-lawyers. I argue that the purpose of negative representation of other 
practitioners was to valorize the barristers of the Inns of Court; conventional 
interpretations are thus sometimes questionable by reason of their over-generalization 
of the word “lawyer.” 
The third is that representation of lawyers is inflected by the various forms and 
impulses of city comedy. Some apparently negative allusions to lawyers are not to be 
taken as read since they are examples of different kinds of literary strategy – be it, for 
example, irony, purposeful depiction of foolish characters, or a broader connection to 
antecedents, such as the notion suggested of deliberate failure influenced by Juvenal.1
The fourth is that city comedy incorporates some reflection of the increasing 
professionalization of legal practice in the period. It is possible to find in city comedy 
representations of changes made in the first decade of the seventeenth century relating 
to legal education and the requirements for membership of the Inns of Court. 
 
 
8.2 Significance 
 
I begin this section with two paragraphs on the general significance of the thesis; I 
proceed to look at the specific significance of each chapter. 
 The thesis presents an alternative interpretation to the conventional analysis of 
the genre’s representation of lawyers, which has remained unchallenged since Brian 
Gibbons articulated it in his landmark study of the genre.2
                                                 
1 Supra, 50-3; in particular, the Juvenal reference, 52 n. 155. 
 It has been recognized that 
this conventional analysis results in a paradox: that city comedy should be hostile to 
2 Supra, 1 n. 2. 
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the legal profession when the plays were written for performance before Inns of Court 
men.3
I wrote in the introduction of how Geoffrey Vos’s speech at the Bar’s annual 
conference for 2007 made national news for calling for lawyers to be recognized in a 
positive light.
 A key part of the significance of the thesis is that it endeavours to solve this 
problem. More broadly, the thesis highlights the significance of the role that city 
comedy played in representing important contemporary distinctions lawyers made, 
and were beginning to make, about themselves in relation to other legal practitioners. 
4 Vos is reported in the Bar’s press release as taking a colloquial line in 
identifying what he sees as the current negative presumption about barristers: “They 
are”, he says, “in no sense fat cats.”5
                                                 
3 Supra, 31-2. 
 The negative as Vos expresses it, and as he feels 
inclined to rebut it, says something interesting about a distinctly and perennially 
British habit of deprecating success, prestige, and power. This is, at the same time, the 
inverse of a back-handed compliment: the reason Vos’s speech made national news 
has probably to do with the fact that there is something a bit rich in his calling for 
sympathy for lawyers for their being notionally characterized to any extent as 
successful and prestigious “fat cats.” The relevance of city comedy in this connection 
is that the affirmative I argue for in this thesis sees the genre making a significant 
contribution to a contemporary drive to increased organization and regulation of the 
common law professional, bringing increased success and prestige to the profession of 
the Inns of Court lawyer. City comedy might be said, that is, to play on the implicitly 
valorizing back-handed insult in which the common law court pleader becomes 
4 Supra, 5. 
5 “Bar Chairman Champions Barristers’ Public Service Role, 3 November 2007” from the Bar 
Council’s website. 
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prototypical successful and prestigious fat cat. Vos’s mission for today is, 
incidentally, in one way doomed to failure – doctors and nurses cure ills that cannot 
be helped; the ills and problems lawyers “cure” habitually reflect their clients’ own 
worst instincts: anger, revenge, covetousness, intolerable behaviour to a spouse. 
 I have attempted to show how the playwrights of city comedy were 
contributing subtly to the positive fashioning of what J. H. Baker calls the New 
Profession.6 Theodore B. Leinwand’s analysis of city comedy can seem capable of 
being adapted to explain the paradox that the genre is hostile to a significant part of its 
audience in his suggestion that city comedy invited its audience to laugh at attitudes 
which were already stale and inadequate.7
The thesis acknowledges that negative representations of legal-figures are 
sometimes unambiguously negative. But close examination shows that such 
representations tend to be directed not at Inns of Court lawyers, but at other workers 
in the legal system – amateur, quasi-lawyers such as Throte in Ram Alley, or civil 
 But where lawyers and Inns students were 
concerned, in particular, the joke proposed in that analysis would have worn thin with 
repetition in the plays – certainly, if nothing else was going on in terms of how 
lawyers and law were represented. I contend that other legal business was going on. If 
the playwrights of city comedy were in part, as Leinwand proposes, critiquing an 
existing element of culture by rendering negative stereotypes stale by exaggeration 
and parody, I have attempted to show that they were doing something more complex, 
at least where representations of lawyers were concerned. They did this by alluding 
directly and indirectly to things such as landmark legal decisions, legal doctrines and 
debates. 
                                                 
6 Supra, 114. 
7 Supra, 57-8. 
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lawyers such as Voltore nominally is in Volpone. Where negative opinion is directed 
at the Inns of Court, there is literary strategy at work. The speaker might be, for 
example, an obviously foolish character, whose provocative opinion about a 
significant element of the audience is included for something like pantomimic effect, 
as with Tucca in Poetaster. 
 I arrived at a number of subordinate, interim conclusions in the preceding 
chapters. I want to draw these subordinate conclusions together to the end of showing 
how they support the fundamental thesis: that lawyers and law are represented 
positively in Jacobean city comedy. 
 Jonson’s Poetaster may be seen to turn on its head the literary convention of 
anti-lawyer sentiment: it refutes perceived negatives, and pleads positives. The 
playwright defends the form of satire in the play against accusations of defamation by 
arguing that, contrary to being a malicious form, conscientious satire performs a 
service useful to the state. The playwright’s compelling general defence is consistent 
with the idea of positive representation of lawyers in three ways. Firstly, viewing 
Jonson’s particular denial of having “tax’d / The Law, and Lawyers . . . / By their 
particular names” (68-70) in the context of his general denial of defamation, his 
counter-argument of performing a useful service implies not a passively neutral but an 
actively positive representation of the law and lawyers. This points to the second way 
in which Jonson represents lawyers positively: he makes a great lawyer of history, 
Trebatius, a character in the play; moreover, he uses the lawyer-figure to emphasize 
the poet Horace’s rectitude. The third point on positive representation in Poetaster 
relates to the law. Matthew Greenfield’s recent argument relates to the play’s subtitle 
(and original main title): Jonson, he says, has a legal “genre” of arraignment displace 
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the conventions of verse satire.8 Greenfield’s proposition corresponds with the 
fundamental idea of this thesis in so far as it represents an example of literature’s 
affirmation of legal method by adoption of the law’s formal aspects – and its 
doctrines, with the concept of mitior sensus in mind, encouraging mild construction. 
But Jonson does not, I suggest, “displace” the conventions of verse satire – this may 
seem the last thing he would have wanted to do. Rather, he signals a reciprocal – that 
is, a positive – interest and engagement between poet-playwright and lawyer: 
vocations seen before and after this time as, in effect, mutually exclusive.9 I provide a 
notable example of this reciprocal interest by arguing that Jonson is to be credited 
with the early drawing of a distinction between slander and libel in the 1601 play, 
such distinction being normally said to be post-Restoration.10
 The title of The Phoenix gives an indication from the start of a sense of new 
things rising from old. Middleton represents the tangled old legal system in old quasi-
lawyer Tangle, but the debate between Tangle and old Justice Falso about a new 
method of physical fighting may be interpreted as a metaphor for a self-conscious 
drive for increased professionalism in the Inns of Court. That the notion of supposed 
anti-lawyer sentiment in city comedy ought not to be regarded as specific hostility is 
shown by the fact that all professions are alluded to pejoratively in The Phoenix: the 
law is only one of them. Young prince Phoenix suspects “infectious dealings in most 
offices, and foul mysteries throughout all professions” (I.i.109-10), and towards the 
play’s end he declares: “I’m sick of all professions” (IV.ii.98). 
 
                                                 
8 “Trial by Theater: Jonson, Marston, and Dekker in the Court of Parnasus,” in Solon and Thespis: Law 
and Theater in the English Renaissance, ed. Dennis Kezar (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2007), 20-1. 
9 Prest, The Rise of the Barristers, 184. 
10 Supra, 79-83. 
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 I challenged the authoritative view that John Day’s play Law Tricks contains 
no legal matter, since the whole play turns on the legal matter of a bought-divorce.11 
Day participates in the elusive and antithetical discursive practice which had become 
fashionable in educated circles by the early years of the seventeenth century.12
 I followed the chapters on The Phoenix and Law Tricks with one that makes 
reference to those and other, non-dramatic literature in connection with the subject of 
early modern wife-sale. The significance of this chapter is that it points to an 
affirmative representation of the law that is more complex than the “bad-lawyer / 
good-law” topos. I argue that, since divorce was in effect impossible for all but the 
very wealthy, emphasis on quasi-legal formality shows respect and desire for the 
organizing principles of the law. Consequently, representations of wife-sale 
demonstrate a specific, affirmative response to law that goes beyond the lip-service 
paid to the general “good law” topos. Broader significance rests in the collecting 
together of Elizabethan and Jacobean literary allusions to wife-selling, which are 
capable of being interpreted to suggest that wife-selling was not quite so rare in the 
early modern period as has hitherto been thought. 
 This 
accounts for some ostensibly meaningless, gratuitous, and incorrect legal usages in 
the play. I suggest these have meaning or at least purpose. For example, where Lurdo 
uses the term habeas corpus incorrectly, it is not a matter of Day being ill-informed, 
but a characterization of an unqualified legal-figure, resembling the amateur quasi-
lawyers from whom the young members of the Inns of Court had recently begun to 
distance themselves. Day’s play performs them a service by representing negatively 
Lurdo’s wrongly assumed legal know-how. 
                                                 
11 Gibbons, Jacobean City Comedy, 112. 
12 Supra, 42, 47. 
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Recognizing the clear distinction Barry makes between the Inns of Court and 
the Inns of Chancery is the key significance of the chapter on Ram Alley. The negative 
representation of the Inns of Chancery in the play serves to emphasize the positive 
representation of the Inns of Court. The significance is heightened by the fact that the 
most clearly negative representation of the Inns of Chancery – “Were the Rogue a 
Lawyer, but he is none,” and so on (II.i.296) – is uttered by a servant. By implication, 
it was not only those within legal circles, or even the more well-to-do members of 
society, who were aware of the diminution of the professional and educational role of 
the Inns of Chancery: ordinary people became aware of the change. There is no 
allusion in the play to the 1590 ruling of Broughton vs. Prince,13
The chapter on Michaelmas Term contradicts the idea that the play has little to 
say about the law.
 but a clear premium 
is placed on a full Inns of Court education. The chapter contributes to the central 
significance of the thesis in recognizing that the negative representation of the 
ostensible lawyer-figure is in fact a representation of an unqualified, quasi-lawyer, a 
figure towards which the members of the Inns of Court had an antipathy. 
14
                                                 
13 Supra, 191, 193. The decision made call to the bar of an Inn of Court the required qualification for 
rights of audience before the superior common law courts. 
 I argue that it is possible to find a dramatic conflict between, on 
one hand, generic convention and, on the other, a hugely important and 
contemporarily well-known legal precedent. This puts an ironic slant on the interface 
of law and social privilege: Quomodo is made the loser in the play, but it may be left 
to the audience of the day to see that he should not be. In law, the judgment in the 
play’s final scene is inconsistent with the 1602 decision on contractual promises in 
Slade’s Case. In dramatic terms, Quomodo may appear, then and now, a more 
14 Supra, 213-14. 
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interesting, more likeable character than young gentleman Easy.15
 
 Social degree does 
win at the end of the play, but, I suggest, only because dramatic convention demands 
it, and the tone and dialogue of the scene invite an audience to question the 
assumptions of the generic demand. The significance of this is that it allows an 
audience to question the genre’s conventionally assumed political sympathies. 
 
8.3 Limitations 
 
In this section, I comment on four limitations. I begin with evidence of audience 
composition; I go on to comment on three areas touched on but not given fresh 
attention: plague, primogeniture, and documentary evidence of wife-sale. 
 I have attempted to provide a sense of the contemporary lawyers in the 
different Inns of Court, who may therefore be considered potential members of the 
audience for city comedy. I referred, for example, to the case of Christopher Merrick 
and Robert Pye of the Inner Temple, whose real-life story involved something of the 
high risk and trickery (and the punitive judgment) of a city comedy plot.16 I referred, 
as well, to such as John Greene of Lincoln’s Inn, whose short diary entries relating to 
playgoing are the best we have to go on in terms of connecting particular Inns men 
with the private theatres with which city comedy is mostly associated.17
                                                 
15 See Levin, supra, 220.  
 The plays 
themselves contain evidence that the Inns of Court men formed a significant element 
of the audience for the plays. For example, Jonson appeals in the Induction to 
Bartholomew Fair to “my witty young masters o’ the Inns o’ Court” (34-5). But I 
16 Supra, 15-16, and Appendix 1, 250-4. 
17 Supra, 36. 
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acknowledge the lack of detailed evidence of audience composition for city comedy, 
and the lack of detailed contemporary accounts of early modern audience responses.18
 Paul Slack’s 1990 work The Impact of Plague in Tudor and Stuart England is 
a comprehensive, some would say definitive, study on that subject. I refer only briefly 
to the plague in the thesis.
 
Lack of detailed evidence in these areas must be acknowledged to be a limitation, 
since a broad selection of detailed accounts of Inns of Court men’s own responses to 
the plays might serve to confirm or reject the thesis. This is, in any event, a limitation 
shared by all studies of city comedy. 
19 I feel it is a limitation of any study of city comedy to 
make only brief mention of the impact of plague on the genre, in particular on the 
subject and function of comedy. At the same time, that is a significantly broader topic 
than the one on which I have chosen to concentrate. As such, I believe it was 
appropriate to restrict my mention of it to only a few pages. Since the impact of 
plague is such a large topic, it might be asked why I bother to mention it all when my 
concern is specifically representations of lawyers and law. As I point out, it is worth 
bearing in mind that anxiety about the mortality rate must have had an effect on the 
ideas of the student members of the Inns of Court about the years of study and 
training necessary to becoming a successful lawyer. I mentioned, too, that the 
description in a contemporary text of Jonson as “a pestilent fellow” provides an 
example of how an apparent insult can turn out to be, at once, a recommendation and 
a description of the type of wit developed in the genre of city comedy.20
                                                 
18 Supra, 44-5. 
 
19 Supra, 62-5. 
20 Supra, 65. 
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 There is perhaps a limitation in not having given the matter of primogeniture 
more coverage, attaching to the interpretation relating to legal education. Griswold’s 
analysis – that an Inns of Court education became in part a replacement for the course 
of entering the monasteries for younger sons21 – provides an interesting indication of 
increasing secularization in early modern England. Not only for the obvious point: the 
monasteries represented religion, whereas the Inns, despite the faith of their members, 
strictly did not. The dual point here is that the members of the Inns possessed, in 
arguable degree, an antipathy to the civilians, who were sometimes denigrated as 
“popish.”22
 There is a limitation to my suggestion that wife-sale was more common in the 
early modern period than surviving evidence shows. This conclusion is based only on 
the basis of literary representations of the practice. This is an example of the problem 
articulated by Jonathan Rose in connection with accepting some of the conclusions of 
interdisciplinary studies of law and literature: literature is, first, fiction, and, second, 
indirect evidence.
 So, broadly speaking in this connection, Catholicism changes from the 
former pursuit of younger sons to the justification for antipathy against legal rivals. 
There is an element of affirmative and negative representation here, so, in that sense, 
it is a limitation of the thesis that I do not say more about it. But this is more a 
sociological point than one driven by representation in the plays themselves, so, for 
this reason, I chose not to follow this line of enquiry. 
23
                                                 
21 Renaissance Revivals, 245 n. 78. 
 My thesis acknowledges – in fact, it rests on – the idea that 
Jacobean comedy is not to be taken as a straightforward attempt to document reality: I 
examined in the introduction some extended implications of the idea Jonson puts 
22 Supra, 19, 22. 
23 Supra, 66. 
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forward in Every Man Out of His Humour of opposing a mirror to the time’s 
deformity.24 But where direct evidence is lacking – as is the case with early modern 
wife-sale – even if the fictional, indirect evidence of literature has to hold less weight 
than factual, direct evidence, it still holds some value. It shows at the very least that 
people were thinking about the practice, and that begs the question why? I offer an 
interpretation on that line of enquiry. There is dispute between the factual, directly 
evidenced studies on wife-sale, in any event.25 And my proposal is consistent with at 
least one authoritative historian’s conjecture, that wife-selling in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries was at least as likely to be a survival as a novelty.26
 
 Christopher 
Hill’s point is that, in spite of the scarcity of surviving early modern evidence, the 
apparent explosion in the frequency of wife-selling in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries is as likely to mean that earlier cases were not discovered, prosecuted, or 
documented (or that evidence was simply lost or destroyed), as that the practice 
simply suddenly increased in frequency. 
8.4 Further work 
 
The evidence relating to lawyers being part of the audience for plays in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries concerns mainly the amphitheatres. The 
desire to know more about early modern audience composition is implicit in Gurr’s 
leading study.27
                                                 
24 Supra, 40-2. 
 Gurr makes an important distinction in connection with contemporary 
25 Cf. Menefee and Thompson; supra, 172 n. 22. 
26 175 n. 33 for the Christopher Hill reference. 
27 For evidence of lawyers being part of theatre audiences, see Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s 
London, 3rd ed., 77, 79-82. 
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evidence suggesting that a full range of society was present at plays: such descriptions 
come “from around the 1590s,” he says, when only the amphitheatres are open.28 It 
seems worth pointing out another distinction when discussing evidence relating to 
audience members from the Inns of Court, though. Inns of Court students were 
regular playgoers from the start, says Gurr, and he cites two instances of disorder and 
affray involving Inns of Court students at the amphitheatres, from 1580 and 1581.29 
Gurr suggests that this hostility must have had a social origin, and he observes that 
affrays grew less over the next twenty years,30
I noted in chapter six that little is said about the Inns of Chancery in literary 
commentaries.
 but no particular reason is proposed for 
the change in conduct. This may reflect the drive to increased professionalism by the 
members of the Inns of Court, and the eviction of the attorneys to the Inns of 
Chancery. These developments occurred after the dates about which Gurr writes. It 
would be desirable to know more about the lawyer-contingent in the audience for any 
plays from the period, but hard to find as we know this is, the perspective of changing 
conduct of Inns of Court members in the last years of the sixteenth century and the 
first years of the seventeenth, when the important changes involving the Inns of 
Chancery began to be made, might prove a useful, narrower perspective for further 
work in literary studies. 
31 The main reason for this has to be that legal historians admit to 
knowing less about the Inns of Chancery than they do about the Inns of Court.32
                                                 
28 Ibid., 79. 
 The 
29 Ibid., 80-1. 
30 Ibid., 81. 
31 Supra, 184-5. 
32 Richardson says the number of the Inns of Chancery is almost as hard to establish as their origin: A 
History of the Inns of Court, 5. Brooks observes that establishing membership of the Inns of Chancery 
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desire to know more about the Inns of Chancery is already implicit in studies of legal 
history, therefore. In the context of literary studies, there is a less acknowledged 
shortage of attention to the Inns of Chancery as distinct from the Inns of Court. In my 
chapter on Ram Alley, I examine the importance of the contemporary decision to 
segregate barristers and attorneys, and how this impacted on the educational role of 
the Inns of Chancery. The Inns of Chancery continued, becoming, in effect, social 
clubs and boarding societies, but after 1827 they could justly be described as a legal 
anachronism.33
                                                                                                                                            
is especially difficult: more so than with the Inns of Court: “The Common Lawyers in England,” 46-7. 
Prest says there is no way of telling how many prospective barristers between 1590 and 1640 took the 
“highly traditional course” of being placed in an Inn of Chancery before acting as clerks in the office of 
a prothonotary of the common pleas: The Rise of the Barristers, 113. 
 The Inns of Chancery have a long and greatly varying history, then – 
one deserving their own dedicated examination in literature. 
33 The Inns’ struggle for survival saw them invaded by non-legal members, and the establishment of the 
Law Society removed any excuse for their continued existence in a legal context. The Law Society was 
established in 1827, and incorporated in 1831; the Judicature Act of 1873 provided that the “attorney” 
would in name and function be subsumed by the “solicitor.” On the demolition of the Inns of Chancery, 
see Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 7. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Report of the case of Mericke v. Pie, A.D. 1602 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Camera Stellata, coram Consilio ibidem, Mercurij, 5 Maij, 1602, annoque 
Elizabethæ Reginæ 44.1
 
 
 
Coke, Queen’s Attorney, informed on the relation of Christofer Merrike of the Inner 
Temple, utter barrister, against Robert Pye, defendant, of the Inner Temple, also utter 
barrister, for practice as to the life, lands, and goods of the said Cristofer Merrike, for 
perjury touching the execution of this, and for other misdemeanours, as follows, 
namely: – 
 Merrike, – Feb. 1601, at the request of Pie, delivered to him 3li. for a week; 
Pie did not repay this within three months, after Merrike had often demanded and sent 
for it, and at last threatened the arrest of Pie. Whereupon Pie, on – July, carried 56s. to 
Merrike’s chamber in the Inner Temple, and offered payment of this; Merrike said 
that he had lent 3li., and without acquittance, and therefore he would not deliver any 
acquittance. Pie replied that 4s. was to be abated for a wager, touching a case, that 
Merrike had lost to Pie, because Pie averred that when an infant enters upon the 
twenty first year he is of full age, Merrike upon the contrary [said] that not before he 
had accomplished the twenty one years fully, days and hours. Whereupon Pie refused 
to pay the 56s., and Merrike with violence took the money and Pie’s ink-horn [? 
galiere], and beat him. Whereupon Pie indicted Merrike at Newgate, and gave 
instructions to one Grove, the clerk there, to fashion the indictment . . . 
                                                 
1 Hawarde, Les Reports del Cases in Camera Stellata, 1593-1609, 133; A Calendar of the Inner Temple 
Records, i, 473-6. 
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 Pie himself was sworn to the indictment and gave the evidence at the Grand 
Inquest [i.e. to the Grand Jury] that it was on the Queen’s highway, and that he [? 
Merrike] took to flight; whereupon a true bill was found. The Recorder, John Crooke 
seeing the indictment and knowing the parties, demanded of the Grand Inquest who 
gave evidence, and what evidence he gave; they answered as above. Whereupon the 
Recorder conferred at the bar with Pie, and said that this could not be either robbery 
or felony, and therefore advised him to be careful how he proceeded. The next day Pie 
was enjoined to proceed to the indictment; Merrike, then present, was arraigned. Pie, 
confidently and impudently, gave the same evidence, whereupon he was committed to 
the sheriff and bound to appear in this Court the next term. The same night after the 
indictment, Pie went to the Court at Grenewige and there acquainted Ferdinando, 
servant and musician in the Privy Chamber, that one of good estate had committed 
felony and had forfeited his goods and lands, and demanded his letters to divers of the 
bench to have a gracious hearing by the Queen; whereupon [Ferdinando] wrote a 
letter to Sir Robert Wrothe and others, and so [the case] went to trial; and on the 
arraignment, Merrike was acquitted by the same jury as indicted him on the Grand 
Inquest. Then the Benchers of the Inner Temple examined this, and put Pie out of 
Commons, and referred him to the next Parliament; and they suspended Merrike in 
Commons for a time of forbearance, but in a short time restored him. But at the next 
Parliament they examined the matter at large, and put Pie out of the House [i.e. the 
Inner Temple], and degraded him from the Bar and from all practice: and in the same 
vacation the Queen’s Attorney and the Recorder took Pie’s examination in writing, 
when he confessed all, and subscribed his hand: and thereupon the Attorney in 
Michaelmas Term next following informed ore tenus on this confession against Pie, 
when Pie denied it to be his hand, and said it was not rightly [dumente] taken, and 
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prayed to have the benefit of the law, [25] Edw. III., cap. [4] quod nullus liber homo 
imprisonetur sans judgmente, and that he should not be condemned before bill and 
answer: Whereupon it was ordered by the Court that the Attorney should inform at 
once, because now Parliament is sitting [continue] and a pardon is expected, but if this 
cause be not heard before the pardon, the Lord Keeper would have care that this 
[case] should be excepted from the pardon if the bill was pending before the pardon: 
Phillips was assigned as Counsel with Pie, but when he saw Pie’s answer, he moved 
for and obtained an order for his discharge: Pie was committed the the Fleete, and 
there remained until the sentence of the cause was heard. Pie did not submit himself, 
but in substance confessed all in his answer, and did not excuse himself in a 
reasonable or sensible word, but audaciously and impudently scandalized with 
imputations not only the Attorney, the Recorder and Merrike, but all the Judges and 
Justices, without any colour of cause. And he examined no witnesses, but Merrike 
examined Grove and three of the Grand Jurors and those witnesses which Pie said he 
had for himself and for the Queen, and they all deposed plainly and directly against 
Pie. To which he answered nothing, but only [said], “God knows the truth of all, and 
they may as well depose any thing [else] against me as this; for may I be hanged, and 
my neck cut off . . . if this be true.” And at last he craved the benefit of the Statute of 
20 Edward I., De defensione juris, that no one should be admitted to sue before he has 
found surety to answer the issues and damages, etc. And thus he would take away the 
jurisdiction of this Court (as in the former Statute that he vouched), the authority of 
the Queen, which is present here, of her Council, of all original writs, and of all 
Justice. Then he craved the consideration of the Court inasmuch as the bill and the 
offences in it were not particular, and he was not charged with committing them 
contrary to the statutes and laws of this realm. But this notwithstanding [the bill] was 
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held good by the Court and these exceptions [were considered] frivolous, Pie having 
superficial knowledge or taste of this, but not intellect. 
 Merrike was commended by the Attorney as a good student and of as good 
conversation as any in the Temple: But Pie falsely scandalized him for coveting and 
beggaring his brothers, taking forfeitures, suing men without cause and otherwise 
cruel and extorting ‘courses’ in general without cause or colour: And [Pie] also 
imputed falsely that the Recorder had taken 10li. From Merrike for a fee before the 
commencement of this suit, and as to this he vouched Serjeant Woodde, who cleared 
the Recorder of this imputation, and said of Merrike that he had intermeddled with Pie 
honestly, pitifully and conscionably. 
Pie’s offence was condemned by the whole Court to be horrible and odious, 
and the offence of robbery, murder and perjury against God; . . . And Pie had intended 
murder and robbery in his heart, which is an offence before God: And the offence is 
more odious and detestable in this, that he has made Justice a murderer and robber. 
 Pie was sentenced to a fine of 1,000 marks, pillory at Westminster and there to 
lose one ear, papers, from [Westminster] Hall to ride with his face to the horse’s tail 
to ‘Temple Gate,’ and there to be pilloried and to lose the other ear, and perpetual 
imprisonment. As for Merrike, he was acquitted with great favour and grace, and 
delivered from all imputation of ‘intemperancye’ or ‘heate.’ And since they were both 
professors of law, [the Court] exhorted them that have authority to admit to the bar, to 
have care to name those that were literate, honest and religious, and in the admittance 
of such to the House [Inn], for if they had had [such care], they would never have 
admitted Pie to the House, but he would have pursued his father’s trade, who was a 
butcher; and they should not have calls by the dozens or scores, as now is the use: For 
the good and literate professors of the law are as good members of the 
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Commonwealth as any others, but the ignorant and bad professors of the law are as 
‘daungerouse vermin’ to the Commonwealth as ‘Caterpillers,’ etc. 
 
 
Postscript 
 
 
The supercilious allusion to Pye’s being the son of a butcher appears to be mistaken. 
If the appendix to Hawarde’s reports and the list of Admissions to the Inner Temple 
are to be believed,2 Pye was the second son of Sir William Pye of Mynde Park, 
Hereford.3
 
 According to the Inner Temple records, he did not suffer the perpetual 
imprisonment handed down in Star Chamber, managing against incredible odds to 
build a successful after-career: 
[Robert Pye] was auditor of the Exchequer under King James I. and Charles I., was 
knighted in 1622, and defended his residence, Faringdon House, Berks., on behalf of 
the King against the Parliament in 1645-46. He was M.P. for Bath, 1620-24; for 
Ludgershall, 1625; for Westminster, 1625-26; for Grampound, 1627-28; for 
Woodstock, 1640; and for Berkshire, 1654 and 1658-59. He died in 1662. Of 
Christopher Merricke nothing is known except that he was “from Southwark.”4
                                                 
2 Les Reports del Cases in Camera Stellata, 410; “Admissions to the Inner Temple to 1659.” 
 
3 A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records, i, xcii 
4 Ibid. 
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Appendix 2 
Plays performed at the Inns of Court, 1500-1615 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Each of the Inns of Court presented dramatic performances at regular intervals at 
different times in their histories, but exact details of the number of presentations and 
the titles of many cannot be known.1
 
 This is a short, selective list of plays performed 
at the different Inns up to the period covered by this thesis, including a few key titles. 
(i) Gray’s Inn 
1 Lord Governance and Lady Publike-Wele. Title applied to 
a political satire by John Roo of Gray’s Inn. 
Christmas 1526 
2 The Supposes. Translation by Gray’s Inn man George 
Gascoigne of Ludovico Ariosto’s Suppositi. 
1566 
3 Jocasta. Translation by Gray’s Inn men George Gascoigne 
and Francis Kinwelmershe of Lodovico Dolce’s Giocasta. 
Christopher Yelverton of Gray’s Inn wrote the Epilogue. 
1566 
4 Jonson’s Catiline performed for Lord Burghley. 16 January 1588 
5 The Misfortunes of Arthur. By Thomas Hughes of Gray’s 
Inn. Performed at Greenwich for the Queen. 
22 February 1588 
6 The Comedy of Errors. Possibly the first production of 
Shakespeare’s play.2
December 1594 
 
 
                                                 
1 Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 243, n. 120; list informed: ibid., 211-44, 401-4. 
2 Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, eds., Complete Works of William Shakespeare (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1999), 257. 
 256 
(ii) Inner Temple 
1 Gorboduc. By Thomas Norton and Thomas Sackville of 
the Inner Temple. A later edition written by John Day in 
1570-1 (n.d.) is titled Ferrex and Porrex. 
6 January 1562 
2 Gismonde of Salerne in Love. Principally by Inner Temple 
man Robert Wilmot; assisted by Henry Noel, Christopher 
Hatton, Rod. Stafford, and other Inner Temple men. 
Rewritten in blank verse in 1592 as Tancred and Gismund. 
1568 
3 Lady Amity? A “show” mentioned by Francis Beaumont 
(admitted to the Inner Temple in November 1600). 
One Christmas 
1600-1605 
4 Oxford Tragedy (possibly A Yorkshire Tragedy). 2 February 1608 
 
It is not known whether the 1556 Love and Life (a lost play written by William 
Baldwin for performance by students of the Inns) was actually performed.3
 
 
(iii) Lincoln’s Inn 
1 Unknown play. 2 February 1500 
2 The Play of Love. Interlude by John Heywood. Christmas 1529? 
3 Unidentified play performed by the boys of the royal 
chapel; perhaps Richard Edwardes’ Damon and Pithias. 
2 February 1565 
4 Unidentified play performed by the boys of the royal 
chapel. 
2 February 1566 
                                                 
3 Albert Feuillerat, Documents Relating to the Revels at Court in the Time of King Edward VI and 
Queen Mary (Louvain, 1914), 215-17; cited by Richardson, A History of the Inns of Court, 240 n. 108. 
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5 Unknown play presented by the players of Sir Richard 
Rich. 
2 February 1570 
6 Unidentified comedy presented by the boys of the royal 
chapel; directed by Richard Farrant. 
Christmas 1580 
 
 
(iv) Middle Temple 
1 Marston’s Histriomastix. Possibly part of the Middle 
Temple revels of 1598-99. 
About 1599 
2 Twelfth Night, or What you Will. Noted in Middle Templar 
John Manningham’s Diary.4
2 February 1602 
 
3 The Fleire. By Middle Templar Edward Sharpham. 1607-1610 
4 The Bridegroom and the Madman. Author not known. 2 February 1613 
5 Unidentified play. 2 February 1615 
 
                                                 
4 Diary of John Manningham, of the Middle Temple, 1602-1603, ed. John Bruce (London, 1868), 18; 
entry dated 2 February 1602. 
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Appendix 3 
STC numbers and location of early modern books 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Extended titles are stated in shortened form. Full titles are stated in the Bibliography. 
 
Book Location STC 
system no. 
STC 
citation no. 
Barry, Lording. Ram-Alley or Merrie-
Trickes. London, 1611. 
British 
Library 
006172634 S100951 
Burnet, Gilbert. The Life and Death of Sir 
Matthew Hale, Kt. London, 1682. 
British 
Library 
006122078 R215370 
Coke, Sir Edward. A Booke of Entries. 
London, 1614. 
British 
Library 
006193114 S121747 
Cowell, John. The Interpreter. Cambridge, 
1607. 
British 
Library 
006180652 S108959 
Croke, George. Reports. London, 1661. British 
Library 
006098296 R31318 
Cupper, William. Certaine Sermons. London, 
1592. 
British 
Library 
006187774 S116429 
Dalton, Michael. The Countrey Justice. 
London, 1618. 
British 
Library 
006178983 S107267 
Dekker, Thomas. The Seuen deadly Sinnes of 
London. London, 1606. 
British 
Library 
006176972 S105270 
Finch, Henry. Law or a Discourse Thereof in 
Foure Bookes. London, 1627. 
British 
Library 
006193414 S122048 
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Fletcher, John. Wit without Money. London, 
1639. 
British 
Library 
006172892 S101208 
Fraunce, Abraham. The Lawiers Logike. 
London, 1588. 
British 
Library 
006174317 S102621 
Fulbeck, William. A Direction or 
Preparative to the study of the Lawe. 
London, 1600. 
British 
Library 
006174454 S102759 
Gibbon, Charles. The Praise of a good Name. 
The reproach of an ill Name. London, 1594. 
British 
Library 
006185220 S113889 
Hake, Edward. Newes out of Powles 
Churchyarde. London, 1579. 
British 
Library 
006177850 S106141 
Jenner, David. The Prerogative of 
Primogeniture. London, 1685. 
British 
Library 
006084010 R17940 
Jonson, Ben. Workes (vol. 2). London: 1641. British 
Library 
006183169 S111824 
The Just Lawyer. London, 1631. British 
Library 
006180078 S108388 
Lambarde, William. Eirenarcha. London, 
1581. 
British 
Library 
006181015 S109320 
Langbaine, Gerard. An Account of the 
English Dramatick Poets. Oxford, 1691. 
British 
Library 
006086954 R20685 
Lenton, Francis. Characterismi. London, 
1631. 
British 
Library 
006181089 S109394 
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March, John. Actions for Slaunder. London, 
1647. 
 
Copy used. 
Trinity 
College, 
Cambridge 
006096346 R29500 
British 
Library 
Integrated Catalogue 
system no. 002376289 
–––. Reports: or, New Cases. London: 1648. British 
Library 
006103052 R6440 
Martin, William. Historie, and Lives of the 
Kings of England. London, 1615. 
British 
Library 
006185591 S114259 
Mulcaster, Richard. Positions wherein . . . . 
London, 1581. 
British 
Library 
006185585 S114253 
Perkins, John. Profitable Booke. London, 
1597. 
British 
Library 
006185616 S114284 
Petowe, Henry. Londoners their 
Entertainment in the Countrie. London, 
1604. 
Bodleian 
Library, 
Oxford 
006184021 S112686 
Powell, Thomas. The Art of Thriving. 
London, 1635. 
 
 
 
Copy used. 
College of 
Cardiff, 
University 
College of 
Wales 
006186323 S114990 
British 
Library 
Integrated Catalogue 
system no. 002974004 
–––. Tom of All Trades. London, 1631. British 
Library 
006186325 S114992 
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The Practick Part of the Law Shewing the 
Office of an Attorney And a Guide for 
Solicitors. London, 1681. 
British 
Library 
006154218 R184827 
Pricket, Robert. Lord Coke, His Speech and 
Charge. London, 1607. 
British 
Library 
006180145 S108454 
Prynne, William. Histrio-Mastix. London, 
1633. 
British 
Library 
006186652 S115316 
Reports of Certain Cases. By John Godbolt. 
London, 1652. 
British 
Library 
006090879 R24389 
Rolle, Henry. Un Abridgement des Plusieurs 
Cases. London, 1668. 
British 
Library 
006135084 R353288 
S. S., The Honest Lawyer, London, 1616. British 
Library 
006187679 S116335 
Sheppard, William. Epitome. London, 1656. British 
Library 
006076431 R10939 
Stow, John. A Survey of London. London, 
1603. 
British 
Library 
006189243 S117889 
Stow, John, and Edmond Howes. The 
Annales or Generall Chronicle of England, 
London, 1614. 
British 
Library 
006188950 S117596 
Wheeler, John. A Treatise of Commerce. 
Middelburgh, 1601. 
British 
Library 
006191103 S119735 
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